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ABSTRACT 
The relationship between music and emotion is complex, and has defied 
explanation for a great many years. The present study addressed one particular 
aspect of this issue: to what extent can young children interpret the emotions 
expressed in short musical excerpts drawn from larger works, and how do their 
interpretations differ from tho_se of adults and change as they mature? 
Following an appraisal of current theoretical approaches and empirical 
research, a ~tructural model of emotions incorporating the ideas of fuzzy, 
prototypically organised emotion concepts based on underlying dimensions of 
degree of pleasure and arousal or activation (Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1986; 
Russell, 1989) was used to reveal and interpret patterns and developmental 
trends in children's understanding of emotion in music. 5-year-old, 7-year-
old and 9-year-old children and adults (n = 30 in each age group) participated 
in the main study. They were asked to link 18 musical excerpts to an emotion 
word/facial expression pair selected from the following alternatives: calm, 
happy, excited, scared, angry/cross and sad. These were presented to the 
subjects in a set of three tasks utilising different combinations of musical 
excerpts and emotion words. 
The results revealed three main trends in the development of children's 
interpretation of emotion. Firstly, even preschool children used emotion terms 
Vl 
quite systematically to refer to musical excerpts. These judgments were linked 
to formal structural/acoustic elements of the musical excerpts, but did not 
show any consistent relationship with a variety of personal and experiential 
characteristics of the listener. Secondly, inter- and intra-individual 
consistency in the labelling of excerpts increased with age. Thirdly, 
agreement among individuals was found to vary according to the emotion 
being expressed, and certain emotion words were systematically 'confused' 
with each other. 
These developmental trends are discussed in terms of narrowing emotion 
categories and a corresponding stabilising of category boundaries between 
emotion states similar in degree of activation and, to a slightly lesser extent, 
pleasure or displeasure. Together with changes in the understanding of one or 
two particular concepts and in the base rates for using certain emotion labels, 
this decreasing fuzziness of emotion concepts is proposed to account in large 
part for the developmental advances that have been observed in children's 
interpretation of emotion in music. 
vu 
INTRODUCTION 
Why was it necessary with the old silent movies to hire a pianist to bang out a 
crudely appropriate musical background? Why must the movies and TV have 
musical scores? ... Why, when I first saw the Grand Canyon and the Piazza San 
Marco and the Alps, did I feel that these things had all been more moving in 
cinerama? Why? Because both God and Man forgot to put in the music. 
(Brown, 1981, p.240) 
At least since the days of Plato and Aristotle, two intriguing questions have continued to 
perplex scholars of human thought and behaviour. The first of these concerns the nature 
and functions of music in human experience. The second concerns the nature and 
functions of emotion. 
According to ethnomusicologists music is, and has been, a part of every known culture. 
Although musical forms and styles vary from one society to another, making and 
listening to music appear to be fundamental, universal human activities (Blacking, 1987). 
Children begin singing as soon as they gain sufficient control over their voice to talk 
(Dowling & Harwood, 1986; Gardner, 1983). And thanks to the availability of 
electronically reproduced music, the average twentieth century child typically grows up 
being exposed to a wide range of musical styles in a great diversity of contexts. Most 
households possess a radio, television, and/or tape-playing equipment, and music is 
commonly heard in shops, churches, schools, restaurants and discotheques as well as in 
more formal settings such as concert halls. As Merriam (1964, in Radocy & Boyle, 
1979) points out, there is probably no other human cultural activity which is so 
ubiquitous and which reaches into so much of human behaviour. 
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Yet in spite of its pervasiveness, music is something of an enigma. Not only are its 
origins unknown, but it is unclear why it has remained so important in human experience. 
Music - a phenomenon defined by Sessions as "controlled movement of sou~d in time" 
(quoted in Gardner, 1983, p.105) - has no clear adaptive value and is not essential for 
biological survival. Why, then, is it so difficult to imagine a world without it? What is 
music for? 
This question has puzzled some of history's greatest scholars including Aristotle and 
Darwin, and is unlikely to have a simple answer. A brief consideration of music's 
functions, however - in public and religious ceremonies, education and therapy, 
commercial settings, film and television, consumer marketing and advertising - as well as 
its many informal uses by. individuals in our society - suggests that music's ubiquity may 
be due at least in part to its capacity to heighten our emotional life. The idea that the arts 
have a special relation to feeling is apparently pervasive in all cultures (Storr, 1992), and 
there is little doubt that music can arouse strong emotions in people and influence their 
mood and behavioural state. Furthermore, music is often argued to be able to express, 
display or represent emotions in all their complexity, and for some it is the capacity of 
music to communicate ranges and nuances of affect that cannot be expressed verbally 
which accounts for its chief value (Gaston, 1968; Langer, 1951; Osborne, 1982). It has 
been claimed that aesthetic education is the education of feeling in quality, depth and 
breadth (Reimer, 1989) and that music can be particularly useful in breaking down the 
psychological isolation of individuals diagnosed as autistic (Rosenfeld, 1985), as well as 
for putting ordinary people in touch with feelings from which they have become 
alienated (Sloboda, 1985). 
Explaining the links between music and emotion therefore appears to be one of the most 
important and fascinating tasks facing those interested in the psychology of music. This 
is particularly the case given the current renaissance of interest in emotion within 
contemporary psychology. After neglecting the study of emotions for many years, 
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psychologists have gradually come.to accept that they are complex and important 
phenomena which suffuse everything we are and do: an understanding of emotion is 
therefore a vital component of our understanding of ourselves and others. In fact, 
Wellman, Harris, Banerjee and Sinclair (1995) have argued that developing an 
understanding of emotion is an integral and crucial part of the child's emergence into the 
social-psychological world - a contention supported by recent studies which demonstrate 
a relationship between children's understanding of emotion and their positive perception 
of their early school social experiences, their popularity, and their moral sensibility 
(Dunn, 1995; Manstead, 1995). 
Why, then, has an explanation of music's emotional expressiveness and import been 
largely lacking in the work of music psychologists to date? One possible reason is that 
despite the current resurgence of interest in emotions, they continue to defy explanation: 
there is not even general agreement about what an emotion is. Another possible reason 
for the paucity of scientific work on music and emotion is that musical meaning is 
grounded at least in part in long-standing culti.rral conventions and deeply rooted beliefs 
about the nature and functions of art. Because our responses to music partly reflect 
deeply embedded and unconscious assumptions about the way the world is, questions 
about it are difficult to pose and to resolve (Frances, 1958/1988). Yet as Berlyne (1972) 
argues, the same nervous system is used for both aesthetic and other activities, so that if 
there seems to be an inexplicable gap between aesthetic behaviour and other behaviour, 
this points to limitations in our understanding of how the nervous system works in non-
aesthetic contexts. Deepening our understanding of the meaning, effects and appeal of 
music must therefore have much to tell us about human nature in general. And other 
areas of psychology must have much to tell us about the nature of music. 
What, then, can people's interpretation of emotion in music tell us about their 
understanding of emotion in other contexts? And what can our knowledge of their 
understanding of emotion contribute to our understanding of music? Until now, research 
on emotions and studies of musical expression have tended to progress independently. 
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The aim of this dissertation is to draw these two separate threads together in attempting to 
address one particular issue: how children's understanding of emotion in music develops 
as they mature. Can young children reliably identify happy music, sad music, calm 
music, and so on? How does their knowledge compare with that of adults? And to what 
extent is their recognition of emotion in music dependent on, or influenced by, their 
~ ' 
experience with different musical styles and genres, their ability to perceive various 
structural features of music, and/or their understanding of emotions and emotional life 
more generally? These are just some of the questions that will be considered in the 
following chapters. 
The first four chapters of this thesis provide a general review of the theoretical and 
research literature concerning people's understanding of emotional expression in music, 
and examine the current state of knowledge regarding how this understanding develops. 
Chapter 1 begins by introducing the main philosophical approaches to the question of 
emotional 'meaning' in music, and proceeds to examine the contribution of empirical 
research to answering the question of whether music conveys emotions in ways that can 
be reliably recognised by listeners. 
Chapter 2 takes a step back, as it were, to consider the question of what we actually mean 
by the term 'emotion': what is the nature of the phenomenon that music is supposedly 
expressing? A brief discussion of the opacity of the term 'emotion' as it is typically used 
in psychological theory and research is followed by an outline of the primary theoretical . 
approaches that underlie much of the work in this field. Two contrasting interpretations 
of emotion, the biosocial or psychoevolutionary perspective and the social constructionist 
approach are summarised, and their limitations for informing our understanding of 
emotional expression in music are discussed. This is followed by an argument in favour 
of shifting the focus of research away from studying emotion states to focusing on 
emotion concepts, and an alternative theoretical approach describing emotion concepts as 
fuzzy categories organised around prototypical scripts and based on underlying bipolar 
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dimensions of degree of pleasure and degree of activation or arousal (Russell, 1980, 
1991 b) is presented. The chapter ends with an exploration of the potential of such an 
approach to clarify our understanding of emotional expression in music. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the role that musical and listener characteristics play in contributing 
towards music's emotional meaning. The chapter begins with a summary of the 
empirical literature concerning the relationship between the formal, structural elements of 
music and the emotions that are perceived as being expressed, and goes on to consider the 
strengths and weaknesses of a variety of theories of musical expressiveness in accounting 
for these findings. The question of the effects of personal and experiential characteristics 
of the listener on the perception of these elements is then introduced. 
The suggestion that certain skills or knowledge might be required in order to interpret the 
emotions expressed in music is developed further in chapter 4, which explores the 
following question: when do children first become able to interpret emotions in music, 
and do their interpretations become more reliable with age? Evidence concerning 
developmental trends in the perception of emotion in music are considere? within the 
perspective of current knowledge about children's understanding of musical elements as 
well as their knowledge of emotions. The limited utility of traditional theories for 
explaining these findings is discussed, and an alternative model of emotional 
development incorporating the idea of decreasing breadth and fuzziness of emotion 
categories (Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1986; Russell & Bullock 1985, 1986) is explored. 
Despite having some limitations, this model has illuminated many of psychologists' 
observations about children's interpretation of emotion words and facial expressions, and 
it will be used as a framework for the empirical part of the dissertation. 
Chapter 5 describes the rationale and method of a research project based on this model, 
which attempts to fill in some of the gaps in our understanding of the development of 
children's interpretation of emotion in music. The results of this investigation are 
presented in chapter 6, and discussed in chapter 7. The final chapter summarises the 
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main conclusions drawn from the theoretical review and empirical work, and considers 
their potential implications for the use and importance of music in contemporary society. 
There can be few more puzzling questions fating psychologists than that of the 
relationship between music and emotion, and it is easy to dismiss it as inexplicable by 
rational means and an unsuitable topic for scientific study. Ifwe do so, however, we are 
. inevitably limiting our understanding of human psychology. The anthropologist Levi-
Strauss (in Gardner, 1983) is by no means alone in claiming that a failure to take music 
seriously weakens any account of the human condition, and the same can be said of 
emotion. This study represents an exploratory attempt to link music psychology with a 
broader theory of emotional development, with the aim of contributing to a greater 
understanding of human cognition and affect. It is believed that such an approach is 
necessary in order to begin to synthesise many unrelated bits and pieces of data into a 
coherent framework- a framework which will benefit the research community, and from 
which it will be possible to draw in order for music psychology to make a more positive 
contribution towards applied areas as well. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
DOES MUSIC EXPRESS EMOTION? 
The relationship between music and emotion is complex. Music has long been 
recognised as a powerful generator and moderator of emotions, although the feelings 
that it evokes may be difficult to describe, let alone to account for. But music is also 
inextricably linked with emotion in another way. Not only do listeners often have 
emotional reactions to music, but music can also express emotions in ways that can be 
recognised by listeners: 
It seems both an unaccountable, and yet, to date, irrefutable fact that one of the 
correct and most pervasive ways to describe pure music - that is, music 
without text, title, or program - is in terms of the 'garden-variety' emotions: 
anger, hope, sadness, happiness, and others of that general kind. (Kivy, 1989, 
p.153) 
Here we are faced with what may be the most perplexing characteristic of music from 
a psychological point of view. In physical terms, music is merely a combination of 
sounds of different pitches, timbres, durations,·and so on. Why do we attribute 
emotional.sigruficance to these sounds? And when we interpret music in emotional 
terms, are we hearing what the composer intended to express, or are we interpreting 
the meaning of the notes in the light of our own background and experiences? Do 
others hear those notes as we do, or as the composer did? Does the music mean the 
same thing to everybody? 
There are, in fact, those who deny that music can be correctly described in emotional 
terms. Professional composers themselves have debated whether or not music can be 
expressive, contradicting each other and occasionally themselves in their attempts to 
deal with the issue of musical meaning. Whether music does express emotion is 
clearly a huge and complicated question; nevertheless, it is a question which has 
captured the interest of aestheticians and philosophers as well as a few psychologists, 
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and some of the most influential views and findings that they have produced will be 
outlined below. 
1.1. Philosophical Theories 
The traditional approach to examining the question of expression and meaning in 
music is speculative or philosophical. While many divergent views have been 
offered, aesthetic theories concerning the association of meaning with music have 
traditionally been grouped into two main theoretical positions. The essential debate 
between these two positions centres around whether the meaning of music is primarily 
intellectual or primarily emotional. 
The expressionists, on the one hand, argue that meaning in music is chiefly emotional. 
Emotion is in some way embedded in the music, and in perception of the music we 
perceive the embodied feeling. In its simplest form, expressionism holds that the 
composer is expressing his or her own personal, specific (and perhaps especially deep 
and insightful) emotions in his or her music; these are transmitted to the audience by 
a performer who acts as the composer's mouthpiece (Budd, 1989). This view has a 
long and involved history, and is implicit in attempts to 'explain' a piece of music's 
mood in terms of the contemporaneous tragic or joyful events in the life of the 
composer. It has often been criticised, however, as it implies that music is merely a 
vehicle for self-expression. In addition, it suggests that a composition cannot be sad, 
for instance, unless its composer was sad at the time and intended to express that 
sadness (Barwell, 1986). And as Langer (1942) argues, how could a composer 
possibly feel all those emotions a musical work may seem to express? 
There is a more sophisticated version of the expressionist thesis, however, which 
argues not that music expresses the emotions of the composer or performer, but rather 
that music in some way represents, displays, expresses or symbolises 'universal' 
human emotions as understood by the individual composer (Callen, 1982). In other 
words, the music expresses the composer's knowledge of human emotions, not how or 
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when that knowledge was acquired. According to this view, music's most valuable 
and significant feature is its ability to express ranges and nuances of feeling that could 
be expressed only inadequately, if at all, through verbal means, and which would 
otherwise remain outside the listener's experience (see, for example, Gaston, 1968 
and Merriam, 1964 in Radocy & Boyle, 1979). 
In opposition to the expressionists, the formalists deny that emotions are the subject 
matter that music is intended to represent. They argue that meaning in music is 
primarily intellectual, based on the perception, understanding and appreciation of the 
formal structural relationships contained within a musical composition (Budd, 1985; 
Hargreaves, 1986). Thus, musical works have no meaning outside themselves, and an 
understanding and appreciation of music requires no familiarity with human emotions, 
or anything from life outside of music (Bell, 1914 in Reimer, 1989). 
One of the most forceful proponents of this view is Eduard Hanslick (1891/1986), a 
Viennese music critic of the late nineteenth century. Perhaps as a reaction against the 
romanticised, emotionalised interpretations of artworks which abounded at that time, 
as well as the corresponding belief that 'good' music is music that expresses socially 
desirable emotions, Hanslick denied that music is capable of representing a specific 
feeling or emotional state. He argued thatdefinite emotions such as hope, sadness and 
love involve, and are distinguished from one another by, concepts, judgments, 
thoughts, and a historical content which music cannot represent. Music may, he 
argues, embody the motion or dynamics ·of feeling, but it cannot depict the feeling 
itself: "Music can, in fact, whisper, rage, and rustle. But love and anger occur only 
within our hearts" (Hanslick, 1891/1986, p.9). The formalists do not claim that 
people are incapable of hearing emotion in music, and at times even describe music in 
emotional terms themselves. However, they argue that this is not the way music 
ought to be appreciated: emotion terms cannot be used to describe music in a way 
that is purely musical, and hence are irrelevant to the composition's meaning and 
significance. 
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In between these two extremes lies the position taken by Susanne Langer (1942). 
Like the expressionists, Langer argues that the function of musical works is to 
symbolise feelings or emotions, but she agrees with Hanslick that it is the dynamic 
form, rather than the specific and complete content, of emotion that music represents. 
Music symbolises the morphology of feelings, the 'shells' of emotive life, things like 
tension and release, acceleration and retardation, continuity and sudden change, rather 
than specific, verbalizable emotions such as yearning or gaiety. Because different 
emotions sometimes share common dynamic forms, this explains why musical 
expression is ambiguous, as well as why music can express the nature of feelings in a 
way that language cannot: "Because the forms of feeling are much more congruent 
with musical forms than with the forms oflanguage, music can reveal the nature of 
feelings with a detail and truth that language cannot approach." (Langer, 1942, p. 191) 
There are many contemporary variations on and developments of the three classical 
viewpoints outlined above. To some extent, these arguments are based on a particular 
understanding and use of certain terms such as 'represent', 'symbolise' and 'express', 
the meanings of which are debatable. When this is taken into account, it appears that 
the various viewpoints are not in fact as different as they might at first seem. 
Hanslick ( 1891 /1986), for example, claims that to represent "is to produce a clear and 
distinct content, to put it before our very eyes" (p.14 ). Scruton ( 1993) argues that if 
music is to represent emotions, it must tell a story about them which is capable of 
being translated into another medium, while Kivy (1989) adds that if music is a 
representation of certain emotions, the composer must consciously have intended his 
or her music to portray these emotions, which is often not the case. This conception 
of representation is central to the formalist argument: Hanslick does not deny that 
music can symbolise or resemble emotions, in the sense that a relationship between 
the two is established in our imaginative interpretations of music; his main point, 
however, is that emotion is not a characteristic of the music itself. Nevertheless, 
others have argued that conventional denotation is not the only possible kind of 
meaning, and that simply because music does not articulate emotions in the way that 
literature does - because it is difficult to say what a piece of music means - one does 
not need to go to the extreme of denying that music can be expressive (see, for 
10 
example, Langer, 1942). We do, however, need to explain what we mean when we say 
that music expresses emotion. Kivy (1989), for example, argues that music is not an 
expression of emotion, for the word implies that an inner state is being manifested 
externally. However, music expresses emotion in the sense that it resembles 
expressive behaviour: music is 'sad', for example, in the same way that a St 
Bernard's face is 'sad'; it possesses expressive properties, but not expressive content. 
Of course, the differences between conflicting viewpoints are more than just 
terminological. However, some writers have argued that the dispute between 
formalists and expressionists is in fact nonsensical: all music offers both formal 
structure and the possibility of semantic and expressive interpretations, and the 
affective and intellectual responses to music cannot really be separated. According to 
this view, confusion and controversy arise only because different scholars - due to 
their disposition or training - are focusing on different aspects of the same experience 
(Frances, 1958/1988; Storr, 1992). The musicologist L.B. Meyer, for instance, has 
argued that there are two types of meaning in music: embodied meaning and 
designative meaning. Designative meaning is that which refers outside the music to 
non-musical objects and events. Embodied meaning, in contrast, is the meaning that a 
musical passage has for a listener in terms of its own structure and the interaction of 
that structure with the listener's musical knowledge and expectatfons, based on past 
experiences with music of the given style (1956, 1973 in Slaboda, 1985). Thus 
although some music has quite explicit designative (extra-musical) meaning, this 
designative meaning does not exhaust its significance - the music will still 'make 
sense' even if this reference is not appreciated by a listener. On the other hand, no 
music contains only embodied meaning, for its elements will always possess 
connotations derived from the musical culture (Cazden, 1951 in Farnsworth, 1969). 
Looked at from this perspective, the formalists' and expressionists' views are 
complementary rather than contradictory. Why, then, the continuing - and often 
heated - debate? Perhaps part of the answer lies in the fact that these philosophical 
positions are concerned not only with the meaning of music as such, but also with its 
value, beauty and importance. Questions of musical meaning inevitably overlap with 
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some of the fundamental and perplexing issues touched on in the introduction to this 
dissertation: What is the essence of music? Why does it exist? What is the nature 
and value of the experience of perceiving and understanding a musical work? 
Although the philosophical approach has not given us any clear answers to these 
questions, several contemporary theorists agree that it no longer seems plausible to 
define music as essentially an art of emotional expression. Budd (1989) points out 
that a great deal of fine music does not appear to express emotion and resists any 
attempt to impose an emotional meaning upon it1• There is little support for claims 
that the highest function of music as an art is the expression of emotion, or that music 
has some kind of special mission with regard to emotional expression over and above 
the other arts (Kivy, 1989). Nor is the emotive description of music the only correct 
and illuminating way of describing it: it is possible to understand a musical 
composition without reference to any emotional terms - without reference, in fact, to 
any verbal terms at all - and any explanation of music's value and meaning should not 
separate it from the medium of music itself (Brown, 1981; Budd, 1989). 
But while music should not be seen merely as a vehicle for the expression and 
communication of psychological states, that it is capable of expressing emotion is still 
· thought to be an important aspect of music. People who care about music want to 
communicate their experiences to others, and while emotive descriptions of music are 
not the only way of talking about it, they are without a doubt one of the most 
common. And although centuries of philosophical debate have not resolved the 
question of whether it is correct to describe music in emotional terms, lay people and 
musicians alike apparently find it quite natural to talk about music using words such 
as 'happy', 'nostalgic' or 'sad', and continue to do so. The nextsection, therefore, 
will bypass these great abstract issues and go instead right to the level of the everyday 
language that people use to communicate about music. 
1 An extreme example is serial music, where the music's 'grammar' - it's embodied meaning -
becomes virtually all-important (Budd, 1989). 
12 
1.2. Empirical Findings 
While the traditional philosophical approach has made a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of musical meaning, it is limited by a lack of objectivity. 
Approximately fifty years ago, however, psychologists began to take a more 
scientific approach to the question of whether music can really communicate 
emotions. Do people agree on the emotions expressed by different kinds of music? 
And are such emotions pronounced to the extent that it is possible to translate them 
into such discrete terms as hope, joy and anger? 
Empirical work in music psychology is notoriously difficult due to the problems 
involved in controlling conditions. Studies of musical expression are often 
characterised by a lack of consistency and clarity in the selection and use of musical 
stimuli, particularly when it 1comes to determining what emotions a musical work 
'really' expresses. Some researchers have selected existing compositions and used 
program notes, autobiographies, personal documents, letters and so on to determine 
the intentions of composers to convey certain emotions. Others have used the 
judgments of musical experts, of the experimenters themselves, or of a panel of 
judges; still others have selected instrumental versions of vocal music based on the 
emotional meaning of the words. Alternative approaches have been to use original 
works incorporating specific musical elements that experimental research has 
suggested convey particular emotions, or to make use of improvisations. In addition, 
the teclmiques used to measure listeners' understanding of the music vary and provide 
different degrees of guidance: while the primary approach used by researchers 
requires listeners to associate verbal responses to music, methods range from the use 
of adjective checklists through semantic differentials to non-verbal judgments of 
synonymy. 
In spite of these methodological inconsistencies, however, there is considerable 
agreement among studies that listeners drawn from roughly the same subculture show 
widespread consistency in their characterisation of the emotional content of Western 
tonal music, even if they are not highly knowledgeable about the specific kinds of 
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music in question, and even if the excerpts are taken out of the context of a larger 
composition and therefore presumably express incomplete musical ideas. 
In a pioneering study, Hevner (1936) presented 52 college students with five pieces 
of music of widely differing character, although all drawn from classical music in the 
Western tonal tradition and played either by a solo piano or orchestra. She asked 
them to respond by checking all the adjectives from a list of 66 which they.found 
appropriate to describe each piece. Hevner then developed an 'adjective circle' 
grouping these adjectives into eight clusters, each cluster containing adjectives with 
similar meanings and emotional connotations. For example, merry, joyous and gay 
fell into one cluster; dreamy, yielding and tender into another. The groups were 
arranged in such a way that as one progressed around the circle the mood similarity 
· would decrease steadily until the opposite cluster was reached; from there back to the 
starting cluster the resemblance would increase again. Hevner' s results revealed a 
general consistency among subjects in the adjectives checked for all but one of the 
musical selections. Farnsworth (1969) subsequently updated Hevner's procedures 
using factor analysis. He revised Hevner's list, including only fifty of the original 
adjectives and rearranging them into ten adjective clusters reported to possess more 
mood consistency. 
Although these techniques seem fairly valid and reliable, they have not given rise to a 
great deal of subsequent research. Nevertheless, several researchers have found that 
subjects tend to agree with each other, with the intentions of the composer or 
performer, or with the opinions of experts, at above-chance levels when they are asked 
to link excerpts of classical music with an emotion chosen from a list of between 
three and thirty adjectives (Campbell, 1942; Hampton, 1945; Meerum Terwogt & van 
Grinsven, 1991; Thompson & Robitaille, 1992), to choose between a pair of 
alternative labels for different excerpts (Scherer, 1979), to describe musical excerpts 
on semantic differential scales (Edmonston, 1966), or tci judge the similarity of 
emotions expressed by different musical excerpts (Brown, 1981)2• Agreement 
2 Only studies in which subjects were specifically asked to identify the emotions expressed in or 
conveyed by the music were included in this review. Although studies in which subjects are asked 
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. between listeners does vary depending on the selection played, and is typically highest 
for selections which can be characterised as program music. However, the ability to 
recognise emotions in music does not depend on the ability to identify a particular 
composition or place it in a context (Hampton, 1945). Music may not, however, be 
able to expres~ all emotions, or to express every emotion equally well. Mull (1949) 
and Lowry (1974, in Haack, 1980) focused on humour in music, and found that music 
can express humour in ways that can be reliably recognised by listeners. Hampton 
(1945) found that emotional expressions characterised by an unpleasant feeling tone 
\ 
were better identified than emotional expressions characterised by a pleasant feeling 
tone, and that emotional expressions characterised by what he referred to as a "mental 
attitude" (such as determination, triumph or defiance) were easier to identify in 
musical compositions than were the "purely emotional" expressions. Campbell 
(1942), on the other hand, found that while college students agreed with each other 
consistently in identifying the emotions of joy, gaiety and assertion in music, there 
was less agreement for the emotions of yearning, calmness, sorrow and tenderness. 
More recently, Meerum Terwogt and van Grinsven (1991) and Scherer and Oshinsky 
(1977) found that happiness and sadness were easier to recognise in music than fear 
and anger. 
These findings are not necessarily universal. Most of the above studies have been 
conducted with college students, and the extent to which they can be generalised will 
only be established by further studies investigating other populations and using a 
methodological rigour sometimes lacking in the early work. The generalizability of 
the above findings may also be limited to certain musical genres. Not only are the 
vast majority of studies in this field rooted in the tradition of Western (mainly 
European) tonal music, but they have tended to deal almost exclusively with serious 
'art' music, which is of interest to only a minority of people. Folk and popular music 
and music from other traditions has been largely neglected, as have musical sound 
"How does the music make you feel?" have often been included in reviews of the literature on music's 
emotional expressiveness (see, for example, Radocy & Boyle, 1979), this approach was felt to be 
problematic: while the emotions expressed by music may be the same as those invoked in the listener, 
this is by no means always the case. 
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sources, styles, and forms (e.g. electronic music) which have developed since most of 
the basic work was done in this area. 
Another qualification of these findings is that these studies are answering the question 
of whether music can communicate emotions, not whether it typically does 
communicate emotional meaning or information. We do not know whether the 
listeners in the studies mentioned above, responding spontaneously, would have 
classified the music in terms of emotional categories. There is, in fact, some doubt as 
to the efficacy of words in gauging such a complex emotional experience as music 
presents. Frances (1958/1988) points out that the significations of music, as perceived 
by individual listeners, do not necessarily have verbal equivalents. Thus, there is not 
always a possibility of translation. Verbal labels can describe the shifting emotional 
nuances expressed by music only in a crude and approximate fashion, and it may in 
fact be impossible to express in words much of what we experience and recognise in 
music. To quote Imberty (1975, cited in Dowling & Harwood, 1986, p.207): "It is 
exactly the meaning that when explicated in words gets lost among the verbal 
significations - too precise and too literal - and gets betrayed." As Tighe and Dowling 
(1993) point out, our knowledge of musical meaning is procedural, rather than 
declarative. Just as we perceive an angry face directly and do not have to think about 
or verbalise what emotion the face is expressing, so we perceive meaningful, 
interpreted musical events, and normally do not have to cogitate about or express in 
words the emotional meaning we perceive in the music. 
Nevertheless, although words could not describe music to someone who has never 
heard it, they are necessary if we are to be able to discuss and converse about it. And 
the empirical evidence does suggest that people find it quite easy and natural to attach 
general emotional labels to pieces of music when they are asked to do so, and that 
they are quite consistent in their descriptions of music's emotional character. Of 
course; results indicating that at least some music does possess emotional 
expressiveness for at least some listeners tell us little more than is already provided by 
common sense. What these findings do not tell us is what it actually means to say that 
we hear a certain emotion in a particular musical work. What is the nature of the 
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experience of hearing a sequence of inanimate sounds as being expressive of an 
emotion? 
Any attempt to answer this question has, in fact, to consider several related issues. 
The first of these centres around the meaning of the term 'emotion'. When we say 
that music expresses emotion, what is the nature of the phenomenon that is 
supposedly being expressed? Secondly, if music does express emotion, how does it 
do so? And thirdly, what characteristics does a listener need to possess in order to be 
able to perceive or understand this expression? These questions will be the focus of 
the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER2: 
WHAT ARE EMOTIONS? TRADITIONAL 
THEORIES AND A NEW APPROACH 
Underlying the arguments of formalists such as Hanslick is the implicit belief that 
linking music to emotion somehow demeans music. This belief can be explained in 
part by a long-standing notion in Western society that emotions are simple, 
involuntary, disorganised and non-cognitive phenomena which we are seized by, 
suffer or undergo. 'Emotion' is a fairly new word which first appeared in English and 
French around the end of the sixteenth century. It replaced the 'passions', those wild, 
potentially dangerous aspects of human psychology that threaten to corrupt human 
reason - the faculty that differentiates us from the animals - and to disrupt behaviour, 
and which continually need to be controlled and suppressed (Crespo, 1986; Lyons, 
1992). According to this traditional view, emotion is a lower function than thought, 
' 
and it is considered with distrust and contempt. 
Contemporary psychology has, however, brought us to the realisation that emotion 
and thought are not absolutely distinct domains, but are inextricably linked. 
Furthermore, it is now recognised that emotions are complex and important 
phenomena which play a central role in individual experience and interpersonal 
relations; in fact, it is difficult to conceive of human life without emotion. As Bullock 
and Russell (1986) argue, the ability to function effectively in the social world, to 
interpret each other's actions and transient affective states and guide our behaviour 
accordingly, is dependent on knowing how to detect and distinguish between different 
emotions, what the causes and consequences of particular emotions typically are, what 
the temporal sequence of emotional reactions can be, how to control the experience 
and expression of emotions, and so on. As Izard (1991) points out, emotions are so 
important to human existence that it is hard to believe that their scientific study 
remained outside the mainstream of psychology for more than a century. Indeed, it is 
only in the last decade or two that we have seen a resurgence of interest in emotions. 
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In this time, however, the study of emotions has become one of psychology's most 
rapidly growing areas, attracting a great deal of attention and interest from 
investigators in clinical, developmental, personality, physiological and social 
psychology. 
Perhaps partly as a consequence of the earlier devaluation and disparagement of 
emotions, however, the meaning of the term 'emotion' is opaque and ambiguous, and 
some of the confusion and controversy in discussions of music's expressiveness seem 
to stem from its vague and inconsistent use. While everyone believes that they know 
what such words as anger, fear, and happiness mean, no one has yet found a 
commonly acceptable definition· for emotion. Some writers define it as a feeling, 
others as a cognitive state or type of judgment, others as a physiological response, a 
brain state, or a set of behaviours, and still others as a social process (Beckwith, 1991; 
Izard, 1991). While illustrations can be found to support each definition, each can 
also be met with criticisms and counterexamples. 
Consequently, many psychologists believe that attempts to define emotions in strictly 
cognitive, strictly behavioural, strictly physiological or strictly social terms are 
automatically inadequate because emotions are multidimensional constructs that 
. include all these and other components (Brody, 1985; Fehr & Russell, 1984). Thus 
for Izard (1991), "an emotion is a complex phenomenon having neural, motor-
expressive, and experiential components" (p.54). As Fehr and Russell (1984) argue, 
however, such a definition is so broad that almost any psychological process would 
qualify as·an emotion, and Izard himself has admitted its inadequacy. Fehr and 
Russell observe that many writers less inclined towards philosophical argument have 
therefore simply ignored the problem, presumably considering emotion to be a self-
evident concept which needs no definition. But this leaves unanswered important 
questions such as which words in the English language actually refer to emotions. 
Bullock and Russell (1986) point out that most people will probably agree that anger, 
happiness and fear are emotions, but what of admiration, courage and loneliness? 
How many emotions are there? What is an adequate operational definitiOn of 
emotion? Are facial, vocal and gestural behaviours all alternative measures of the 
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same construct? If an infant smiles or frowns, can we conclude that he or she is happy 
or angry? And can we legitimately talk about emotions in our pet dogs, in fish, in 
insects or - to return to the particular focus of this thesis - in abstract stimuli like 
music and the visual arts? 
Underlying many of these questions is the issue of whether emotions are primarily 
biological or cultural in nature. Or, to put it slightly differently (cf. Wierzbicka, 
l 992a), do emotion terms provide labels for emotions that already have an 
independent existence, or do they contribute to the construction of emotions 
themselves by creating certain assumptions, norms and expectations which may 
influence the interpretation of emotional experience, guide behaviour, and shape 
interpersonal relationships? 
2.1. Theories of emotion: Psychoevolution versus social constructionism 
The biosocial or psychoev+olutionary interpretation of emotions has a long history, 
and is clearly expressed in Darwin's (1904) theory of emotions as common to animals 
and humans, based on primitive states of physiological arousal, automatically 
triggered, and manifested in innate and universal behavioural responses and 
expressions. According to this perspective, emotions have organising and 
motivational properties that serve adaptive functions, and evolved in order to promote 
the chances for survival of the individual and the species. 
Theorists who support the biosocial position typically take a theoretical perspective 
which argues that there is a set of discrete, fundamental and universal human 
emotions. These fundamental or basic emotions are thought to comprise specific 
neural substrates, distinct, automatic patterns of physiological expression and 
particular phenomenological experiences which are innately linked. They are usually 
assumed to correspond to basic emotion terms of the English language such as joy or 
jealousy (e.g. Ekman, 1993; Izard, 1991; Plutchik, 1962). Today, 7 ± 2 basic 
emotions are most often listed: anger, fear, happiness/joy/enjoyment, sadness, and 
disgust, with surprise, contempt, shame or shyness and interest sometimes added. 
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According to this discrete-emotions model, all emotion words other than the basic 7 ± 
2 can be defined in terms of the fundamental emotions. Either they are seen as 
'blends' of these emotions (e.g. Plutchik, 1962), or they are seen as subdivisions of or 
variations on these basic emotions which are grouped together in 'emotion families' 
of related states (Ekman, 1993). Cognitive and sociocultural processes may play a 
role in determining the intensity of emotions, in distinguishing the different members 
of emotion families, or in determining what will trigger an emotion, as well as in 
providing 'display rules' which determine how and whether an emotion will be 
expressed. However, these processes are seen as peripheral to the essence of emotion. 
In contrast to the psychoevolutionary emphasis on a universal set of biologically-
based emotions, the social constructionists argue that emotions are "the internal 
representation of social norms or rules" (Averill, 1986, p.100). In other words, 
emotions are learnt, culturally variable patterns of behaviour which express a 
particular culture's conception of what is appropriate behaviour in a specific, socially· 
defined situation (Griffiths, 1989). According to this view, there are no natural, fixed 
and non-arbitrary units of emotion called things like 'happiness' which objectively 
exist as separate categories of experience. Rather, 'emotion' itself is a socially 
constructed concept, and instead of forming coherent bundles, any pattern of 
physiological changes, subjective experience, expressive reactions and behaviours is 
as likely to occur as any other (Bullock & Russell, 1986): no single component or 
subset of components represents a necessary or sufficient condition for any emotion. 
While some of these component responses, for example certain expressive reactions, 
may have a biological basis, the way in which these components are organised into 
coherent sets of responses is culture-bound and determined primarily by social 
interaction rather than biological evolution (Averill, 1986; Gordon, 1989). 
Evidence can be found for both of the positions discussed above. However, 
differences in theoretical position on this issue are reflected in clear differences in 
methodological strategy, and the data presented by each does tend to focus on 
different topics and only rarely to overlap .. The biological theorists, for example, cite 
evidence that certain facial (and to some extent vocal and gestural) expressions of 
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emotions are cross-culturally recognised: in other words, the percentage of judges 
selecting the intended emotion term from a list of alternatives in labelling a particular 
emotional expression is significantly greater than chance, and greater than some 
higher arbitrary level (usually 70%), across all cultures. They have also presented 
evidence of cross-cultural agreement about which facial expressions fit different 
social situations such as the death of a child, a fight, or seeing friends (Campos & 
Barrett, 1984; Ekman, 1993; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman et al., 1987; Matsumoto, 
1992; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Van Bezooijen, Otto & Heenan, 1983). The social 
constructionists, on the other hand, argue that agreement about the meaning of facial 
expressions using a forced choice procedure implies cross-cultural similarity, but not 
necessarily cross-cultural equivalence, in the interpretations given to these 
expressions, and point out the less than perfect agreement among people in the labels 
given to faces, particularly in cultures speaking languages that are not of Indo-
European origin. As evidence for their alternative view, they refer to studies showing 
that even some of the most important (and supposedly fundamental) English emotion 
words have no equivalent in some languages. Polish, for instance, does not have a 
word corresponding exactly to the English word 'disgust' (Hiatt, 1978, reported in 
Russell, 199la). And many emotions that some cultures would regard as equally 
fundamental are either omitted from lists of basic emotions in English, or have no 
equivalent in that language (Kagan, 1984; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Russell, 1989, 
1991 a; Wierzbicka, 1986, l 992b). 
Ifwe look at the evidence more objectively, however, it becomes clear that it does not 
support either approach to the exclusion of the other. Reviews by Mesquita and Frijda 
(1992) and Russell (l 99la) suggest that there are both cross-cultural differences and 
cross-cultural similarities in the various subcomponents of emotion, and that 
similarities in cine aspect (for instance, cognitive appraisal) do not necessarily imply 
similarities in other aspects (such as behavioural expressions). Therefore while the 
biological and constructionist views appear to be diametrically opposed and are 
usually considered to be rivals, some theorists have argued that viewing emotion from 
only one side of the debate narrows our understanding of the concept, and that these 
two approaches need to be integrated rather than set in opposition to one another (e.g. 
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Harris, 1989; Lutz & White, 1986). Epstein (1984) and Griffiths (1989) have both 
attempted to do this by arguing that different emotions may in fact be different types 
of psychological phenomena. Epstein, for instance, poses a distinction between 
primary and secondary emotions, where primary emotions such as sadness or fear are 
biologically determined and adaptive patterns of physiological arousal, feeling states 
and expressive reactions, and secondary emotions such as jealousy are culturally 
determined syndromes that have no characteristic elements of physiological arousal, 
feeling states or expressive reactions. He points out, however, that this distinction is 
theoretically useful rather than practically useful: in everyday life the distinction 
between primary and secondary emotions becomes blurred because the primary 
emotions have often been shaped by learning to the extent that they are functionally 
indistinguishable from secondary emotions. Such theories have the potential to prove 
enlightening, but they need to be further developed before they can offer a thorough 
and succinct explanation of emotions. 
The next question that needs to be asked is what these debates contribute to our 
understanding of emotions as expressed in music. The answer seems to be very little, 
apart from raising questions about whether what is communicated in music are 
phenomena characterised by a distinctive universal signal and for which there exists a. 
correct label such as 'happy' or 'sad', or whether music expresses an undifferentiated 
emotional domain which we divide up and interpret according to certain assumptions, 
norms, expectations and verbal labels provided by our culture. Although cross-
cultural research on the emotional meaning of music is virtually non-existent, an early 
study by Gundlach (1932) does suggest that although there are similarities in the way 
in which different cultures express and interpret emotions in music there are, not 
surprisingly, also marked differences. 
2.2. A new approach: Studying emotion concepts 
If questions about what exactly emotions are had to be clearly answered before we 
could investigate emotions in music, research in this field would probably never 
progress very far. A more useful approach, however, has been provided by those 
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psychologists who have recently begun to shift their attention away from emotion 
states to focus on emotion concepts. Rather than asking questions such as what 
emotions exist or what the nature of the phenomenon that is labelled by terms such as 
'anger' is, they are concerned with investigating how people use emotion terms within 
the perspective of ordinary language to refer to people, situations, and so on (see, for 
exan1ple, Bullock & Russell, 1986; Fehr & Russell, 1984; Harre, 1986; Lutz & 
White, 1986; Russell, 1989, 1991a; Storm & Storm, 1987; Wierzbicka, 1992a, 
1992b). 
Gowin (1970, in Reimer, 1987, p.80) describes a concept as 
a sign which points to a commonality in events and which permits the concept 
user to make relatively stable responses to those varied events. The signs 
which are vehicles for the concept are largely linguistic and conventional. The 
commonality in events may range from simple similarities to regularities to 
law-like invariance. 
A concept therefore has three essential features. Firstly, it requires a phenomenon that 
is manifested more than once: a common feature, or set of features, of a range of 
events. Secondly, it needs a linguistic or conventional sign, symbol, name or marker 
of some sort which indicates the common feature(s) being noticed. The third thing 
needed for a concept to exist is that this symbol should be regularly and stably 
associated with the phenomenon to which it refers, even though the phenomenon 
exists in various forms incorporating a range of common qualities. Thus according to 
this definition, emotion concepts such as love or anger comprise words which 
categorise a number of experiences or phenomena which are somewhat related to each 
other. 
People's emotion concepts undoubtedly reflect the underlying emotion domain - their 
emotion experiences - to some extent at least. However, they also reflect the implicit, 
unexamined common-sense assumptions of a particular culture (including its 
scientists and philosophers), linguistic factors such as the language's history, and 
practical issues involved in the need to communicate about emotions (Wierzbicka, 
1986). Leaving aside, for now, the question of how, or to what extent, emotion 
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concepts contribute to the construction of our experiences and social realities, it can 
be argued that human emotion (as a basic psychological reality or experience) and 
human emotion concepts do not necessarily have a one-to-one correspondence. The 
relationships between categories and phenomena are unclear and multiple, and the fact 
that a particular language does not have a word for a certain emotion does not tell us 
that the speakers of this language cannot perceive that emotion as a distinct, 
recognisable feeling or experience, or that they cannot talk about it. What it does 
suggest, however, is that this culture does not recognise the emotion in question as 
particularly salient (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Wierzbicka, 1986, 1992a). 
According to this view, everyday emotion concepts are worthy of study in their own 
right. Thus the ambiguity of the term 'emotion' is not a problem, but rather a data 
base on which to found an investigation of the different and changing ways in which 
emotion terms are used in everyday life. No formal definition of emotion is required 
because, in a sense, the definition of emotion, and of particular emotion states by 
people in a particular society, is the variable under study (Crespo, 1986; Masters & 
Carlson, 1984). So from this perspective, rather than trying to find out what 'it' is that 
is communicated by happy music, we should be concerned with the way in which 
people use emotion terms such as happiness, yearning, and so on to categorise and 
label music. We can probably never determine whether a piece of music is really sad, 
but we can ask on what basis the word 'sad' is used by people in contemporary 
society to refer to music and, in turn, what this use tells us about their conceptions of 
and assumptions about sadness (as well as about music). 
2.2.1. Prototypes and fuzzy categories 
One consequence of the shift of attention from emotion events to emotion concepts is 
that some researchers have begun to question our ideas about how emotion concepts 
can be defined. According to Bullock and Russell (1984), it has traditionally been 
assumed that natural language concepts about everyday events can be defined in the 
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same way that logically defined concepts or 'proper sets' are: as clear, 
nonoverlapping entities whose membership is defined in terms of a set of necessary 
and sufficient features. Every item possessing these criteria} attributes therefore has a 
full and equal degree of membership in the category (Rosch, 1975). Gradually, 
however, this classical or Aristotelian view of concepts has begun to be challenged as 
evidence has been accumulated to show that many natural language concepts or 
categories such as vegetable, vehicle or furniture lack clearly defining or criteria} 
features. The same problem apparently applies to the concept of emotion: nobody has 
I 
yet been able to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the term. 
Consequently, Fehr and Russell {1984) argue that we need to look for an alternative 
way of defining emotion concepts, and suggest Rosch's (1975, 1977) prototype theory 
as the most likely candidate. Rosch's categorisation of natural language categories, 
which develops an idea initially suggested by Wittgenstein (1953, in McCloskey & 
Glucksberg, 1978) has already been very useful for reconceptualising psychological 
concepts like intelligence, mental illness and specific diagnostic categories (Fehr & 
Russell, 1984). Although it is not the only alternative to classical definitions of 
emotion concepts, Rosch's theory has helped to explain the difficulties psychologists 
have experienced in defining emotion, suggested new directions for research, and 
revealed interesting properties of emotion concepts previously overlooked. In 
particular, it has provided a framework for understanding how each emotion word 
categorises a huge realm of possibilities of subjective experience which nevertheless 
have something in common. 
According to Rosch's theory, systems or taxonomies can be viewed as both vertically 
and horizontally organised. Firstly, category systems are vertically organised within 
an abstract-to-concrete hierarchy, typically involving three main levels: the 
superordinate (furniture, or emotion); the basic (chair, or anger), and the subordinate . 
(kitchen chair, or annoyance). The basic or middle-level categories (usually 
represented by the shortest words) are those that people use for much of their 
everyday conversation and thought, because they offer the best compromise between 
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informativeness and cognitive economy or simplicity' (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & 
O'Connor, 1987). 
More importantly for our purposes, however, Rosch's (1975) prototype theory 
proposes that each of these levels is also horizontally organised. This horizontal 
organisation has two main (related) features: firstly, natural language categories have . 
··an internal structure, or hierarchy of inclusion, and secondly, natural language 
categories have/uzzy boundaries. Russell (1989) explains the meaning of these 
features as follows: (1) Membership in natural language categories is organised 
around typical or characteristic members known as prototypes (the clearest cases or 
best examples). (2) Membership within a category is a matter of degree rather than all 
or none, based on family resemblance to the prototype. Good members have many 
attributes in common with the prototype, while poor members have less psychological 
similarity to the prototype. (3) Borders between categories are vague, rather than 
clear-cut, and categories tend to overlap each other (in ways that vary in kind and 
number) rather than to be mutually exclusive. Some categories overlap each other 
completely, others to a high degree, others to a minimal degree, and some not at all. 
(4) Although some items clearly belong in one category, others are difficult to 
categorise and are inconsistently said to be or not be exemplars of overlapping 
concepts. 
Evidence that the superordinate (English) concept of emotion has an internal structure 
(i.e. that membership in the concept is a matter of degree rather than all or none) and 
fuzzy boundaries (i.e. that no sharp boundary separates members from nonmembers 
such as states of mind, moods, affective disorders and bodily sensations) has come 
from several converging sources in a set of studies by Bullock and Russell ( 1986), 
Fehr and Russell (1984), Fehr, Russell and Ward (1982), Russell (1980; 1983), and 
Shaver et al. (1987). For instance, these studies have shown that although subjects 
have difficulty giving an explicit rule-like definition for emotion, they are able to 
1 The term 'basic' as it is used here has a slightly different meaning to that given it by the biosocial 
theorist~, who might argue that some basic (i.e. middle-level) emotion concepts are more basic (i.e. 
fundamental) than others. 
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make reliable judgments about whether particular words represent good or poor 
members of the category. Limited cross-cultural support for a prototype analysis of 
the concepts most closely resembling emotion in other languages has also been 
obtained by Smith and Tkel-Sbal (1995) and Smith and Smith (1995). 
In addition, evidence has been provided to suggest that basic or middle-level emotion 
words themselves, such as anger and happiness, can be thought of as labels for fuzzy · 
sets with an internal structure. In other words, it is argued that a term such as 'anger' 
can he defined as a category lacking sharp boundaries into which actual occurrences 
of various emotional states fit more or less well, and which overlaps with other 
categories such as disgust and sadness. For example, Russell and Bullock (1986) 
examined how adults categorise the message conveyed by emotional facial 
expressions, and found that some expressions were prototypical examples while 
others were intermediate or poor examples. There were also borderline cases in which 
subjects could not decide whether particular facial expressions were or were not 
members of a particular category. 
As Fehr and Russell (1984) point out, however, this evidence should not be 
interpreted to imply that prototype analyses of everyday concepts are better than 
. . 
classical definitions, nor that classical definitions have no role to play in the study of 
emotions. It may be that for each emotion there is a correct word to describe it, but 
that people simply have less than perfect knowledge about the criteria for perfect 
membership (see, for example, Wierzbicka, 1992a). McCloskey and Glucksberg 
(1978) have made the point, however, that if we are concerned not with developing a 
technical taxonomy for emotion terms but rather with determining people's 
representations of emotion categories as currently used in everyday life, our focus 
needs to be not whether classical definitions of emotion are possible, but rather 
whether people act as if they are clearly defined. And the existing data seem to 
indicate that they do not. 
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2.2.2. Emotion scripts 
If emotion categories are organised around prototypes, we need to ask what the nature 
of those prototypes is. One view which is gaining increasing acceptance is that the 
concept expressed by an emotion word is a script or paradigm scenario (De Sousa in 
Beckwith, 1991; Fehr & Russell, 1984; Lewis, 1989; Russell, 1989, 1991a; Shaver et 
·al., 1989; Wierzbicka, 1992a). According to this position, an emotion is not a 'thing', 
but rather a sequence of subevents, and to know the meaning of a word such as 'fear' 
is to know such a sequence. An emotion script is therefore a knowledge structure 
which contains prototypical causes, desires, beliefs, physiological reactions, feelings, 
vocal and facial expressions, self-control procedures, actions, consequences, and so 
on, which are ordered in a causal sequence. Some of these features are likely to be 
universal, others specific to a particular culture. We interpret obseiVed or experienced 
emotions by implicitly comparing them with the prototypical emotion script: the 
more features an emotion event has in common with a script, the clearer a case it is of 
that particular emotion. For example, consider the prototypical case of fear as 
described by Fehr and Russell (1984, p. 482): 
A dangerous situation occurs suddenly. You are startled, and you scream. 
You try to focus all your attention on the danger, try to figure a way out, but 
you feel your heart pounding and your limbs trembling. Thoughts race 
through your mind. Your palms feel cold and wet. There are butterflies in 
your stomach. You turn and flee .... 
Actual instances of fear vary in how well they match this prototypical case of the 
concept fear. 
Unfortunately, the word 'script' is somewhat vague and is used differently by 
different writers. Wierzbicka (l 992a), for example, argues that emotion concepts can 
be defined in terms of prototypical scripts formulated in terri1s of thoughts, wants and 
feelings which specify necessary and sufficient conditions for particular emotion 
concepts, and which draw clear boundaries between apparently synonymous concepts. 
Her notion of emotion scripts has, however, been criticised for being too narrow and 
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not conveying anything about what it feels like to experience a particular emotion 
such as sadness. 
For these and other reasons, Russell and his colleagues, as well as other theorists such 
as Averill (1986), use the word 'script' in a broader sense, arguing that the features 
that make up an emotion script are neither necessary nor sufficient for applying a 
particular emotion term. An actual emotion event may resemble the script to varying 
degrees and in different ways. On the one hand, the more features of the prototypical 
script present, the closer the resemblance and the more appropriate the script label. 
On the other hand, each feature of the script has a prototypical value, and subevents of 
an emotion (for example, beliefs or actions) can resemble the prototypical subevent of 
the script again to varying· degrees and in different ways. For example, while 
researchers have identified a prototypical facial expression of fear, a range of different 
facial expressions count, to varying degrees, as fear, and the border between this and 
expressions of other closely related emotions are fuzzy. What remains unclear, 
however, is just how abstract or concrete are the features that constitute a script, or 
whether different people - even within the same culture - might possess slightly 
different scripts for the same emotion (Russell, 1989, 199la). 
An important aspect of the prototype theory of emotion concepts as outlined above is 
that terms such as fear, anger and sadness have fuzzy boundaries and overlap with one 
another to a greater or lesser degree. This leads us to the question of how emotion 
concepts are related: how do people perceive the similarities and differences among 
emotions? One possibility is that the similarity between different emotion concepts is 
determined by the number of features of a script (cognitive appraisals, feeling states, 
overt actions, and so on) that they have in common. An alternative possibility is that 
specific features of a script have different 'weightings' and that some features are 
more important or fundamental than others in determining the similarities and 
differences between emotions. The latter view is implied by Russell (1989), who 
argues that the degree of overlap between different emotion states depends in large 
part on their position on two underlying bipolar dimensions of degree of pleasure and 
degree of activation. 
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2.2.3. Dimensions of emotion 
The idea that the domain of emotion is structured - that is, that the categories labelled 
by words such as 'happy' and 'afraid' may be interrelated in a systematic fashion -
was first introduced by Woodworth (1938, in Bullock & Russell, 1984). Woodworth 
examined the 'errors' people made when categorising facial expressions of emotion, 
and found that these errors were systematic: subjects who did not choose the correct 
emotional term for a particular facial expression nonetheless chose from a limited set 
of categories. Woodworth consequently proposed a structural model of emotions in 
which emotions are ordered along a continuum in such a way that adjacent emotions 
are the ones most likely to be confused with each other. In other words, the most 
common label for one expression is likely to be somewhat applicable to adjacent 
expressions. Woodworth's student Schlosberg (1952) later modified this model. 
Noticing that the two ends of Woodworth's continuum were also occasionally _ 
confused for one another, Schlosberg placed these two ends together. The result was 
a model which organised emotions in a circular structure. Schlosberg interpreted this 
structure as being based on two underlying dimensions which he termed pleasantness 
- unpleasantness and attention - rejection. Later, he suggested a third dimension 
labelled sleep - tension (Schlosberg, 1954). · 
Since Schlosberg's ideas were published, psychologists trying to clarify, understand 
and organise emotion concepts have attempted to identify the primary dimensions 
underlying these concepts. Although there is a certain amount of diversity in the 
terms used by different writers, two main orthogonal dimensions have been frequently 
noted and are well established. The first of these is typically labelled as pleasure -
displeasure, valence, comfort - discomfort or hedonic tone, and the second as degree 
of activation or arousal - sleep. These dimensions have been identified in adults' and 
children's categorisation of emotion words and facial expressions as well as in studies 
of self-reported mood and of the emotional impact of physical environments, using 
statistical techniques such as multidimensional scaling and factor analysis (Bush, 
1973; Davitz, 1969; Moland & Whissell, 1993; Russell, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1989, 
1991a; Russell & Bullock, 1986; Shaver et al., 1987; Storm & Storm, 1987; Whissell 
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& D'Elia, 1993). Furthermore, both of these dimensions have been found in studies 
using languages other than English, although only the pleasure - displeasure 
dimension has been consistently supported cross-culturally (Lutz, 1986; Russell, 
1991; Russell, Lewicka & Niit, 1989). Russell (1989) has suggested that these 
dimensions might represent pancultural aspects of emotion scripts, whereas other 
features are culture-specific. However, it is possible that these dimensions might take 
on slightly different forms in different cultures. Storm and Storm (1987) have 
suggested that these two dimensions might be manifested slightly differently at 
different points in the emotion domain, for example 'pleasure' might take on the form 
of moral goodness or social desirability, and activation might also be interpreted as 
intensity or degree of arousal. Studies by Lutz (1986) and Smith and Tkel-Sbal 
(1995) suggest that the same argument might also hold cross-culturally. 
The most clearly developed and widely tested model utilising these dimensions in 
explaining the interrelationships among emotion concepts is the circumplex model of 
affect developed by Russell and his colleagues (Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1986; Fehr 
' 
& Russell, 1984; Russell, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Russell & Bullock, 
1986; Russell & Ridgeway, 1983). This model, which is depicted in Figure 1, places 
emotion words in a roughly circular order around the perimeter of a two-dimensional 
space, so that more similar emotions fall closer together, while emotions labelled as 
antonyms fall opposite one another on the circle. Underlying this circular ordering are 
the two dimensions described above: pleasure versus displeasure on the horizontal 
axis, and degree of arousal on the vertical axis. 
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Figure 1: Circular structure of emotions in two-dimensional space (after Bullock & 
Russell, 1984, 1986) 
AROUSAL 
Surprise 
Fear 
Excitement 
Anger 
Happiness 
Disgust 
PLEASURE 
Sadness Calmness 
Sleepiness 
Evidence for other dimensions has also been found, although these typically have 
accounted for small amounts of variance in the perceived relations, and their 
identification has been inconsistent. The most commonly found third dimension has 
been interpreted variously as potency, power, control or dominance, and may refer to 
the individual's position in relation to other persons in the emotion-eliciting situation 
(Davitz, 1969; Lutz, 1986; Shaver et al., 1987), and/or to the depth or profundity 
versus superficiality or frivolity of the emotions (Averill, 1975 in Russell, 1978). 
While researchers are just beginning to go beyond this third dimension, there is some · 
suggestion that dimensions beyond pleasure-displeasure and arousal may refer to 
cognitive appraisals or beliefs about the antecedents or consequences of the emotion, 
such as locus of causation (Russell, 1978). 
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An advantage of the dimensional approach to emotion concepts is that it allows for the 
possibility that the complete set of emotion words in any language underdifferentiates 
the actual emotion domain, and goes at least some way toward accounting for how 
different emotions such as anger, fear and hate overlap and fuse with each other. 
Critics of this approach have, however, argued that the emergence of particular 
dimensions depends on the particular sample of words used in a study, and that at face 
value some of the terms used in dimensional studies (for example, 'sleepy') probably · 
do not denote emotions at all (Scherer, 1984). Although there is some evidence that 
almost perfect-looking circumplex analyses such as Russell's require the inclusion of 
words that most people would not call emotions, a study by Shaver et al. (1987) has 
shown that a similar structure does emerge even for emotional terms which have not 
been preselected to fit a circumplex - or any other theoretical - model, although parts 
of the circle are not occupied. Nevertheless, there are still those who argue quite 
persuasively that two or three dimensions are unlikely to be able to explain the 
variation in meaning conveyed by the large set of emotion-related terms in a language 
such as English. 
Few, if any, dimensional theorists would in fact deny this limitation (see, for example, 
Russell, 1978, 1991 b; Schlosberg, 1952). Rather, both dimensional theorists .and 
those who argue against this approach have suggested that dimensions such as ' 
pleasure - displeasure and degree of activation are most suited to describe the internal 
feeling component of emotions and its expression in observable reactions, but that 
they do not allow for finer discriminations among emotional states which rely on 
other components of emotion such as antecedents and consequences which are more 
culture-based (Davitz, 1969; Russell, 1978; Scherer, 1984; Schlosberg, 1952). In 
addition, it needs to be remembered that we are dealing with emotion concepts, not 
emotion events. The categorisation of emotions may reflect emotion 'reality', but it 
may not, and talking about emotions in terms of dimensions or structures does not 
necessarily - as has often been assumed - compete or contrast with talking about 
emotions in terms of categories. Rather, the two approaches are complementary. 
Bullock and Russell (1986) point out that if we consider emotion categories to have 
fuzzy boundaries and to overlap one another, asking in what way categories overlap 
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leads directly to the idea of a structure according to "which emotion concepts are 
interrelated. And the idea of intercategory structure in turn leads directly to the idea 
of underlying dimensions. From this perspective, categories (based around 
prototypical emotion scripts), structures and dimensions are all interrelated aspects of 
the network of conceptions used by humans to understand emotion. 
2.2.4. Music and the prototype analysis of emotions 
How can we apply this model to our understanding of the emotional meaning of 
music? Firstly, a prototype analysis of emotion categories would suggest that a piece 
of music is said to be sad, happy, or whatever to the extent that it resembles certain 
ideal or prototypical cases, with certain musical works being good examples of a 
particular emotion category, and others being poorer examples of that category. 
Furthermore, if the categories overlap one another and are not clearly bounded, then a 
particular piece of music could be a peripheral member of one emotion category and a 
prototypical member of another. A single piece of music may share certain features in 
common with several emotion categories, and therefore be categorisable as expressing 
more than one emotion. 
In addition, the applicability of a certain emotion concept or concepts to a particular 
piece of music should depend on those concepts' positions on one or more underlying 
dimensions. Since it is widely agreed that musical compositions (or, for that matter, 
decontextualised facial, vocal, ·or bodily expressions of emotion) are incapable of 
expressing the cognitive or interpersonal aspects of emotion such as antecedents, 
appraisals, causes, or behavioural consequences, the most important dimensions are 
likely to be those of pleasure-displeasure and degree of activation, with some 
contribution possibly also made by a potency/depth dimension. Frijda (1958, in 
Davitz, 1964) has suggested that perhaps facial cues express the more general 
characteristics of emotional expression (for instance, positive versus negative, active 
versus passive), while situational cues determine the more specific and subtle 
discriminations within a general category (such as anger versus impatience, 
satisfaction versus contentment), and it seems reasonable to assume that the same 
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might apply to music. Thus according to Russell's circumplex model, the emotion 
terms most applicable to describing a particular piece of music could be predicted by 
their co-ordinates on the dimensions of pleasure-displeasure and degree of arousal, 
with the applicability of emotion terms for describing that piece of music decreasing 
as one moves around the circumference of the circumplex model. In addition, we 
would expect that if people's categorisation of music is primarily determined by these 
underlying dimensions, they will not be able to make as fine discriminations between 
the emotions expressed in music as they would in other contexts where additional 
information about causes, con,sequences and concomitants specified by the emotion 
script occur. As a result, all emotion terms similar in pleasantness and arousal might 
be equally applicable to describe a particular piece of music. 
Although Russell's circumplex model has not been examined directly in relation to 
musical expression, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that it might be useful 
for exploring emotional meaning in music. Meerum T erwogt and van Grinsven (1991) 
asked thirty adults to rate how well music is capable of expressing each of 100 
emotions. They found that happiness, anger and sadness were rated as best expressed 
in music, followed by calm, restful, and restless. These results were interpreted to 
suggest that music expresses both a positive.:.negative and an activity dimension. The 
authors subsequently found that when subjects were asked to match musical excerpts 
with emotion terms, they made a fairly systematic distinction between music which 
was positive or negative in tone, and that within the negatively valenced pieces there 
was clear consensus about the identity of 'sad' music (which is low in activation) as 
opposed to music expressing anger or fear (both high activation states), which tended 
to be confused with each other. This supports the findings of McMullen (1974, in 
Abeles, 1980) who examined similarities between the Hevner checklist approach and 
the dimensions of the semantic differential (SD). In his study, college students were 
asked to describe eight classical and pop music excerpts on 7-point scales using 
adjectives that had either previously been shown to be important in SD research or 
that were representative of each of Hevner's eight adjective clusters. The results 
suggested that the Hevner adjectives are describing two sub-factors of the evaluative 
dimension produced by most SD research, and also hinted at the presence of an 
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activity dimension. Another relevant finding is thatofHampton (1945), who found 
that emotional expressions characterised by either a clearly unpleasant or a clearly 
pleasant feeling tone (for example, grief or joy) were easier to identify than emotional 
expressions where the feeling tone was subdued or neutral (such as abandon, praise, or 
resignation). 
Wedin (1972) took a different approach. She applied factor analysis and 
multidimensional scaling to listeners' ratings of musical excerpts ranging from Bach 
to the Beatles on 125 adjectives, and found that emotions expressed by music fall on 
three dimensions which she termed intensity- softness (contrasting energy, intensity, 
power and activity with softness, relaxation, tenderness, intimacy, and sometimes 
melancholy); pleasantness - unpleasantness (contrasting joy, mirth, happiness, 
elation, gaiety and pleasure with agony, fear, depression, threat, uneasiness, tension, 
gloom and sorrow); and solemnity- triviality (contrasting solemnity, dignity and 
grandiosity with exhilaration, popularity and triviality). In a smaller-scale study, 
Asada and Ohgushi (1991) asked thirteen music students to rate the 18 pieces of 
Ravel's Bolero on semantic differential scales and found that two (unnamed) 
dimensions emerged. The first contrasted words such as energetic, powerful, open 
and gorgeous with calm, quiet, suppressed and sober, resembling Wedin's 'intensity' 
. and Meerum Terwogt and van Grinsven's 'activity' dimensions. The second 
dimension contrasted terms such as comic, sticky and coquettish with words such as 
serious, flowing, and reserved, showing some similarity to Wedin's 'solemnity-
triviality' dimension. 
There is also some indication that certain dimensions may be easier to use in 
interpreting music than others. Meerum Terwogt and van Grinsven (1991) found that 
disagreements were more likely to occur on the pleasure dimension than on the 
activity dimension: for example, all subjects identified a Tchaikovsky extract as 
passive, but there was some disagreement about the happy-sad distinction. Similarly, 
Campbell (1942) found that her subjects confused the 'active' emotions of gaiety, joy 
and assertion with each other, and also tended to confuse the 'passive' emotions of 
yearning, tenderness, calm and sorrow; in contrast, they had no difficulty in 
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differentiating between two pleasant, but differentially active emotions like gaiety 
and calmness. Likewise, Scherer and Oshinsky (1977), in a study utilising 
synthesised tone sequences, found that subjects tended to agree more readily on the 
activity level than on the dimensions of pleasure and potency. 
Further indirect support for the utility of a prototype analysis of emotion in music 
comes from an early study by Campbell (1942). She found that whereas subjects 
tended to agree among themselves when it came to dividing musical pieces into seven 
main (middle- or basic-level) emotion categories, there was little agreement among 
them for subdivisions within each of these main categories. For example, while over 
90% of her sample agreed that certain selections expressed gaiety, there was no 
agreement as to whether this gaiety was carefree, lively, or merry. Campbell 
comments, however, that it is unclear from her results whether such distinctions are 
not expressible in music, or whether her subjects lacked the musical sensitivity to 
distinguish them. 
What these studies do not tell us, however, is what the features are that categorise 
prototypical musical examples of particular emotion categories. It is all very well to 
say that a piece of music will tend to be described as sad if it conveys displeasure and 
low arousal, but this does not in fact tell us anything more about how it is that music 
expresses these emotional qualities. According to Radocy and Boyle (1979), 
variables contributing to musical meaning can be divided into two main categories: 
(1) those related to the structural features of the music itself, and (2) those related to 
the listener. The following chapter will examine each of these in turn. 
38 
CHAPTER3: 
HOW DOES MUSIC EXPRESS EMOTION? 
3.1. What musical elements express emotion? 
A number of researchers over the years have attempted to link the emotional 
properties of music to specific acoustic elements and their combinations. Scherer and 
Oshinsky (1977) found that two-thirds to three-quarters of the variance in listeners' 
judgments of the emotions expressed in synthesised tone sequences could be 
explained by the manipulation of musical elements. However, no definitive taxonomy 
of musical elements used to express emotion has yet been developed. Definitions 
vary, and what is a chief component in one taxonomy is often only a subcomponent in 
another (Bruner, 1990). Part of the reason for this seems to be that different studies 
have focused on different musical elements, and not controlled the elements that 
others have used as independent variables. Edmonston (1966) and Eagle (1971, in 
Radocy & Boyle, 1979), for example, found that rhythm seems to be primary in 
4etermining the emotional character of music. Henkin (1955, 1957)found that 
rhythmic and melodic faCtors were equally important in determining the emotional 
meanings of music, while Hevner (1937), Scherer (1979) and Scherer and Oshinsky 
(1977) found that tempo had the most influence on judges' ratings. Hevner (1936, 
193 7) also found, however, that the relative importance of musical variables depended 
on the emotion that was being expressed. 
Some of these differences between studies may be due to methodological features. 
While psychological studies investigating the manner in which music expresses 
recognisable emotions often show greater methodological sophistication than those · 
which merely investigate the extent of agreement among listeners about music's 
emotional character, they do differ in their choice of music, the techniques they use to 
measure listeners' responses, and their methods of statistical analysis. Researchers 
also differ in the extent to which they take a synthetic (experimental) versus an 
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analytic (naturalistic) approach. In the former, particuiar musical variables are 
isolated and manipulated and their effects on the listener's responses measured. In the 
latter approach, researchers measure people's interpretations of music taken from 'real 
life' (Hargreaves, 1986; Radocy & Boyle, 1979), which has an advantage over the 
former approach in ecological validity, but involves a corresponding loss of precision. 
In addition, while the pioneering researchers in this area had to rely on a skilled 
musician varying one formal property of a piece while keeping the others roughly 
constant, the advent of computers has led to the use of electronically synthesised tone 
sequences in which musical elements can be systematically and independently 
manipulated. In spite of these methodological variations, however, there is some 
agreement about the affective meaning conveyed by certain musical characteristics, 
which will be summarised under the headings of time-, melody-, harmony-, modality-
and texture-related findings. A glossary of the musical terms used is provided in 
Appendix 7. 
Time-related findings 
The two main time-related aspects of music are tempo and rhythm. As far as the 
former is concerned, researchers have arrived at the same general conclusion: all 
other things being equal, faster tempos tend to be associated with greater happiness, 
excitement and activity than slow tempos (Eagle, 1971 in Radocy & Boyle, 1979; 
Gundlach, 1935; Hevner, 1937; Nielzen & Cesarec, 1982; Rigg, 1940; Scherer, 1979; 
Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977; Wedin, 1972). Two main aspects ofrhythm have been 
studied: (a) strength and smoothness, and (b) phrasing and articulation (the actual 
length of notes). Firm rhythms were associated by Hevner's (1936) subjects with 
words such as dignified and vigorous and by Wedin's (1972) subjects with words 
such as dramatic and ominous. In both studies flowing rhythms were associated with 
descriptions such as happy and playful. Some cross-cultural support for these 
findings is provided by Gundlach' s (1932) analysis of Indian music in which war· 
songs were found to have the least even rhythms, and healing songs to have the most 
even rhythms. Gundlach (1935) also found that European musical phrases with 
uneven rhythms were classified as delicate, dignified, sombre, and so on, while 
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phrases with many smooth rhythms were described as brilliant, animated, flippant and 
glad. In contrast, however, Nielzen ahd Cesarec ( 1982) found judgments of gaiety as 
opposed to gloom to be associated with a marked rhythm. 
A relationship has also been found between staccato-legato articulation and the 
activity dimension of music. Gundlach (1932) and Wedin (1972) found that staccato 
rhythmic articulation was-associated with greater energy and excitement, while 
Nielzen and Cesarec ( 1982) found that staccato music expressed more happiness and 
activity than legato music. 
Melody-related findings 
Three main aspects of melody have been investigated: mean pitch level, pitch range, 
and the direction of the melodic line. Scherer (1979) found a high pitch level related 
to judgments of happiness and surprise, and low pitch levels to disgust and boredom. 
A high pitch level was found by Hevner (1936) to reflect humour and sprightliness 
and by Wedin (1972) and Heinlein (1928) to reflect emotions such as happiness 
(gladness) and playfulness. Similarly, Swinchoski (1947, in Haack, 1980) found that 
higher pitches were associated with humorous, graceful, happy moods. In all four 
studies a low pitch level was found to be associated with negative and unpleasant of 
gloomy emotions as well as with qualities of dignity and solemnity. 
As far as pitch range is concerned, Scherer (1979) and Scherer and Oshinsky (1977) 
found small to moderate pitch variation to be associated with unpleasant emotions 
such as disgust, anger, fear and boredom, while extreme pitch variation was associated 
with pleasant, active and potent emotions such as happiness and surprise. Similarly, 
Gundlach (1935) found that pieces with a pitch range of more than an octave were 
perceived as more uneasy, animated, grotesque, brilliant and glad, while those with a 
narrow range were judged as more tranquil, dignified, delicate, mournful, awkward 
and sombre. 
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The findings concerning the direction of the melodic line ~re less consistent. 
Gundlach (1935) found no relationship between melodic line and the emotions 
listeners ascribed to music. Hevner (1936) found some tendency for an ascending 
melody to express dignity and a descending melody to seem exciting, but these effects 
were very slight. Scherer and Oshinsky (1977), on the other hand, found that rising · 
contours were associated with potent emotions such as interest, surprise, anger and 
fear, while down contours were associated with boredom, pleasantness, and sadness. 
Trehub, Cohen and Guerriero (1987, in Trehub, 1993) found that ascending 9-note 
sequences typically led to 'happy' judgments, while descending sequences led to 'sad' 
judgments. 
Harmony-related findings 
Harmony has received somewhat less attention by researchers than the melodic 
aspects of music. However, Hevner (1936), Nielzen and Cesarec (1982) and Wedin 
(1972) all found that consonant harmonies were associated with pleasant emotions 
such as happiness, playfulness, serenity and peacefulness, while dissonant harmonies 
were associated with descriptions such as exciting, dramatic, agitating, ominous, and 
sad. Winold (in Farnsworth, 1969) found music with consonant harmonies to be 
generally characterised as dignified, spiritual, triumphant or majestic. Slightly 
dissonant music tended to be described as calm, dreamy, happy, and so on, while 
extremely dissonant music was characterised as depressing, frustrated, humorous, 
agitated, exciting, and so on. 
Modalitv-related findings 
Several studies have tested conventional thinking in Western culture that the major 
mode expresses happiness and the minor mode sadness. Trehub, Cohen and Guerriero 
(1987, in Trehub, 1993) found that only musically trained subjects made the 
conventional major-happy/minor-sad associations when listening to short melodic 
sequences. Similar results were obtained in an early study conducted by Heinlein 
(1928), who found that the ability to associate major chords with happiness and minor 
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chords with sadness was dependent on musical training. Crowder (1984 ), however, 
has reanalysed Heinlein's data and found generous support overall, some exceptions 
notwithstanding, for the conventional connotations for both musically trained and 
untrained subjects. The effects of musical training were barely significant. Other 
researchers (Crowder, 1985; Hevner, 1935; Nielzen & Cesarec, 1982; Scherer & 
Oshinsky, 1977; Wedin, 1972) have found the expected associations of the major 
mode with pleasant emotions such as happy, playful and peaceful, and of the minor 
mode with negative emotions such as sadness, gloominess, tension and anger 
regardless of musical training, although Hevner (1935) did find that these effects were 
stronger for musically trained subjects. Hevner also found that modality was not 
related to excited-calm ratings. 
Texture-related findings 
Two main aspects of musical texture have been examined: volume or intensity, and 
instrumentation or timbre (tone quality or 'colour'). In an early study, Gundlach 
(1935) found that the loudest pieces tended to be described as triumphant or animated, 
!ind the softest as delicate or tranquil. More recently, Asada and Ohgushi (1991) 
found that loud music tended to be characterised as energetic and powerful, while 
Nielzen and Cesarec (1982) found 'that louder music was judged as expressing more 
gaiety and activity than soft music. Wedin (1972), on the other hand, found that 
volume tended to interact with tempo, so that loud music tended to be described as 
active and energetic when it was played at a fast tempo, while loud, slow music 
tended to be described as dignified and solemn. Scherer and Oshinsky (1977) studied 
the variation in volume rather than volume level per se, and found that a large 
variation was associated with active and potent emotions such as anger and fear, while 
a small variation in volume was associated with happiness, pleasantness and activity. 
While little attention has been paid to instrumentation, Gundlach (1935) found that 
brass instruments carried the melody in songs described as triumphant or grotesque; 
woodwinds expressed uneasy, mournful and/or awkward feelings; melodies on a 
piano were perceived as delicate, sentimental and tranquil as well as brilliant; while 
string sounds were characterised as glad. Behrens and Green (1993) found that 
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subjects' accuracy at identifying the emotion that a musician intended to express 
depended both on the instrument played and on the expressed emotion. Subjects were 
significantly more accurate when identifying sad improvisations performed on a violin 
or vocally than on a trumpet or timpani, but were also more accurate at identifying sad 
trumpet improvisations than scared or angry improvisations played on this instrument. 
, 
However, for angry improvisations they were correct more often when these were. 
performed on a timpani rather than on other instruments. Scared improvisations were 
most accurately identified when performed on the violin. Taking a somewhat 
different approach, Asada and Ohgushi (1991) found that pieces played by a larger 
number of instruments were rated as more energetic and powerful than those played 
by a solo instrument or only a few instruments. 
Scherer and Oshinsky (1977) investigated another aspect of timbre. By manipulating 
the filtration cut-off level of their synthesised tone sequences, they were able to study 
the effects of the number of harmonics (overtones) on listeners' emotional judgments. 
Sounds with few overtones (between 1 and 8) were rated as significantly more 
pleasant, happy and bored, whereas sequences for which more harmonics (16) were 
audible were judged as significantly more active, potent, angry, disgusted and fearful. 
There are, of course, other musical elements which might contribute to a piece's 
emotional meaning which have not yet been investigated, and there are other aspects 
of those features which have been investigated which may well be of great importance 
in the expressiveness of music (Hevner, 1936). Furthermore, while several studies 
have investigated the main effects of musical elements such as tempo, the interaction 
effects have received much less attention. As Frances (1958/1988), Hevner (1937) 
and Nielzen and Cesarec (1982) observe, a musical work is a complex of many 
interacting elements that are not usually isolated, and the typical emotional effect of 
any one element when it occurs by itself may be neutralised, obliterated, emphasised 
or otherwise changed by deliberate changes in other musical elements. Thus while 
these studies identify general trends, many exceptions to these trends can be found in 
the musical literature. Scherer and Oshinsky's (1977) study has suggested that while 
most of the variance in music's emotional expressiveness can be explained by the 
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additive combination of main effects, in some cases specific combinations of musical 
elements serve to communicate different types or subdivisions of a certain emotion 
such as happiness (for example, quiet, subdued bliss versus buoyant gaiety). 
Although examination of these interaction effects will result in a huge increase in 
complexity and require more detailed specifications of emotional states than have 
been used in the studies to date, exploration of these effects does seem to be an 
important task for future research. 
Keeping these cautions and limitations in mind, it does nevertheless appear that 
listeners may well use an informal but fairly standard 'syntax' for interpreting 
emotion in music. Table I presents, for a selection of emotions, the musical elements 
which have been found to contribute to the variations in listeners' attributions of 
emotional states. 
Table I. Musical elements related to the expression of specific emotion states 
HAPPINESS SADNESS EXCITEMENT CALMNESS/ ANGER FEAR 
SERENITY 
TEMPO fast slow fast slow fast fast 
RHYTHM flowing, firm flowing firm 
-
-
fast slow slow, 
ARTICU- · staccato legato staccato legato 
-
(stac-
LATION cato?) 
PITCH LEVEL high low 
-
- -
high 
PITCH RANGE large small- large small - small - small -
moderate moderate mod. mod. 
MELODIC (up?) (down?) (down?) 
-
(up?) (up?) 
CONTOUR 
MODE major minor minor (min.?) 
-
HARMONY simple, complex, complex, simple, dissonant dis so-
consonant dissonant dissonant consonant nant 
VOLUME medium - soft loud soft 
- -
loud 
OVERTONES few many few? many many 
-
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If, as suggested, listeners infer emotions in music based on specific musical elements, 
the next question we need to ask is, of course, how it is that these elements achieve 
their effects. 
3.2. How do musical elements express emotion? 
There are two main positions on the question of how emotional meaning is conveyed 
by music. The first alternative, usually known as emotivism, holds that music's 
expressive qualities are dispositions of the music to arouse corresponding emotions in 
listeners. The other view, sometimes referred to as cognitivism, argues that music 
possesses emotional qualities as perceived phenomenal properties of itself (Kivy, 
1989): we hear the emotion in the music, rather than feeling it in ourselves. Each of 
these positions, in -tum, encompasses various subtheses as to how these effects are 
achieved. 
3.2.1. Emotivism 
According to the emotivist theory of musical meaning, to say that music expresses an 
emotion (for instance, sadness) is to say that the music typically makes an attentive 
listener feel that emotion (it is saddening) (Davies, 1991 ). Although there are various 
explanations as to how and why music is capable of evoking emotions in listeners, 
the best known and most widely accepted is that of Leonard Meyer (1956, 1973 cited 
in Radocy & Boyle, 1979 and Sloboda, 1985). Meyer's explanation of musical 
meaning is based on the theory that emotion is aroused when an expectation, or 
tendency to respond, is inhibited or blocked. Due to a listener's knowledge of and 
previous experiences with a particular musical style, he or she will have certain 
expectations about what musical events and patterns will follow each other in a work. 
Some of these expectations will be thwarted, somewill be fulfilled at once, and others 
will be fulfilled after a delay. This gives rise to a dynamic flux of tensions and 
resolutions which gives meaning to the music and arouses emotion. Because music 
in a style with which a listener is totally unfamiliar will not produce expectations in 
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the listener, he or she will therefore find it totally meaningless and without emotional 
import. 
Not all writers feel that Meyer's explanation is sufficient to account for the meaning 
and effects of music. However, most would accept that music can arouse or modify 
our emotions. Certainly at times the emotions expressed in a piece of music and the 
emotions aroused in a listener are difficult to separate, and probably for this reason the 
emotivist thesis has widespread support. Emotivism has, however, also been widely 
criticised as being simplistic, illogical and inaccurate (e.g. Kivy, 1989). This theory 
implies that when we say that music expresses emotions, we are projecting moods or 
feelings from ourselves to the music because we have become victims of the pathetic 
fallacy1 (Budd, 1985). Critics have argued, however, that we can hear music as. sad 
without feeling sad - if this were not the case, we would exp~ct people to avoid 
listening to sad music. And it seems doubtful that listening to angry music typically 
makes people angry. Furthermore, a piece of music might make someone feel sad or 
angry (for example, when it has a personal association for them), although they would 
not regard that piece as expressing sadness or anger (Kivy, 1989). Outside of 
aesthetics, people do not usually say that something that makes them feel sad or angry 
expresses sadness or is itself angry. As Stecker (1984) points out, the term 
'expressing' implies showing something forth, and unless emotion is more closely 
related to the music itself than emotivism hypothesises, it is difficult to see how we 
could justify talking of music as expressing emotion at all. 
3.2.2. Cognitivism 
The alternative position to emotivism holds that when we say that music expresses an 
emotion, that emotion is phenomenologically in the music itself, and nowhere else. 
Philosophers within this tradition generally draw on the language of semiotics to 
1 Ruskin (1856, in Budd, 1985) believed that our err{otions can induce a falsity in our experience of 
the world, so that - because of their effects on us - nonhuman animals and inanimate objects can seem 
to possess characteristics that we know they are incapable of possessing. If someone who listens to 
music is so powerfully moved by it that he or she comes to perceive it as something which is in an 
emotional state, then this is an instance of what he termed the pathetic fallacy. 
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explain musical expression. According to this view, music is a sign which represents 
(in the broadest sense of the word) emotional states. However, there is disagreement 
as to how this representation or signification takes place: it has been suggested that 
musical works 'symbolise', 'resemble', 'imitate', 'refer to', 'denote' or 'stand for' 
emotions. 
A useful approach to exploring the ways in which music can represent or signify 
emotion is to use the classification of the ways in which signs can represent other 
things developed by C.S. Peirce (1955) in a series of essays first published around the 
tum of the century. Peirce described three types of sign: index, icon, and symbol. An 
index represents its referent by having being associated with it in the past, for 
example, lightning and thunder with a storm. An icon represents because it has a 
formal similarity to its referent (for example, a wiring diagram representing a circuit), 
or because it stands in a natural relation which allows the sign to suggest what it 
represents (for example, a guttering candle used in a film to represent the process of 
dying). Symbols represent by being members of a formal symbolic system, such as a 
language: their meaning depends on the conventional syntactical rules by which they 
are combined, rather than on association or resemblance. 
Music as index 
Indexical representation involves the direct association of a musical form with some 
extramusical object or event, so that emotions previously associated with the 
-··- ,.,, . ~ 
extramusical object come to be associated with the music (Dowling & Harwood, 
1986). This phenomenon is, of course, well known to psychologists as classical 
conditioning. The idea here is that the percei·ved emotion is not intrinsic to the music 
itself, but becomes attached to the music through a learning process: people within a 
given cultural group learn that music with certain characteristics reflects certain 
emotions while music with different characteristics expresses other emotions. 
There are two main ways in which this associative learning is thought to occur. 
Firstly, people learn as a cultural norm that certain types of music are conventionally 
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used on particular occasions. For example, in our musical culture there are particular 
musical forms traditionally used in activities like worship, battle, affirmation 'of 
patriotism, mourning, burlesque, folk and popular dance, and no doubt many others 
(Callen, 1982). Consequently, whenever the emotional significance of such occasions 
is more-or-less the same for everyone, we associate the matching type of music with 
that emotion (Meerum Terwogt & Van Grinsven, 1991). And so we hear grief in a 
funeral march, happy exuberance in Dixieland jazz, and so on. 
Powerful as these effects may be, however, there is nothing particularly musical 
about them. Indexical representation of this type cannot explain all instances of 
emotionally expressive music, nor how people are able to recognise emotions in 
unfamiliar kinds of music. Indexical representation or classical conditioning may, 
however, also be used to explain music's expression of emotions at a more general 
level. According to this view, it is possible that people attribute emotional meanings 
to musical motifs or sequences through association with the kinds of emotional words 
that habitually seem to accompany the motifs over a long period of time in songs, 
masses, operas, and so on. It is argued that while emotions were initially attached to 
musical forms according to the whims of the composer, eventually these associations 
became codified, and people heard what they were supposed to hear in the music 
(Farnsworth, 1969). 
An important feature of this theory of music's emotional expressiveness is that in 
indexical representation, the relationship between sign and signified is arbitrary. Just 
as the association between the majority of words in a spoken language such as English 
and their referents is merely conventional - there is nothing about the word 'cat', for 
example, which makes it particularly suitable to stand for the small feline domestic 
mammal as opposed to anything else - so the expressiveness of music is simply a 
function of customary, culturally variable patterns of association of certain musical 
features with certain emotional ones, quite apart from any structural analogy between 
them (Cunningham & Sterling, 1988; Kivy, 1989). In terms of this argument, some 
different pairing of musical structure and emotion would be just as easy to learn and 
use as those we actually have. 
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The indexical theory does appear to be the simplest explanation of how a listener 
brought up within a particular musical culture comes to understand that culture's 
music as expressing emotions. There is certainly little doubt that correlations between 
musical elements and particular emotions vary between cultures and over time within 
the same culture, and that familiarity with a particular musical culture is often 
necessary for an adequate appreciation of musical expression. For instance, the 
eighteenth-century music of Bach and Handel was rooted in part in musical 
conventions which associated certain musical keys with particular emotions. F major, 
for instance, was the key of the pastoral idyll, while F-sharp major was a 
transcendental key. Similarly, Northern Indian music claims to be able to bring out 
certain emotional nuances using certain corresponding musical intervals (Blacking, 
1973). Yet few, if any, composers writing outside of these musical traditions would 
accept that there is an inherent correspondence between these musical features and 
their emotional connotations. 
The indexical theory of musical expression has not, however, generated much interest 
or discussion. One possible reason for this is that it gives rise to a 'chicken and egg' 
situation: it does not explain why composers should have begun to pair emotions with 
particular musical elements in the first place (Cooke, 1959). Furthermore, it is 
difficult to know how this theory might be tested empirically. Heinlein (1928) 
argued, based on the number of 'errors' that his subjects made, that the major and 
minor modes do not have intrinsic emotional characters but rather have arbitrary 
conventional emotional associations that listeners learn. Support for this idea comes 
from the fact that in other musical systems (for example, African, Oriental, Spanish, 
Slav and Balkan folk-music), pleasure is expressed by music of a decidedly minor 
character (Cooke, 1959). However, several other studies (Crowder, 1984, 1985; 
Hevner, 1935; Nielzen & Cesarec, 1982; Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977; Wedin, 1972)) 
have found that the conventional emotional associations of these modes do not depend 
on musical training. Yet these studies do not in themselves refute the classical 
conditioning thesis, since the many everyday experiences that even musically 
'untrained' listeners have with music may be sufficient for them to learn the 
conventional emotional connotations. 
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Whatever the reason, however, the majority of theorists have rejected the notion of 
intrinsic neutrality for music. Yet while these theorists agree that certain musical 
features are more suitable than others for suggesting particular emotions, they are 
divided as to the reason for this. 
Music as icon 
Philosophers such as Kivy (1989) and Tormey (in Barwell, 1986) have put forward 
the theory that the expressive properties of music result from resemblances between 
characteristics of the music and characteristics of the natural behavioural expressions 
of emotion. In other words, formal intrinsic properties of music such as tempo, 
dynamics, harmonic texture, melodic contour, timbre and rhythm represent iconically 
expressive features and behaviour - the rhythms, vocal intonations, movements, 
gestures and demeanour - that we associate with specific emotions. Furthermore, the 
processes involved in understanding these relationships are argued to be common to 
human beings in all societies (Harwood, 1976). 
In some musical traditions, for example the songs of the Venda, variations in melody 
and rhythm are sometimes deliberate attempts to reflect changes in speech tone 
(Blacking, 1973). Even within European music, however, many of the emotional cues 
discussed above do seem to be similar to the non-verbal cues used in making 
inferences about the emotions expressed in speech. Reviews of the research on 
emotional vocal cues in speech by Scherer (1986) and Sundberg (1982), and 
individual studies by Costanzo, Markel and Costanzo (1969), Scherer, Banse, 
Wallbott and Goldbeck (1991) and Williams and Stevens (1972) suggest the 
following: 
TEMPO: Slow tempos are associated with sadness, sorrow and boredom; fast tempos 
are described as expressing joy, anger and fear as well as neutrality or 
indifference. 
RHYTHM: 'Legato' articulation is associated with the expression of tenderness; 
'staccato' articulation with the expression of anger. 
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PITCH LEVEL: Lower pitches are associated with sadness and boredom; higher pitches 
help to express joy, anger, fear, and in one study (Costanzo et al., 1969) 
also grief. 
PITCH VARIATION: A small pitch variation is typically found in sad expressions, 
whereas a large pitch variation characterises happiness, anger, and fear. 
VOLUME/INTENSITY: A soft volume is associated with sadness and boredom; a louder 
volume with joy and anger. The findings for fear have been inconsistent 
As Scherer ( 1986) points out, most of the existing studies on the vocal communication 
of emotion have focused on a few tried-and-tested vocal cues that are relatively easy 
to obtain, and ignored other potentially important features such as voice quality or 
timbre. Nevertheless, as with music, it has been found that the aspect of emotion best 
expressed by these vocal cues is the degree of activation or arousal, and that errors in 
identifying vocal expressions of emotion are generally a function of similarity in 
levels of activation of the emotions concerned rather than, for example, similarity in 
hedonic tone (For example, mistaking anger for happiness and sadness for love) 
(Albas et al., 1976; Davitz, 1964a, 1964b; Scherer, 1986; Van Bezooijen et al., 1983). 
Scherer (1986) points out, however, that these findings are hardly surprising 
considering that most of the vocal cues that have been examined are related to the 
tenseness or laxness of the voice, and they do not provide a sufficient basis to answer 
the question of whether only the activity dimension is expressed by verbal cues, or 
whether there are specific patterns of acoustic elements for each emotion. 
On the other hand, the correspondence between emotional expression in music and in 
the human voice is not exact. Scherer et al. (1991) and Bums and Beier (1973) found 
that in nonverbal speech auditory cues were particularly helpful when assessing anger 
and least useful when judging happiness (in Dolgin & Adelson, 1990). Music, in 
contrast, appears to be able to express happiness more easily than anger (Meerum 
Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1991; Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977), suggesting that there is 
something in the music itself, apart from or in addition to its similarity to prosodic 
features of the voice, that is responsible for.its emotional significance. In evaluating 
the iconic theory of musical expression, however, it is interesting to note that there are 
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fairly substantial similarities between the cues which listeners use to judge emotion in 
both speech and music. 
Further support for this theory comes from a rather different source: studies 
investigating the relationship between acoustic cues and body movements. Frances 
and Bruchon-Schweitzer (1983) conducted an unusual study which revealed a partial 
equivalence between the verbal categories associated with musical excerpts and those 
associated with bodily expression sequences recorded either after the actors had 
listened to the musical excerpts or after they had been given the verbal categories 
associated with the music. In another investigation, Clynes and Nettheim (1982) 
asked subjects to press on a button-like transducer in such a way as to express one of 
seven emotions, and transformed these into auditory signals varying on the following 
parameters: starting pitch, rising or falling pitch contour, pitch range, and intensity. 
Subjects were then asked to listen to the sounds and to identify the emotions they 
expressed using a forced-choice procedure. Recognition of emotions was highly 
significantly better than chance except for love and reverence which were largely 
confused with each other. Clynes has used these findings to take the iconic thesis one 
step further and suggest that the dynamic expressive communication of specific 
emotions in various sensory modes (including music) are based on common 
underlying brain programs of spatial-temporal patterns which he calls essentic forms 
(Clynes, 1986; Clynes & Nettheim, 1982). Clynes's data, methods and arguments 
have been questioned and criticised, and Blacking (1987) observes that he neglects the 
cognitive aspects of musical ideas as well as of emotions. Nevertheless, his ideas are 
intriguing and have the potential to stimulate interesting discussion and research. 
An important aspect of iconic representation in general, however, is that the sign is 
vague and ambiguous without contextual support (Brown, 1981 ). Therefore Tormey 
argues that having a set of formal musical properties is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for a work having expressive properties, and that similar musical 
properties may have a variety of different expressive meanings in the same work, 
depending on the musical and/or dramatic context (in Stecker, 1984). By analogy, a 
particular expressive behaviour is not necessarily the normal effect of only one 
53 
emotion. Crying, for instance, might be an effect of joy as well as of sadness and 
despair. Therefore, while the words of a song or the story of an opera or ballet 
provide sufficient context so that the emotional meaning of the music is usually clear 
even on a first hearing, without such a context there might be disagreements or 
misunderstandings as to the intended emotional meaning of a piece of music. 
Although iconic representation is currently one of the most popular explanations of 
music's emotional expressiveness, a limitation of this thesis has been noted by 
Scruton ( 1993 ), who points out that this theory cannot explain why, if the features we 
notice in expressive music are precisely those we see and hear in human behaviour, 
we need the special experience of understanding music in order to appreciate them. 
Music as symbol 
By symbol, Peirce (1955) meant a sign that depends for its meaning and significance 
on its relationships in a network with other signs. According to one school of thought, 
musical motifs are symbols in the sense that they express emotions through their place 
in a musical pattern which is governed by a conventional, formal system of syntactic 
rules. 
Cooke (1959), in his book The Language of Music, has presented one of the most 
thorough versions of this thesis. He argues that melody is the most important element 
of Western tonal music since 1400, and that certain intervals of the diatonic scale are 
more suitable than others for suggesting certain emotions due to the tonal 
relationships (tensions) that occur between their members. According to his argument 
music is a language of the emotions, not simply in a vague general sense, but in the 
sense that it should be possible to draw up a "dictionary" which would specify the 
emotional meaning of the basic terms of musical "vocabulary". For example, Cooke 
I 
argues that the major third expresses joy, the minor third grief, stoic acceptance, or 
tragedy; the minor sixth falling to fifth expresses anguish, while the sequence 13565 
in the major is used to express a siinple, innocent, blessed joy. 
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Cooke argues that the correspondences between melodic motifs and different 
emotions are inherent, implying that the emotional significance of particular musical 
intervals is the result of fundamental features of human psychology and physiology 
and should therefore be universal. Sloboda (1985) points out two corollaries of this 
argument. Firstly, anyone who is able to comprehend the tonal relationships in music 
and who has a normal understanding of the emotions should, in principle, be able to 
discover analogical relationships between music and emotion. Thus an explicit word-
music association is not necessary to come to appreciate emotional meanings in music 
(although it may contribute to this process). Secondly, it follows that pairings of 
melodic motifs with emotions other than the ones we now have would be more 
difficult to learn, since they would be working against the 'ready-made' analogical 
relationships inherent in the tonal system. 
) 
Cooke collected a large array of examples from Plainsong to Stravinsky to support his 
analyses, and presents an impressive argument. There are also, however, so many 
exceptions to Cooke's thesis that it has been sharply criticised, and he has been 
accused of picking his examples to support his case. As Sloboda (1985) points out, 
however, counter-examples are not as immediately damaging to Cooke's thesis as 
they may seem, because Cooke himself admits that melody is only one of the features 
which composers may use to express emotion. He concedes that volume, rhythm, 
tempo and harmony can emphasise and modify the emotional significance of the 
melodic elements in a variety of ways not available to spoken language. So a melody 
would have different emotional connotations when played fortissimo by the entire 
brass section of a symphony orchestra than when played liltingly by a solo violin. 
Although Cooke's thesis is empirical, it is difficult to know how to test it. As Slaboda 
(1985) points out, the'ideal' practical demonstration of this thesis would be given by 
someone who had never been exposed to any word-music associations (through song, 
etc.), but who had received otherwise normal musical and linguistic experience, 
showing culturally 'normal' appreciation of the emotional connotations of music. Of 
course, it is unlikely that such conditions could ever be set up. 
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GabrieL(1978) did attempt to study Cooke's thesis empirically. He played each of 
· Cooke's basic melodic motifs or 'terms' to 22 non-music polytechnic students twice. 
On one occasion the motif was paired with Cooke's emotional characterisation of it, 
on the other by a randomly chosen description from Cooke's set. Subjects were asked 
to rate the appropriateness of each motif-emotion combination on a five-point scale. 
Gabriel argued that if particular melodic motifs convey the meanings ascribed to them 
by Cooke, then subjects should rate Cooke's designated description of each motif as 
more appropriate than the randomly chosen one. In fact, the results showed that the 
designated descriptions and the random descriptions were equally often chosen as 
more appropriate. Thus Gabriel failed to demonstrate any relationship between 
melodic motifs and emotional connotations. 
Sloboda (1985), however, claims that Gabriel's experimental design may have 
destroyed the conditions under which it is possible for listeners to link tonal patterns 
with emotional connotations. Gabriel himself admits that the meaning of the motifs 
would not be at "maximal power" in his experimental design. Slaboda argues that 
music's emotional meaning depends on the context in which the crucial melody is 
embedded: we may need to know where an excerpt comes in the structure of the 
music before we can interpret it emotionally. Because Gabriel presented the motifs in 
musically 'disembodied' form, his task was an unreal one and does not in itself 
disprove Cooke's thesis. As Kivy (1989) argues, musical elements which do not 
themselves express emotion can take on an emotional connotation by means of their 
'syntactical' function in a wider musical context. Thus the emotional meaning of a 
diminished triad alone, for example, is ambiguous. But in a musical context, during a 
long period in the history of our musical tradition, it has become a chord that tends to 
go somewhere, to lead to something, and when it occurs as part of a musical 
'sentence' it therefore may take on a restless, 'anguished' character. Gabriel's study 
does suggest, however, that it is highly unlikely that every occurrence of a melodic 
motif has emotional significance. More likely, it is the portion of a sequence that is 
highlighted in its position in the musical structure that is responsible for much of the 
music's emotional meaning (Sloboda, 1985). 
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Nevertheless, there are many who argue that music is not a language in the strict sense 
of having a vocabulary of separable elements with fixed connotations, which can be 
combined by means of syntactical rules in such a way that they take on complex 
connotations without detracting from their individual meanings (e.g. Langer, 1942). 
The emotional effects of music, it is argued, are more dependent upon context, less 
upon purely musical devices, than Cooke allowed. For example, Storr (1992) draws 
attention to the fact that the French carol Quelle est cette odeur agreable, Bergers qui 
ravit tous nos sens appears as a beautifully tender melody when sung as a carol; but 
the same tune serves as a rumbustious drinking song, Fill every glass, in The Beggars 
~- Cooke's thesis is of course also limited from a psychological point of view in 
that he explicitly confines his discussion to European art music written since 1400 and 
in the tonal tradition. As Blacking (1973) points out, because Cooke's theory is not 
general enough to apply to any culture or society, it is automatically inadequate as an 
explanation of the emotional expressiveness of music - even only of European music. 
For these and other reasons, the view that is currently most widely accepted is that it 
is the more primitive, iconic features of music that are the principal carriers of musical 
meaning. 
Integration of different views 
It is, however, quite possible that music can be involved in more than one sign 
function at the same time. Peirce (1955) did not intend his categories of signs to be 
mutually exclusive, and there is .an intuitively appealing argument which holds that 
the indexical, iconic and symbolic theories of musical expressiveness together account 
for how music expresses emotions: sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes -
inextricably - all bound up together. The musical expression of emotion probably 
does not always take place in the same way. 
The idea that musical expression may be partly explained by iconic resemblances to 
emotional behaviour and partly explained by conventional associations was put 
forward some time ago by Frances (1958/1988). More recently, Kivy (1989) has 
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articulated this argument in a more sophisticated and systematic fashion, suggesting 
that emotionally expressive cues in music are of (at least) the following kinds: 
i. Those that are heard as expressing emotion because they resemble expressive 
behaviour of some kind, for example the 'weeping' figure of grief [iconic 
representation]. 
11. Those that do not in themselves resemble expressive behaviour but which 
contribute, in certain contexts, to expressing emotional properties such as 
tension and release. An example would be the 'restless' diminished triad 
[symbolic representation]. 
111. Those which are expressive merely by custom or convention, for example the 
minor triad [indexical representation]. 
Some empirical evidence for this view has been provided in the study by Frances & 
Bruchon-Schweitzer (1983) which was referred to earlier (p.53). The results that they 
obtained were factor-analysed and suggested the following: 
1. The feelings expressed by the pieces of music closely corresponded to the 
feelings visually expressed by the actors' bodies, regardless of the condition of 
induction (either verbal or musical). However, this similarity was limited to 
the activation dimension or kinetic aspect of emotional expression. 
2. Distinguishing the affective tone (positive/negative) of expressed emotions 
which are similar in activation level depends on more conventional and 
culturally variable aspects of music which cannot be directly translated into 
body movement. 
The suggestion here, then, is that different aspects of emotion (for example, hedonic 
tone versus activation level) may be conveyed by different kinds of musical cues. But 
how, then, do we explain differences of opinion - whether of one person with another, 
or of a person with his or her former self - about the emotions expressed by musical 
works? One possibility suggested by Sloboda (1985) is that the emotional cues in 
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music form a hierarchy, with primitive iconic cues such as tempo and volume 
available to most people regardless of their level of musical sophistication, and with 
more subtle (symbolic or indexical) cues such as aspects of tonal relations available 
only to those with deeper analytic po~ers with respect to the music. Therefore as one 
becomes more sophisticated musically (and perhaps obtains greater knowledge of the 
emotional world), so one acquires an improved ability to understand finer emotional 
nuances in music. Thus, while an inexperienced listener often finds the music of 
Mozart elegant but rather insipid and all vaguely 'happy' and trivial, especially when 
set beside the music of the Romantic composers, closer knowledge of Mozart's music·. 
typically results in an appreciation of its emotional richness, diversity and subtlety 
(Brown, 1980; Sloboda, 1985; Storr, 1992). 
According to such cognitive psychological theories of music, while some of music's 
meaning may well be intrinsically specified by musical structure, much of the 
variance in the identification of meaning is attributable to characteristics of the 
listener and their familiarity with the musical idioms of their culture. Music is seen as 
a complex field of experience which draws upon cognitive, aesthetic, emotional and 
aural abilities (Peters, 1990), and which requires a structured listening. From this 
point of view, it is possible to fail to understand the emotional quality of a piece of 
music, since the ability to understand music's affective meaning depends on the 
requisite learning history as well as on the necessary reflective, analytic and 
interpretative abilities (Cunningham & Sterling, 1988). 
What, then, are the variables related to the listener that are necessary to appreciate the 
emotional qualities of music? 
3.3. The effects of listener characteristics on musical meaning 
I 
The effects of listener characteristics on the understanding of emotional expression in 
music have received little systematic attention. What information we do have, 
however, suggests tlmt listener judgments are little affected by musical training 
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(Beldoch, 1964; Campbell, 1942; Edmonston, 1966; Hevner, 1935; Meerum Terwogt 
& van Grinsven, 1988, 1991 ), although it may be that in the randomly selected, small 
samples typically used in these studies within-group differences in training are not 
large enough to make their effects noticeable. 
Gender, too, typically has no effect, or only a small and barely significant effect which 
is limited to particular emotions (Beldoch, 1964; Cunningham & Sterling, 1988; 
Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Edmonston, 1966; Kastner & Crowder, 1990; Kratus, 1993; 
Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1988, 1991), while the effects of intelligence 
(operationally defined in a'Variety of ways) are inconsistent and unclear. Beldoch 
(1964), for example, found that the accuracy with which subjects identified the 
emotions expressed in music was related to their verbal intelligence as measured by a 
vocabulary test. Hevner (1935), on the other hand, found no relation between 
subjects' ability to distinguish between the major and minor modes in music and their 
scores on the Minnesota College Ability tests. 
The ability to identify the broad emotional category into which a piece of music falls 
also does not seem to depend on familiarity with the composition (either having heard 
it before, or being able to identify it) (Hampton, 1945; Lieberman, Lewis & Walters, 
1968). However; an interesting light has been thrown on the question of familiarity 
by Brown (1981 ), who designed a novel study aimed at getting away from a total 
reliance on verbal responses. Brown's subjects were asked to group nineteenth 
century orchestral and operatic excerpts into pairs that were maximally similar in 
meaning. The performance of experts and nonmusicians did not differ when the 
emotional characters of the excerpts were quite disparate. However, when listeners 
were asked, in a study entitled Twelve Variations on Sadness, to make subtle 
distinctions between musical excerpts with very similar emotional meanings and 
which fell into the same verbal emotion category, then above-chance agreement was 
only achieved by listeners who liked, and were well acquainted with, the musical 
styles and genres involved. A possible reason for this has been suggested by Sloboda 
( 1985), who remarks that judgments of the emotional meaning of a piece of music are 
not necessarily made instantaneously as we understand a word or phrase in a spoken 
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language. Rather, the full appreciation of the emotional meaning of a piece of music 
might require careful and repeated hearings in the same way that repeated readings are 
necessary to appreciate the particular implications and connotations of a certain phrase 
ma poem. 
Other listener variables which have been hypothesised to influence the interpretation 
of musical meaning but which have not yet been empirically tested include the 
existing mood of the listener, personality, motivation for listening to music, and 
attitudes toward music in general as well as towards the particular excerpt being 
listened to. 
There is another approach, however, to exploring the effects of nature and nurture on 
the interpretation of emotional meaning in music. The focus of this approach is on the 
role of maturation and learning in the ability to understand one's community's music. 
Here the sort of questions that are asked concern the age at which the standard 
emotional connotations of music begin to appear, and whether these connotations 
become more reliable with age. These questions will be considered in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER4: 
DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS IN THE 
INTERPRETATION OF EMOTION IN MUSIC 
4.1. Effects of age 
As with all studies of musical meaning, some of the findings with children may reflect 
the particular musical stimuli used (recorded orchestral excerpts, solo instrumental 
pieces, songs, or specially composed melodies), as Well as the response measures 
employed (usually verbal responses versus schematic drawings of facial expressions). 
Nevertheless, there is considerable agreement among studies that even preschool 
children can recognise a few basic emotions in music at better than chance levels. 
And by the time they are six or seven, children typically show beyond-chance 
agreement for all the emotions tested - most commonly happiness, sadness, anger and 
fear (Cunningham & Sterling, 1988; Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Kastner & Crowder, 
1990; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1988, 1991; Trehub, Cohen & Guerriero, 
1987 in Trehub, 1993). In addition, all the studies conducted to date except that of 
. Kratus (1993) have found a developmental trend: the older children are, the more 
accurate they are at recognising the emotions expressed in music. Cunningham and 
Sterling (1988), Dolgin and Adelson (1990) and Meerum Terwogt and van Grinsven 
(1988, 1991) all found that children's ability to identify the emotions of happiness, 
sadness, anger and fear in music improved with age. Cunningham and Sterling 
(1988), for example, asked subjects aged 4, 5, 6, and 19-24 to assign verbal labels to 
orchestral excerpts previously judged by adults to express one of the above four 
emotions. The four-year-olds showed beyond-chance agreement with adults for only 
two of the emotions, the five-year-olds for three emotions, and the six-year-olds for all 
affective categories. Dolgin and Adelson (1990) investigated the ability of 4-, 7- and 
9-year-old children to recognise the same four emotions in specially composed 
melodies presented in two modalities: soprano voice and viola. They gave their 
subjects the opportunity to express thei.r choices either nonverbally (by selecting facial 
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expressions) or verbally. They found that four-year-olds' agreement with adults was 
above chance except for males' identification of fear played on the viola and females' 
identification of anger and fear played on the viola. Using a somewhat different 
approach, Scherer and Oshinsky (1977) conducted a pilot study in which they asked 
ten second-graders, nine sixth-graders and ten adults to choose between alternative 
labels (illustrated by stylised facial expressions) for twelve synthesised tone sequences 
that had been found consistently to receive particular emotional labels in their main 
study with adults. Their results showed a linear trend for age, with decreasing 
numbers of errors for older subjects. 
4.2. Effects of emotion 
As with adults, some emotions were found to be easier for children to identify than 
others. The general finding is that children at all age levels apparently find it easiest 
to identify happiness in music followed by sadness, anger and fear, usually in that 
order (Cunningham & Sterling, 1988; Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Kastner & Crowder, , 
1990; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1988, 1991; Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977). 
There is widespread agreement that children as young as four can identify happy 
music (Cunningham & Sterling, 1988; Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Kastner & Crowder, 
1990; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1988, 1991; Trehub et al., 1987, in Trehub, 
1993). However, children are less accurate at identifying other emotions in music. 
Cunningham and Sterling (1988) found that four-year-olds had difficulty recognising 
sadness in music, while both four- and five-year-olds were unable to recognise anger 
at above-chance levels. Cunningham and Sterling's five-year-olds and Dolgin and 
Adelson's four-year-olds also had difficulty identifying fear. 
Although relatively few studies have examined children's errors, Meerum Terwogt 
and van Grinsven (1988, 1991) and Cunningham and Sterling (1988) found that anger 
· and fear were frequently confused with each other. For example, in Cunningham and 
Sterling's ( 1988) study, one half of the four-year-olds' responses to the three anger 
segments were afraid interpretations, while only one-quarter were anger 
interpretations. In addition, Dolgin and Adelson (1990), using specially composed 
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melodies reflecting auditory characteristics associated with emotions in speech, found 
that their subjects tended to confuse frightened and sad-sounding melodies; 
furthermore, angry-sounding melodies were, if not correctly recognised, confused 
with happy-sounding ones, but not vice-versa. Dolgin and Adelson also pointed out 
that although the four-y~ar-olds made many errors, their responses were not random. 
They avoided confusing emotions. that according to theories such as those of Plutchik 
(1980, in Dolgin & Adelson, 1990) are 'polar opposites': happiness and sadness, and 
anger and fear. They concluded that four-year-olds generally understand some portion 
of the emotional content of music even when they cannot make a completely correct 
judgment. Taking a slightly different approach, Kratus (1993) found that children 
aged six to twelve were able to make more consistent distinctions between happy and 
sad music than between excited and calm music. Similarly, a table in Flowers' (1988) 
study (cited in Kratus, 1993) indicates that children in preschool through sixth grade 
who were asked to describe music used the adjectives 'happy' and 'sad' more 
frequently than they did 'exciting' and 'calm', although college students frequently 
used words such as 'excited', 'relaxing' and 'peaceful' to refer to music. 
How can we explain these findings? If, as has been suggested above, musical 
meaning depends both on structural features of the music and on certain listener 
characteristics, then we would expect that an improvement in the ability to detect 
emotional expressiveness in music would be influenced firstly by an improved 
auditory processing capacity (in other words, a more advanced or differentiated 
perception of musical elements), and secondly by an increased knowledge of the 
meaning of emotion concepts in a particular community. 
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4.3. What do children know about music, and how does this 
knowledge develop? 
It has recently become clear that the musical aspects of speech are particularly salient 
for infants, and that even newborns can distinguish between notes of different pitch 
and intensity (Fernald, 1989; Trainor & Trehub, 1992). By the time they are about 5 
months old, infants can detect pitch changes as small as one semitone (the smallest 
ratio separating notes in Western tonal music), and can discriminate changes in both 
melodic contour and rhythm pattern (Chang & Trehub, 1977b in Trehub, Bull & 
Thorpe, 1984; Cohen, Thorpe & Trehub, 1987). By 19 months most children also 
produce songs with melodic contours and occasional, if irregular, rhythm patterns 
(Davidson, McKernon & Gardner, 1981). 
There is evidence to suggest that children's initial grasp of music is 'topological': 
they categorise sequences of sound on the basis of global, relational properties such as 
melodic contour and rhythm, rather than on the basis of specific details (Trehub, 1987; 
Trehub, Bull & Thorpe, 1984; Trehub, Thorpe & Morrongiello, 1987). As children 
grow older, they gradually advance from using these global processing strategies to 
using more subtle features such as tonality and interval size. Although it is unclear 
when the ability to use these mote subtle features appears, Davidson et al. (1981) 
found that by the age of five-and-a-half children could produce songs organised 
within a stable key or tonality. Five-year-olds can also distinguish closely-related 
keys from distant keys, although they struggle to detect changes in interval size in 
melodies (Bartlett & Dowling, 1980). At this age children also acquire the ability to 
perform expressive transformations, for example to slow down the pace of a song for 
a sad version thereof (Davidson et al., 1981 ). 
On the basis of these findings, Gardner (l 973a, in Hargreaves, 1986) argues that by 
the age of six or seven children possess many of the fundamental skills required for 
full-scale musical perception and performance. There is evidence that at least by the 
age of eight, children can not only distinguish between a melody played in different 
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keys, but can also detect interval changes in melodies (Bartlett ~ Dowling, 1980). It 
seems, therefore, that after the age of eight musical development involves merely an 
improvement in the basic skills that have already been acquired. 
It is not very surprising, then, that children apparently base their judgments of the 
emotions expressed by music on much the same formal musical elements as those 
used by adults. When Meerum Terwogt and van Grinsven (1988, 1991) asked their 
subjects to justify their classifications of musical excerpts into emotion categories, 
they found that older subjects mentioned more and more varied musical elements such 
as tempo or the use of particular elements, but that all age groups mentioned rhythm 
and melody with equal frequency. 
Kratus ( 1993) conducted a set of stepwise regression analyses to investigate the 
relationship between musical elements and emotion judgments, and found that 
schoolchildren listening to excerpts from Bach's Goldberg Variations based their 
happy-sad distinctions largely on the rhythmic activity (regardless of tempo) and 
articulation (staccato/legato) of the excerpt, while excited-calm distinctions were 
largely based on rhythmic activity and meter (duple/triple). Trehub et al. (1987, in 
. Trehub, 1993) played very simple melodic sequences composed of either two or nine 
notes to children between the ages of 4 and 8 as well as to adults, and asked them to 
rotate a pointer to a sad face, a happy face, or a neutral face. For children, like adults, 
high pitch - fast rate two-note sequences and ascending nine-note sequences typically 
led to happy judgments, while the typical response to low-slow and descending 
sequences was sad. 
The effects of modality on affective judgments by children are less clear. Trehub et 
al. (1987) found that children's responses to nine-note sequences using notes from 
either the major or minor scale were inconsistent. Kastner and Crowder, however, 
obtained contrasting results. They played twelve short musical passages in either the 
major or minor mode to 38 children between the ages of three and twelve, and asked 
them to point to one of four schematic faces chosen to symbolise happy, sad, angry 
and neutraVcontented expressions. They found that the conventional positive 
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(happy/neutral) - major and negative (sad/angry) - minor connotation was present for 
all their subjects, even the youngest, and that the means differed significantly from 
chance. These results need to be interpreted with caution, however, as Felleman et al. 
(1983) have found a tendency for children to misidentify neutral expressions as sad. 
Nevertheless, some support for Kastner and Crowder' s conclusions is provided by 
Kratus (1993). In his study, modality did not enter any of the stepwise regression 
analyses as a significant predictor of subjects' interpretations, as it was highly 
correlated with other variables that were more strongly related to subjects' responses. 
However, modality was significantly correlated with the percentages of both happy 
and excited responses, indicating that children associated the minor mode with both 
sad and calm responses. In this way, children interpreted modality in music in much 
the same way as adults do. Finally, Kastner and Crowder (1990) also found an 
interesting interaction between mode and type of arrangement (harmonised versus 
unharmonised). Minor tunes were perceived as sad or angry much more frequently 
when presented in their harmonised version than in their purely melodic version. And 
for major-mode stimuli, subjects associated unaccompanied items more often with 
positive emotions than accompanied items. 
The mode of presentation also appears to have an effect: Dolgin and Adelson (1990) 
found that their youngest subjects, four-year-olds, were better able to recognise 
emotion in sung, rather than instrumental, melodies. It needs to be remembered, 
however, that Dolgin and Adelson's melodies were specially composed to include 
features associated with the expression of emotion in the human voice. It is therefore 
impossible to determine from this study alone whether this difference in accuracy 
should be attributed to the difference in the familiarity of voice and viola, whether it is 
intrinsically easier to interpret these particular emotional cues in voices than in 
musical instruments (or at least the viola), or whether both differences are important. 
Dolgin and Adelson's results also showed a significant condition x emotion 
interaction: sad melodies were more readily identified when performed on the viola, 
while angry melodies were more recognisable when sung. 
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Taken together, these findings provide some support for Gardner's (1973a) assertion 
that 
a reasonably competent 7-year-old should understand the basic metrical 
properties of his musical system and the appropriate scales, harmonies, 
cadences and groupings .... What is lacking is fluency in motor skills, which 
will allow accurate performance, experience with the code, tradition and style 
of that culture, and a range of feeling life .. 
(quoted in Hargreaves, 1986, p.83) 
It is this "feeling life", or more specifically the child's knowledge and understanding 
of emotions, to which this discussion will now tum. 
4.4. What do children know about emotions, and how does this 
knowledge develop? 
Knowledge about emotions develops enormously between birth and adulthood, and 
the answer to the question of what children know about emotion therefore varies quite 
considerably depending on the age of the children in question. Furthermore, because 
emotions are multidimensional constructs it is difficult to make generalisations about 
the nature ofemotional development as a unitary phenomenon, since each of the 
components of emotion may have different developmental timetables (Brody, 1985). 
As Manstead (1993) points out, however, research conducted within the last few 
decades suggests that at any given age children tend to know more about emotion than 
was previously thought. 
Most developmental researchers have tended to focus on only one component of 
emotion such as children's emotional vocabulary, recognition of facial expressions, 
or knowledge of the causes and consequences of emotion. Data obtained by 
Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler and Ridgeway (1986) and Smiley and Huttenlocher 
( 1989) indicate that emotion language first emerges around eighteen months to two 
years of age, and increases during the third year. During this time children come to 
label the emotions of others as well as their own, to discuss past and future emotions, 
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and to talk appropriately about the antecedents and consequences of emotions. It has 
been suggested that at this stage chiidren's emotion concepts merely refer to 
expressive behaviours, and that it is only later that they recognise that emotions also 
have internal, intrapsychic components (Beckwith, 1991; Smiley & Huttenlocher, 
1989). However, Wellman et al. (1995), who examined children's use of emotion 
terms in natural language, have presented data to make a strong case that even 
children as young as two years appreciate that emotions are internal, subjective, 
experiential states, and distinguish them from the situations that elicit them and the 
expressions and actions that they give rise to. 
Because many events that communicate affective information in early childhood are 
non-verbal and interpersonal, much of the research on children's understanding and 
awareness of emotions has focused on children's ability to label and recognise facial 
(and occasionally other non-verbal) expressions of emotion. Children have been given 
drawings, photographs or videos of posed or spontaneous facial expressions and been 
asked to provide or select a verbal label for them (Felleman, Barden, Carlson, 
Rosenberg & Masters, 1983; Field & Walden, 1982; Profyt & Whissell, 1991; Stifter 
& Fox, 1986; Tremblay, Kirouac & Dore, 1987), to select a facial expression that goes 
with a given label (Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989), or to match facial expressions to a 
standard (Walden & Field, 1982). They have also been asked to select the emotions 
communicated by non-verbal vocal expressions (Dimitrovsky, 1964; McCluskey, 
Albas, Niemi, Cuevas & Ferrer, 1975; Stifter & Fox, 1986). 
A second body of research has investigated children's ability to identify the emotions 
elicited by verbally described situations and to identify the causes and consequences 
of emotions. In this research tradition children have typically been asked to provide a 
verbal label, select a verbal label, or choose a photograph of a facial expression to 
represent the emotion that would be experienced by the protagonist in a short story 
(Borke, 1971, 1973; Camras, 1980; Camras & Allison, 1985; Gibbs & Woll, 1985), or 
to describe the causes and/or consequences of a set of emotions (Bortolotti, D'Elia & 
Whissell, 1993; Russell, 1990; Stein & Jewett, 1986). 
69 
Despite the methodological variability and focus on different components of emotion, 
however, the data indicate that there ate several clear trends in the development of 
emotional understanding. The most consistent.finding is that children's recognition 
and comprehension of emotional situations and expressions becomes increasingly 
sophisticated with age (Borke, 1971, 1973; Bortolotti et al., 1993; DePaulo & 
Rosenthal, 1978; Dimitrovsky, 1964; Felleman et al., 1983; Field & Walden, 1982; 
Gibbs & Woll, 1985; Manstead, Anderson & Bromley in Manstead, 1993; McCluskey 
et al., 1975; Profyt & Whissell, 1991; Russell, 1990; Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989; 
Tremblay, Kirouac & Dore, 1987; Walden & Field, 1982; for reviews see Gross & 
Ballif, 1991 and Manstead & Edwards, 1992). 
Several studies suggest that pre-verbal infants can discriminate between positive and 
negative facial expressions and that they can associate positive and negative facial 
expressions with vocal expressions of emotion, although one cannot be sure that 
specific emotion meaning (e.g. 'fear' as opposed to merely 'something negative') is 
understood at this stage (Field, Woodson, Greenberg & Cohen, 1981 in Field & 
Walden, 1982; LaBarbera, Izard, Vietze & Parisi, 1976; Walker, 1982; Young-
Browne, Rosenfeld & Horowitz, 1977). By about two-and-a-half years of age, the 
majority of children can identify happy facial expressions, but have difficulty 
distinguishing among other emotions. By the age of about four or five children can 
generally recognise happy, sad, angry, scared and surprised facial expressions at 
above-chance levels, although they still perform relatively poorly compared to adults. 
By this time they can also identify situations that are likely to cause these emotions in 
others at above-chance levels, and can produce largely plausible - by adult standards -
antecedents and consequences for a variety of positive and negative emotions. The 
ability to distinguish between specific facial expressions within the general categories 
of positive or negative expressions continues to improve with age, and by the time 
they are nine years old, children typically display a very high level of accurate 
judgments. Although much less is known about children's abilities to interpret others' 
auditory emotion signals, there is evidence from studies starting at age five or six that 
recognition ability for vocally expressed emotions also improves with age at least 
until age I 0 or thereabouts, when the rate of improvement declines slightly 
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(Dimitrovsky, 1974; McCluskey, Albas, Niemi, Cuevas & Ferrer, 1975; Stifter & Fox, 
1986). Older children also perform with greater accuracy than younger children when 
given a combination of audio and visual channels of nonverbal communication 
(DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1978, 1979). 
A second conclusion is that, across ages, children identify certain emotions correctly 
more often than others. Although there are some differerices among studies, the 
general result is that happiness is differentiated, identified and labelled earlier and 
more consistently than other states, usually followed by sadness and anger, and 
subsequently by fear, disgust and surprise. Emotion terms requiring more complex 
understanding of interpersonal situations (for instance, gratitude, guilt or pride) are not 
appropriately used until the age of about seven or eight (Borke, 1971, 1973; Bortolotti 
et al., 1993; Camras & Allison, 1985; Felleman et al., 1983; Field & Walden, 1982; 
Gibbs & Woll, 1985; Harris et al., 1987, in Manstead, 1993; Profyt & Whissell, 1991; 
Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989; Stifter & Fox, 1986; Tremblay, Kirouac & Dore, 1987; 
Walden & Field, 1982). 
Although relatively few studies have analysed children's errors, it appears that their 
misjudgments are systematic. Although children can make accurate discriminations 
between positive and negative emotions, there is a general tendency for them to· 
confuse emotions within these broad categories. For example, Borke (1971, 1973) 
and Felleman et al. (1983) found a tendency for sadness to be misidentified as anger 
and vice versa. Similarly, Manstead et al. (in Manstead, 1993) found that when 
children were asked to match situations with emotion words or facial expressions, 
their youngest subjects responded to fear and anger with sad labels, and to disgust 
with sad or angry judgments. Manstead et al. (1993) and Russell (1990) also found a 
trend for situations which the majority of subjects linked with excitement to be 
described as leading to happiness. 
Other studies have found errors to be characterised by similarity along the dimension 
of activity, rather than valence. Dimitrovsky (1964), for example, found that vocal 
expressions of active emotions (anger and happiness) tended to be confused, as did the 
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passive emotions of sadness and love. Felleman et al. (1983) found a tendency for 
children to confuse sad and neutral facial expressions, and a secondary tendency for 
anger to be misidentified as happiness. 
In other cases, both the activation and the pleasure dimensions seem to be involved. 
Green and Ekman (1973, in Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989) found that four-year-olds 
had some difficulty distinguishing sad from angry, angry from scared, and surprised 
from both scared and happy facial expressions when asked to select an expression that 
matched a given situation. The last finding parallels that of Manstead et al. (in 
Manstead, 1993), who point out that it reflects the ambivalent nature of the concept 
'surprise' on the dimension of pleasure-displeasure. 
There is also some suggestion that children's emotion concepts are not necessarily 
equivalent to those of adults. In particular, children may interpret surprise, and 
perhaps also excitement, more positively than do adults. For example, according to 
the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) developed by Ekman and Friesen (1971), 
Field and Walden's (1982) photograph of a child's expression for surprise was a 
happy/surprise blend. Russell (1990) and Bullock and Russell (1984) have found that 
children are much more likely than adults to give a positive sense to the word 
'surprise', although they treat a facial expression of surprise as neither positive nor 
negative. Similarly, Stein and Jewett (1984) reported the results of a pilot study 
showing that young children associate excitement and surprise with positive events. 
Felleman et al. (1983) point out, however, that an important precaution in interpreting 
results, which is absent in most studies of children's ability to recognise emotional 
states, concerns analysis of the role played by basic inclinations to use, or not to use, 
various emotional labels. They found that children had high base rates for using the 
labels 'happy' and 'sad', which increased their accuracy in recognising those states, 
while low base rates for anger and neutral labels hindered accuracy in identifying 
those states. Similarly, Manstead et al. (in Manstead, 1993) found that younger 
children used the terms happy and sad significantly more often than older children, 
perhaps explaining why, although age trends were seen for other emotions, younger 
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children were as accurate in identifying happiness and sadness as the older children. 
In another study, Dimitrovsky (1964) found that children identifying vocal 
expressions of emotion responded more often with the negative emotions (sad and 
angry) than with the positive emotions (happy and loving), which partly accounted for 
their greater accuracy in recognising the negative states. 
Several other methodological considerations also need to be taken into account when 
evaluating the above findings. Different results across studies may be due to the fact 
that the various techniques used for measuring children's recognition and 
understanding of emotion differ considerably in the task demands placed on subjects. 
Several researchers have expressed concern that children's performance on emotion 
recognition tasks may be confounded by limitations in their verbal ability: higher 
recognition scores are usually found on research tasks that require the comprehension 
of emotion words than on tasks that involve explanations of and/or the production of 
emotion words (Gross & Ballif, 1991; Lewis, 1989). There is also evidence, however, 
that specifying emotions using either only words or only facial expressions may 
produce different responses, and that at least for some emotions such as fear and 
disgust, verbal labels are in fact understood better that facial expressions (Camras & 
Allison, 1985; Manstead et al. in Manstead, 1993; Russell, 1990). 
In those studies that do use facial expressions, the quality of the stimulus materials 
may also be an issue. Children may not respond in the same way to line drawings, 
static photographs, and videotapes (see, for example, Field & Walden, 1982), and 
static representations of facial expressions may have little relation to the subtly 
changing facial expressions that occur during everyday interactive situations, so the 
external validity of these measures is questionable. This problem is exacerbated by 
the fact that some researchers do not evaluate their stimulus materials to make sure 
that the intended emotion is in fact portrayed. 
A similar problem occurs when children are asked to link emotions with situations. It 
has been pointed out that the stories presented to children may be ambiguous, or that 
they might conceivably lead to more than one emotional reaction. For example, a 
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scenario in which a playmate breaks the child's toy is typically expected to lead to 
anger (at the playmate's destructive behaviour); however, it is equally plausible that it 
could lead to sadness (because the toy is broken). One's emotional reaction will 
depend on which aspect of the situation one focuses on, possibly reflecting individual 
differences in responding to frustration (Borke, 1971, 1973; Camras, 1986; Field & 
Walden, 1982) .. Michalson and.Lewis (1985, in Lewis, 1989), for instance, presented 
.· their subjects with a situation of a child lost in a store, assuming that the 'correct' 
emotional response would be fear. However, their adult subjects were equally divided 
as to whether this situation would lead to fear or sadness, and their child subjects 
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associated the situation primarily with sadness: these responses could not really be 
described as 'incorrect' simply because they disagreed with the researchers' 
interpretations. 
Another methodological limitation is that many studies do not compare children's 
response patterns with those of adults, making it difficult to determine when the 
developmental process has reached its peak (Lewis, 1989). Developmental advances 
during later childhood may be obscured if we assume that adults' responses would be 
the same as those of older children in the study. Alternatively, not knowing adults' 
responses might lead us to underestimate children's emotion knowledge. For 
example; if we find that only sixty percent of five-year-old children label a facial 
expression correctly, we could easily assume that the developmental process is 
incomplete at this age if we did not know that adults also only get the correct solution 
sixty percent of the time. 
In spite of these methodological limitations, however, a few firm conclusions can be 
drawn. It appears that the ability to identify specific emotions in both music and in 
other, more 'natural' stimuli emerges in the preschool years and improves with age. 
Accuracy does, however, vary with the particular emotion depicted, and inaccuracies 
or misidentifications tend to be systematic rather than random. 
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4.5. Explaining children's emotional development 
4.5.1. Traditional approaches 
How do we account for these findings? Unfortunately, although the kinds of studies 
discussed above have added much to our knowledge of children's understanding of 
emotions, few researchers have looked at how children come to know what they 
know. The majority of studies are not grounded in or motivated by a particular theory 
of emotional development, and most researchers therefore briefly attempt to explain 
their findings about the changes that occur in children's knowledge of emotional 
behaviour on the basis of post hoc theories. This often leads to inconsistent data and 
confusion, making it difficult to compare studies and systematically accumulate 
knowledge. Without a theoretical rationale, it is unclear how we can explain the 
mechanisms or processes that might underlie the way in which children's 
interpretation of a particular emotional situation, facial expression, or piece of music 
develops. 
Those explanations that have been provided for the way in which emotional 
knowledge changes with age have typically grown out of the theorist's explicit or 
implicit beliefs about the nature of emotion. For example, the psychoevolutionary or 
biosocial theorists' assumption that there is a set of discrete, universal, biologically-
based emotional expressions each of which involves distinctive types of facial, vocal, 
gestural and bodily expression (Izard, 1991) has led scholars who support this position 
to claim that human infants are endowed with innate and instinctive recognition 
devices for interpreting the meaning of this repertoire of emotional expressions 
(Darwin, 1904 ). This line of thinking suggests that children's early concepts of 
emotion are probably anchored to facial - and (although we know less about them) 
perhaps other nonverbal - expressions. Thus, irrespective of culture, the first emotions 
a child will come to understand will be 'basic' emotions such as happiness, sadness 
and anger that can be conveyed easily by facial expressions (Harris & Saami, 1989). 
During development, children's understanding of emotion becomes more 
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sophisticated as they associate these nonverbal expressions with distinct feelings, and 
modify them by associating them with particular behaviours and symbols (including 
verbal labels) as they mature and take part in an increasing variety of social 
experiences (Malatesta & Izard, 1984 in Gross & Ballif, 1991). According to this 
view, there is a tight and inherent link between a particular situation and a particular 
emotion. The role of the social context, therefore, is to facilitate or inhibit the 
emergence of universal cognitive abilities rather than to be an important determinant 
of emotional development in its own right (Gordon, 1989; Harris & Saarni, 1989). 
Because research in this tradition has tended to assume that such words as 'anger' and 
'fear' refer to a set of schemata that are biologically grounded and effectively culture-
free, an understanding of emotion is typically seen as a straightforward registration of 
a universal truth. As a result, certain responses are considered correct, and the rest 
errors. The focus of research within this tradition has therefore tended to be on how 
accurately and rapidly children come to recognise the universal and biologically·based 
links between different emotion components such as expressions and experiences. 
If we apply this position to music, it might be postulated that there are innate, 
universal auditory 'emotion-detectors' common to both the prosodic aspects of speech 
and music (e.g. Scherer, 1979; Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977; Trainor & Trehub, 1992), 
just as there are innate emotion detectors for facial expressions. Izard (1991), for 
example, argues that each basic emotion involves distinctive changes in tone of voice 
(and specifically in the fundamental frequency, or pitch thereof) or possess other 
individual acoustic characteristics. Perhaps, then, children's errors in labelling 
emotional pieces of music can be attributed to children's perceptual limitations 
regarding their ability torecognise and differentiate each of the basic emotions as 
expressed in the auditory modality. 
This explanation for children's errors has been applied to the visual modality by Stein 
and Jewett(l986), who argue that children may experience difficulty in labelling 
facial expressions because they have difficulty locating and encoding the unique 
features of each basic emotional expression which adults supposedly can detect. 
Therefore children might have more difficulty identifying complex facial expressions 
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like fear (which involves seven independent muscle movements) than simple 
expressions like happiness, which involves only two muscle movements (Matsumoto, 
1992). In addition, they might systematically confuse expressions in which the 
positions of facial features are similar (for example, anger and disgust). 
Some evidence for this idea has been obtained by Walden and Field (1982). In their 
research onchildren's understanding of facial expressions, they found that pointing 
out facial features to children aided discrimination of expressions that they found 
problematic. In addition, De Paulo and Rosenthal ( 1978, 1979) have found evidence 
that non-verbal decoding skills become more differentiated with age, with older 
subjects being able to process, integrate and utilise more information than younger 
subjects. 
In contrast to the biological theorists, the social constructionists argue that the links 
between the components of emotion (for example, facial expressions and situations) 
are socially constructed and therefore arbitrary: no particular component is essential 
to the whole. In other words, terms such as anger imply not an absolute truth, but 
rather a culturally relative one. Consequently, the more radical proponents of this 
position claim that the child can have little understanding of emotion that is not 
socially transmitted, as society determines what emotions will be experienced, what 
their subjective experiences will be like, and how they will be interpreted. Therefore 
children's emotional knowledge changes not only because of cognitive development, · 
but also because they construct their own emotion knowledge in response to their 
changing social interactions, their exposure to the beliefs, vocabulary, norms, 
metaphors, rules and so on provided by their culture, as well as through the effects of 
reinforcement and observational learning (Gordon, 1989; Harris & Saarni, 1989). 
According to this view, children's understanding and awareness of particular emotions 
is primarily the result of socialisation: children learn about certain emotions through 
observing their own and others' behaviour, and through verbal explanations by others 
which may either reveal or conceal certain norms and beliefs about those emotions 
(Harris & Olthof, 1982 in Gordon, 1989). Although social constructionists have 
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studied variations in emotional experience and expression linked to social structure 
and child-rearing practices, their findings have not been linked to the development of 
children's understanding of emotion. However, Borke (1971, 1973) suggested quite 
persuasively, on the basis of her findings regarding American and Chinese children's 
abilities to label emotional situations, that emotion recognition is influenced by the 
salience and social acceptability of particular emotions in different societies. This 
position implies that children would have more difficulty recognising certain emotions 
- whether in situations, facial expressions, or music - that are less acceptable to them, 
or that have low social acceptability in their culture. 
This explanation has an advantage over the biological theories in that it can explain 
why children show similar patterns of performance across different expressive 
modalities as well as when labelling emotional situations. In fact, virtually all 
theories of emotional development do make at least some provision for the influence 
of social learning, and many theorists would agree with Borke's view despite thinking 
the social constructionist view to be too extreme. What this argument cannot explain, 
however, is why certain emotions are systematically confused with each other. Thus 
while there seems to be some truth in both the biological and the social constructionist 
perspectives, neither alone seems able to provide a full account of how and why 
children's knowledge of emotions develops. 
4.5.2. An integrative approach 
The next logical step would therefore appear to be to try and integrate these two 
approaches, which is what James Russell and his colleagues have done (Bullock & 
Russell, 1984, 1986; Russell & Bullock, 1985, 1986; Russell & Ridgeway, 1983; 
Russell, 1989). According to their position, which has been referred to as 'moderate' 
social constructionism, children do not possess i1U1ate, discrete emotion categories. 
Nevertheless, there are universal constraints on their interpretation of emotion. ·Young 
children, it is argued, initially classify emotions not in terms· of discrete categories but 
rather in terms of two continuous dimensions:. degree of pleasure and (either 
simultaneously or slightly later) degree of arousal or activation. In other words, 
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young children may initially interpret emotion expressions in a global, relatively 
undifferentiated way according to their general tone, rather than in terms of adultlike 
categories labelled anger, fear, and so on. This hypothesis does not deny that very 
young children discriminate and categorise different emotions, but argues that 
children may initially discriminate between emotion expressions in quantitative rather 
than qualitative terms. 
With development, then, children have to learn to differentiate within their global 
interpretation of the emotional domain until they acquire the adult meanings of the 
categories labelled anger, fear, and so on. The child is thought to develop from 
interpreting emotions in terms of pleasure and arousal to distinguishing emotions 
located at similar points in the two-dimensional space through acquiring emotion 
scripts. Cognitive gains and interpersonal experiences (including observation and 
direct teaching) allow children to learn that the features that make up emotion events 
(for example, contexts, causes, beliefs, physiological reactions, desires, subjective 
feelings, facial expressions, behaviours and consequences) are correlated and tend to 
occur in predictable sequences. In addition, they are stimulated to differentiate among 
emotions previously treated as if they were alike by the labels and interpretations their 
society provides. Thus, while the ability to interpret emotions in terms of broad 
.. . 
dimensions is argued to be innate and pancultural, children learn how to classify and 
differentiate among emotions from their particular culture. 
This view of development has two implications for children's understanding of 
emotion concepts. Firstly, although emotion categories are hypothesised to be fuzzy 
at all ages, the boundaries of emotion categories become less fuzzy with increasing 
age. Younger children have broader conceptions of emotion categories than their 
older counterparts, and initially overgeneralize emotion words to all emotion states 
similar in pleasure and arousal (which explains why they make more 'errors' when 
labelling facial expressions). As they grow older, children's conceptions of what 
define an emotion become narrower and more specific. Secondly, because emotion 
scripts are based on the existence of characteristic or frequently recurring features as 
opposed to necessary and sufficient universal features, the points within the two-
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di.mensional grid at which children develop emotion prototypes will depend on their 
culture and may change with development as their emotional experiences change. 
According to this view, children's 'errors' in recognising and labelling emotional 
expressions are manifestations of their conceptual system: expressions similar in 
pleasure and arousal may initially be treated as alike. For example, what appears to an 
adult as fear, anger, tensiOn, disgust or upset may all appear to the child as 'unpleasant 
and aroused' (Russell & Bullock, 1985, 1986). Consequently, these authors argue that 
at any given age, some categories such as happiness are used more consistently 
because they overlap less with other categories presented to the child - 'happiness' is 
usually the only positive emotion included in studies and hence is maximally distinct 
from the other, less pleasant, emotions. 
This theory argues that children will begin to distinguish between states similar in 
pleasure and arousal as they acquire the adult emotion scripts for these states. Some 
simple scripts, such as 'happiness' (which involves a pleasant feeling due to attaining 
a desired state) will be acquired before those of more complex emotions. Very young 
children may therefore treat terms such as anger and sadness (both of which involve 
goal failure and negative feelings) as though they have the same meaning because 
they have not yet acquired the key components ofthe.'adult' emotion scripts, which 
according to Stein and Levine (1989, in Manstead, 1993) involve a focus either on the 
causes of the goal failure (leading to anger) or on the consequences thereof (leading to 
sadness). Similarly, older pre-schoolers might not make an adult-like differentiation 
between words such as surprise, excitement and happiness, presumably because they 
often hear the first two words in pleasant contexts (for example, "I've got a surprise 
[gift] for you"). It is only later that they learn that words such as surprise and 
excitement refer to high arousal states which are not necessarily pleasant. School-
aged children and adults usually have little trouble making this distinction, but may 
· treat emotions such as guilt and shame - which have even more complex scripts 
requiring a differentiation on the basis of internal versus external causes of the 
displeasure at having violated a rule - as though they had the same meaning. Their 
failure to make fine distinctions between closely related emotions does not, however, 
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mean that such distinctions are not possible. Rather, from this perspective the 
potential taxonomy ofemotion concepts 1s infinite. 
Russell and his colleagues have provided intriguing evidence that when children are 
asked to select a photograph of a facial expression that depicts a particular emotion, 
their errors are quite systematic. They interpret this as support for their contention 
that even before they have any knowledge of emotion names or can label facial 
expressions of emotion 'accurately', very young children nevertheless interpret 
emotions in a meaningful way and can categorise and judge the similarity between 
them. In an unpublished study (reported in Russell, 1989) in which 2-year-olds were 
asked to associate photographs of facial expressions with words like happy or angry, 
these children distinguished positive from negative facial expressions, but were unable 
to distinguish among the negative expressions. Similar findings have been obtained 
by other researchers (Borke, 1971; Camras & Allison, 1985; Felleman et al., 1983; 
Manstead et al. in Manstead, 1993; Stifter & Fox, 1986; Smiley & Huttenlocher, 
1989). 
Additional evidence that the pleasure and arousal dimensions contribute to children's 
understanding of emotion comes from factor analyses and multidimensional scaling of 
children's self-reported emotions (Russell& Ridgeway, 1983) and from 
multidimensional scaling of the perceived similarity ratings between different facial 
expressions. In a set of studies utilising the latter statistical technique, Bullock and 
Russell (1984, 1986; Russell & Bullock 1985, 1986; Russell & Ridgeway, 1983) 
found that the errors made by children between the ages of two and four (as well as by 
adults) were quite systematic and conformed to what the authors predicted on the 
basis of their circumplex model of emotions, in that errors were likely to be a direct 
function of the distance between the target emotion and the other emotions in terms of 
pleasantness and arousal. In other words, the errors made in facial expression tasks 
were more likely to be selections of 'neighbouring' emotion categories in the 
structural model than other category choices, with the probability of a choice 
decreasing with distance (that is, the number of steps) away from the target emotion. 
Supporting evidence that pleasure and arousal dimensions underlie even young 
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children's emotion concepts has been provided by Whissell and D'Elia (1993) and 
Moland and Whissell (1993) who found that adults' open-ended categorisations of 
children's drawings of, and statements of antecedents of, six emotions could be 
predicted on the basis of ratings of pleasantness and arousal. These researchers also 
found that the distance between emotions in two-dimensional space was predictive of 
confusion between different emotions. 
Russell and his colleagues have also found evidence that for most emotion words, 
children's categories narrow with age. For example, in a study reported by Bullock 
and Russell (1986) children were shown photographs of facial expressions and asked 
"Is this person x?" where x was one of 9 emotion terms. On average, a facial 
expression was put into 4.0 categories by three-year-olds, 2.5 categories by four-year-
olds, and 2.2 categories by five-year-olds. When children were asked to select the 
best expression to match a given label, younger children also tended to be 
overinclusive by adult standards - that is, they overgeneralized emotion words to all 
emotional facial expressions similar in pleasure and arousal. For each emotion there 
was a focal point, the expression most likely to be chosen, with the probability of a 
choice decreasing with distance from the focal point. However, the range around the 
focal point was broader for younger than for older subjects, and became narrower with 
increasing age~ This finding is in accordance with the research of Alexander and Enns 
(1988) who (although they were not concerned with emotions) found similar effects 
when they examined the boundaries of categories formed by preschoolers and adults 
following exposure to a continuum of new objects (stuffed animals). Although 
category boundaries were fuzzy at all ages, they became relatively less fuzzy (that is, 
increasingly exclusive) with increasing age. Younger children overextended 
categories to a broader range of exemplars than older subjects, even if this meant that 
the two categories were not mutually exclusive, and underextended concepts to 
similar exemplars. 
Russell and Bullock's theoretical model leaves important questions about emotional 
development unanswered. Firstly, as Manstead (1993) points out, it is not clear why 
and how the young child's concept of emotion is constrained by the pleasantness and 
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arousal dimensions, or whether the ability to make distinctions in terms of these 
dimensions is innate or learned. Secondly, there is a lack of clarity about how scripts 
and dimensions are related, as well as about what emotion scripts need to contain in 
order for the child to make adult-like discriminations among emotion concepts. The 
research reported by Harris ( 1989) indicates that children's representations of emotion 
go beyond associations that they have built up from what they have experienced 
directly or vicariously to include some knowledge of the role played by their own and 
other's beliefs and desires. As Manstead (1993) argues, this suggests that change in 
the ability to attain or maintain a valued state might play a larger role in emotion 
scripts than Russell and Bullock's model allows. Stein and Levine (1989) and 
Wierzbicka (1992a, 1992b), for example, have argued that emotions can be defined 
primarily in terms of what people want and don't want (that is, their goals and values). 
In addition, of course, Russell and his colleagues' analysis only concerns one aspect 
of emotional development: that of emotion concepts or categories, particularly as they 
relate to facial expressions. As these authors themselves note (Russell & Bullock, 
1984), a full account of how children come to interpret emotional expressions requires 
knowledge of a number of other aspects of emotion. These might include topics such 
as the ways in which children interpret and reconcile conflicting emotional 
information from different sources (for example, facial expressions and situations), 
the specific facial, vocal, or gestural features influencing the perception of emotion, 
the relationship between felt and expressed emotion, the effects of children's 
upbringing and experiences on their emotion knowledge, and so on. 
Without denying these limitations, however, it does seem that Russell and his 
colleagues' model of the development of children's conceptualisation of emotions is 
consistent with much of the empirical evidence on this topic briefly reviewed above, 
and that this model provides a useful starting point for future research. This is not to 
deny that there may well be other explanations which do not fit clearly into any of the 
theoretical frameworks discussed above which may help to account for children's 
interpretation of emotion in music as well as in other modalities. For example, some 
researchers have argued that the feelings children attribute to music, to story 
situations, or to facial expressions may partially reflect their own affective 
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experiences. If children are cognitively egocentric and incapable of distinguishing 
self from other, they may be incapable of differentiating their own emotional response 
(such as fear to an angry facial expression or piece of music) from the emotion 
expressed in the stimulus itself(Brody, 1985; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 
1988, 1991 ). Since the relationship between perceived and felt emotion appears to be 
particularly complex in relation to music, even for adults, it is therefore unclear 
whether children who are asked to respond to music are reporting how the musical 
sequences made them feel, or whether they understand, in adult-like fashion, that such 
patterns simply convey emotional meaning. 
A major advantage of adopting Russell and his colleagues' approach to studying 
children's understanding of emotions, however, is that it encourages psychologists to 
question, and if necessary discard, the implicit assumptions that have dominated 
thinking and research regarding children's understanding of emotion. In particular, 
these researchers argue that investigating what children do, accurately or not, when 
asked to interpret emotional expressions, and searching for any order in the processes 
or strategies that may underlie their responses, is likely to be more revealing than 
simply evaluating children's recognition of emotional expressions as correct or 
incorrect against an adult standard (Bullock & Russell, 1986). These authors point out 
that although accuracy scores can give us some information, they may not tell us 
everything. Consequently, rather than making the assumption that children are doing 
exactly the same thing as adults do, but simply making more mistakes, we must be 
careful to interpret their responses in terms of their own emotion concepts, not those 
imposed by adults. If the boundaries between emotion concepts are fuzzy, for 
example, a child may meaningfully associate more than one emotional label with a 
particular piece of music. There need be no inherent, one-to-one correspondence 
between emotion words and musical excerpts, although we would expect children's 
conception of what musical excerpts express a given emotion to become narrower, or 
more exclusive, with age. Additionally, if emotion categories are interrelated 
according to an underlying structure, children who provide 'inaccurate' labels might 
still be interpreting expressive music in an orderly fashion related to the underlying 
dimensions of degree of pleasure and activation. From this perspective, the important 
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question is whether children's responses when they are asked to label, categorise, or 
discriminate among emotions in music ate systematic. If children's responses are 
systematic, then it becomes possible to specify the features that underlie their 
interpretations. We can examine their emotion concepts - the ways in which they 
categorise, organise, and interpret emotional experience - and how these concepts 
develop. 
Conclusions 
The relationship between music and emotion is notoriously complex and raises some 
perplexing questions for psychologists. Although research in this area has produced 
some interesting findings, many questions remain unanswered - partly because of the 
conceptual and methodological difficulties facing researchers interested in these 
issues, but partly also because the majority of studies have lacked an explanatory 
theoretical framework. If we want to understand how the ability to interpret emotions 
in music develops over the life-span, we need to develop suitable theories which can 
be empirically tested. 
One theory of emotional development which has the potential to contribute to a 
greater understanding of the cognitive and affective systems involved in coming to 
understand music's emotional meaning is that developed by Russell ( 1980, 1991 b) 
and his colleagues. Their theory, incorporating the idea that emotion concepts are 
prototypically organised and fuzzy, as well as interrelated according to their position 
on two or more underlying dimensions, promises to provide fertile ground for 
exploring the ways in which people think about and use emotion concepts to describe 
music, and hence to increase our understanding of both the psychology of music and 
emotional development in general. 
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CHAPTER 5: RATIONALE AND METHOD 
5.1. Rationale 
The goal of the present study was to further our understanding of both emotional 
development and people's understanding of emotion in music by extending Russell 
and his colleagues' research on children's understanding of emotional facial 
expressions (Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1986; Russell, 1989; Russell & Bullock, 1985, 
1986; Russell & Ridgeway, 1983) to the more culturally variable stimulus of music. 
In particular, it aimed to examine whether a theoretical framework incorporating the 
ideas of the fuzziness and structural organisation of emotion concepts is useful in 
explaining how children come to apply emotion terms to music, and how their 
interpretation of emotion in music changes as they grow older. 
Underlying the choice of this approach was the assumption that because the emotional 
'meaning' of musical excerpts is ambiguous, in categorising them subjects would be· 
·required to make decisions about which, and how many, particular features a musical 
excerpt needs to possess in order to be classified as expressing a particular emotion, 
and which features are dispensable or irrelevant. It was felt that a study which goes 
beyond a simple investigation of the effects of increasing age on 'accuracy' to 
investigate the nature of subjects' responses and what underlies them, should be able 
to tell us something about how children and adults conceptualise emotion categories, 
as well as to increase our understanding of what it is that people are actually doing 
when they assign emotion labels to music. 
Specifically, the following research questions and hypotheses were posed: 
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Research question 1: At what age does the ability to interpret emotions in 
music emerge? 
Because young children's identification of emotion in music appears to be influenced 
by methodological variations and the particular task demands placed on them (for 
example, the number and nature of emotion categories used as response alternatives, 
response measures [verbal or nonverbal] employed, particular musical excerpts used 
and medium of performance [e.g. vocal versus instrumental]), it was difficult to 
formulate a specific hypothesis regarding the age at which children would become 
able to identify particular emotions in the musical selections to be used in this study. 
Nevertheless, on the basis of previous research findings (Cunningham & Sterling, 
1988; Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Meerum Terwogt& Van Grinsven, 1988, 1991) it 
was expected that even preschool children would be able to identify at least some 
emotions in the music at above-chance levels. 
Research question 2: Do younger and older children and adults differ in the 
consistency with which they interpret emotions in music? 
Based on a theoretical prediction that fuzzy category boundaries will become less 
fuzzy (that is, will become more specific, narrower, and socially agreed-upon) with 
increasing age (Alexander & Enns, 1988; Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1986; Russell & 
Bullock, 1985, 1986), and extrapolating from the fairly consistent findings of previous 
research (Cunningham & Sterling, 1988; Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Meerum Terwogt 
& van Grinsven, 1988, 1991), the following hypothesis was proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Consistency among different indil'iduals in the emotional 
categorisation of musical excerpts will increase with age. 
Previous studies have, however, consistently found that agreement among individuals 
regarding the emotions expressed by different musical excerpts depends not only on 
the age of the subjects, but also on the particular emotion being expressed (Campbell, 
1942; Cunningham & Sterling, 1988; Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Kastner & Crowder, 
1990; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1988, 1991; Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977). 
This led to the third research question: 
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Research question 3: Do children and adults interpret some emotions in music 
more consistently than they interpret others? 
Based on the findings of the above studies, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
Hypothesis 2: Subjects will show greater agreement for the categorisation of 
'happy' excerpts than for excerpts expressing other emotions. 
A study by Felleman et al. (1983)investigating children's recognition of emotional 
facial expressions suggests that differential accuracy for particular emotions may 
reflect adults' and children's varying tendencies to use particular emotion labels more 
frequently than others, rather than true discriminative ability. The following question 
was therefore posed: 
Research question 4: Do basic inclinations to use, or not to use, various 
categories of emotional labels affect the degree of 
agreement among children and adults? 
Although previous studies have not examined the question of intra-individual 
consistency, fuzzy category theory also predicts that the boundaries of emotion 
concepts will become more stable and specific for each individual as they grow older -
a prediction that has been supported by research investigating children's 
categorization of a set of novel stuffed animals (Alexander & Enns, 1988). 
Consequently, the following hypothesis was proposed: 
Hypothesis 3: Older subjects will show greater individual consistency than 
younger subjects in the emotion labels assigned to particular 
musical excerpts across different categorisation tasks. 
Although the consistency of judgments was expected to increase with age and to be 
greater for particular emotions, the theoretical framework on which this study is based 
leads to the prediction that even adults will not be perfectly consistent in their 
judgments, and that the degree of agreement will vary for different musical excerpts. 
This is because if subjects' categories are organised around prototypes rather than 
classically defined, category membership should be graded - that is, we would expect 
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different musical excerpts to be better or poorer musical exemplars of a certain 
emotion category. More specifically, the following prediction was offered: 
Hypothesis 4: Inter-subject consensus will be greater for some musical excerpts 
than others, with some excerpts being fairly prototypical 
members of a particular emotion category and others being more 
peripheral or borderline members. 
Furthermore, Bullock and Russell's work on children's understanding of emotional 
facial expressions (1984, 1986; Russell & Bullock, 1985, 1986) suggests that in some 
cases children's ideas about what constitutes a prototypical member of a particular 
emotion category might change as they grow older. This possibility was considered 
in the next research question: · 
Research question 5: Will the emotion category into which the majority of 
subjects place a particular musical excerpt change 
systematically with age? 
Not only does the theoretical framework for this study predict that subjects' 
prototypes may change with age, however, but it also predicts that with increasing 
age, children's categories will become narrower and more specific - in other words, 
less fuzzy. Consequently, we would expect that the. range of emotions around the . 
modal choice selected by subjects will narrow with age. More specifically, the 
following proposal was made: 
Hypothesis 5: With increasing age, the number of emotion categories selected by 
subjects as applicable to describe a given musical excerptwill 
decrease. 
A prototype analysis of emotion concepts predicts that because emotion concepts 
overlap and the boundaries between them are fuzzy, even when children and adults are 
'inaccurate' in their judgments - that is, when their judgments do not agree with the 
modal choice - they are nevertheless interpreting the emotional qualities of music in 
an orderly and predictable way. In other words, we would expect their 'errors' to be 
systematic rather than random. More specifically, Russell and Bullock's (1985, 1986; 
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Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1986) circumplex model predicts that confusion between 
different emotions will be a function of their similarity on the underlying bipolar 
dimensions of degree of pleasure and degree of activation. 
In practical terms, what this means is that emotion labels similar in degree of arousal 
and pleasure will all be more-or-less applicable to a given musical excerpt, with the 
probability of a choice decreasing as one moves further away on these two underlying 
dimensions (Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1986; Russell, 1991 b; Russell & Bullock, 
1985, 1986). 
This led to the following prediction: 
Hypothesis 6: For each musical excerpt there will be a focal point, the emotion 
category most likely to be chosen, with the majority of errors 
falling into the two adjacent emotion categories, and probability 
of a choice decreasing with distance (in terms of pleasure and 
activation coordinates) from the focal emotion. 
In addition, if the dimensions of pleasure and activation/arousal do underlie the 
emotion concepts of subjects of all ages, we would predict that they will be able to 
make reliable distinctions between musical excerpts expressing similar degrees of 
pleasure and different degrees of activation, as well as between those expressing · 
similar degrees of activation but different degrees of pleasure. Furthermore, the 
emotion categories into which they place each excerpt should reflect the degree of 
pleasure and arousal expressed by that excerpt. This led to the formulation of the next 
two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7: Subjects of all ages will be able to make reliable distinctions 
between musical excerpts varying in degree of either pleasantness 
or activation, when the other underlying dimension is held more-
or-less constant. 
Hypothesis 8: Subjects' emotional judgments will be correlated with 
independent ratings of the degree of pleasure and arousal 
expressed by each musical excerpt. 
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Assuming that subjects can make reliable distinctions between musical excerpts in 
emotional terms, the next question that arose concerns the basis for these judgments. 
Research question 6: On what musical and/or extra-musical features do subjects 
of different ages base their judgments of the emotions 
expressed in musical excerpts? 
Here the focus was on whether the same features are used by children and adults, or 
whether children restrict themselves to fewer features, weigh the same features 
differently, or concentrate on different features. A related question concerns whether 
some emotion 'cues' in music are more natural or unlearned than others. Although 
theoretical disagreements and inconsistencies in empirical findings did not permit the 
formulation of specific hypotheses, it was expected that there would be a relationship 
between the number of subjects associating each excerpt on the stimulus tape with 
particular emotions and the fonnal musical characteristics of the excerpts. 
Finally, since previous research has shown marked individual differences in nonverbal 
decoding skills (Davitz, 1964a; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1991) the present 
study aimed to make an exploratory attempt to find correlates of individual subjects' 
ability to interpret emotions in music. Specifically, it was decided to investigate the 
following characteristics: 
Research question 7: Is there any relationship between the ability to interpet 
emotions in music and subjects' 
(a) gender 
(b) intelligence or academic achievement 
(c) ability to interpret expressions of emotion in speech, 
and 
( d) musical training? 
The research design that was developed in an attempt to answer these questions and 
test the hypotheses proposed is outlined in the following section. 
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5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Subjects 
The sample consisted of 120 subjects divided equally among four age levels: 5-year-
olds (12 girls and 18 boys, mean age= 5 years 6 months), 7-year-olds (16 girls and 
14 boys, mean age= 7 years 6 months), 9-year-:olds (13 giris and 17 boys, mean age 
= 9 years 6 months), and adults (23 women, 7 men, mean age= 33 yrs 5 months, 
range = 18 - 46). The children were drawn from a preschool and primary school in a 
predominantly lower-middle class suburb of Cape Town, both of which catered to a 
fairly broad range of socio-economic classes and races. The 7- and 9-year-olds were 
randomly selected from Sub-A (Gradel) and Standard 1 (Grade 3) classes at the 
primary school. The 5-year-olds and adults were volunteers, the former recruited 
verbally from two preschool classes and the latter recruited through written 
advertisements at suburban libraries, on the university Psychology Department notice 
boards, and at a children's ballet studio. 
One 7-year-old girl failed to complete tasks 2 and 3 as she was absent from school on 
the second day of testing. Seven 5'"year-olds failed to complete all the tasks for the 
same reason, but were replaced by other children of the same age and sex. 
5.2.2. Stimuli 
Music Tape 
The experimenter selected an initial pool of48 music excerpts, each 25-30 seconds 
long, chosen to represent a wide range of musical styles, genres, and traditions and 
subjectively judged to vary in emotional character. These included music drawn from 
children's and adults' movies, musical theatre and ballets, classical 'art' music, 
contemporary 'pop' music (including local African music), electronic music, jazz, 
ragtime, Scottish and Spanish folk music, and melodies specifically composed for 
toddlers. Dates of composition ranged from the early eighteenth century to the 1990s. 
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Instrumental versions of all pieces were used to avoid confounding due to the 
meaning of lyrics. The excerpts were recorded on a Marantz stereo sound system and 
played to subjects on a portable radio cassette recorder, Sharp WQ-283Z. 
A pilot group of 5 adults with varying degrees of musical experience listened to the 
excerpts and provided open-ended descriptions of their emotional character. Eight 
excerpts which these pilot subjects did not perceive as being emotionally expressive, 
or which evoked widely differing descriptions, were excluded from the study and 
replaced with alternative excerpts selected by the author. 
A second group of 15 musically knowledgeable adults then rated this revised set of 48 
excerpts on Mehrabian & Russell's (1974) semantic differential scales for arousal and 
pleasure, which are presented along with the instructions given to subjects in 
Appendix 1. In order to avoid subject fatigue, each pilot subject rated only a third of 
the total set of musical excerpts; each excerpt was therefore independently rated by 
five individuals. For each of six combinations of dimensions (high arousal-pleasure; 
high arousal-displeasure; moderate arousal-pleasure; moderate arousal-displeasure; 
low arousal -pleasure; low arousal-displeasure) dimensional ratings were examined in 
the light of the emotional descriptions provided by the initial 5 pilot subjects in order 
to select three excerpts: two clear or good examples of each category, and one less 
clear or borderline example. This technique was used partly to avoid bias in the 
selection of musical exemplars to fit the author's preconceived notions of their 
emotional character, and partly to ensure that the musical excerpts did indeed express 
varying degrees of pleasure and activation. In addition, any excerpts that evoked a 
very negative reaction from the pilot subjects, or whose title or source (e.g. a 
particular movie soundtrack) had been correctly identified by one or more of the pilot 
subjects were excluded from the final selection. This procedure was followed in an 
effort to reduce confounding due to familiarity with, and/or specific associations to, 
the music. 
The final stimulus selection therefore consisted of eighteen musical excerpts of 25-30 
seconds each, separated by 10-second intervals of silence. This set of excerpts was 
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recorded three times (once for each of the tasks described on pp. 99-100 below). On 
the first tape, the 18 excerpts were divided into two sets of 9 excerpts expressing 
similar degrees of pleasure/displeasure. On the second tape, they were divided into 
three groups of 6 excerpts expressing similar degrees of activation. On the third tape, 
the entire set of musical excerpts was presented as a whole. The order of the excerpts 
was randomised on each tape. Table II summarises the title, composer and/or 
performer and album title of the excerpts, their corresponding mean arousal and 
hedonic tone ratings, and the order of presentation for Task 3. It also provides 
illustrative examples of the emotional descriptions of these excerpts provided by the 
pilot subjects. 
The musical excerpts were independently analysed by the author and 3 music 
students to provide a description of the formal musical elements in each piece. The 
analytical constructs used were similar to those previously investigated. The 
following characteristics were analysed on 5-point scales: 
TEMPO: 1 = largo, 5 = presto 
RHYTHM: 1 flowing, 5 =firm 
RHYTHMIC ACTIVITY: 1 = little, 5 much 
ARTICULATION: 1 =legato, 5 = staccato 
·. PITCH LEVEL: 1 =low, 5 =high 
PITCH RANGE: 1 = small, 5 = large 
HARMONY: 1 =consonant, 5 =dissonant 
The judges also rated the excerpts for modality (major, minor or atonal). 
Interrater reliability for the 5-point scales was calculated by correlating the ratings 
from all possible combinations of the four judges. The mean correlation coefficients 
obtained were as follows: Tempo: r 0.86; Rhythm (firm vs. flowing): r = 0.81; 
Rhythmic Activity: r = 0.82; Articulation: r = 0.60; Pitch Level: r = 0.21; Pitch 
Range: r = OA7; Harmony: r 0.64. These coefficients were significantly greater 
than would be expected by chance with alpha limited to 0.01 for all elements except 
Pitch level and Pitch range, which were subsequently eliminated from further 
analyses. 
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Table II: Composition details, mean hedonic tone and arousal ratings and 
illustrative descriptions by pilot subjects of musical excerpts 
Title Composer Date Album Title Hedonic Arousal Pilot 
tone subjects· 
descriptio 
I. The Fight S. Prokofiev 1934 Romeo and Juliet 3.2 15.6 agitation. 
exuberanc 
2. Wild Bears E. Elgar 1908 The Wand of Youth Suite, 5.6 13.0 happy 
No. 2, Op. lb excitenien 
panic 
3. Desolation Theme Leigh Harline 1940 Walt Disney's Pinocchio -5.2 -5.4 thoughtful 
ness, nostal: 
4. Nocturne No. 8 in F. Chopin 11.0 -8.8 peacefulne~ 
D flat major sadness 
5. Hero's Wedding Patrick Doyle 1993 William Shakespeare's 12.0 10.0 triumph, grc 
Much Ado About Nothing happines~ 
6. Have I told you Van Morrison The Best of Van Morrison 11.8 -7.2 
lately 
7. Dance of the four Arthur Bliss Three English Ballet Suites 0.8 6.8 menace, 
knights, from arousal 
Checkmate 
8. Journey to the Sun D. Hewitt 1989 An African Tapestry -2.0 -8.8 tranquility 
calmness, 
boredom 
9. Shake! Mango Another Country 10.8 11.0 
Groove 
IO The Whale Chase Leigh Harline 1940 Walt Disney's Pinocchio -4.2 13.8 fear, 
&EdPlumb confusion 
II Roinance S. Prokofiev 1933 Lieutenant Kije: -2.2 -6.6 melanchol; 
Symphonic Suite Op. 60 nostalgia 
12 Who wants to live Brian May 1986 Queen: Greatest Hits II -0.8 -1.0 
forever? 
13 Ragtime Dance Scott Joplin The Sting 1.4 6.2 clumsy 
happiness 
jollity 
14 The fall of Saigon, Alain Boublil The Royal Philharmonic -5.8 13.8 dread, 
from Miss Saigon & Claude- Orchestra play suites from dominanct 
Michel Les Miserables & Miss pomposit) 
SchOnberg Saigon 
15 La Cabane de Modest 1874 Pictures at an Exhibition -5.8 6.2 agitation, 
Baba - Yaga sur Mussorgsky expectanc: 
des Pattes de 
Poule 
16 El Relicario (Traditional) The Soul of Spain - 101 7.6 12.8 
Strings 
17 The Ugly Sisters Paul Reade 1993 Cinderella 0.4 15.2 excitemem 
humour 
18 Abraham's Theme Vangelis 1981 Chariots of Fire 4.4 -9.8 - tranquility 
expectanc: 
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Reliability was considered acceptable for the remaining 5 elements. Interrater 
reliability for modality was established by calculating the percentage of agreement for 
all possible combinations of the four judges. Mean interrater reliability was 80%, 
which was also considered acceptable. 
Means of each element for the eighteen excerpts were computed. For modality, 
excerpts were coded as 1 if at least three of the four judges rated them as minor, and 
as 2 if at least three of the judges rated them as major. No modality coding was given 
to five excerpts in which modality could not be clearly established or which were 
rated by two or more judges as atonal. 
Control Tape 
A tape consisting of six segments of verbal/vocal expressions of emotion was 
constructed for purposes of comparison. A female actress read 6 short passages 
adapted by the author from novels with the intention of expressing each of the 6 
emotions used in the study. These passages are presented in Appendix 2. As with 
the music tape, segments were separated by ten seconds of silence and presented in 
random order. 
5.2.3. Response Measures 
Because previous research (Camras & Allison, 1985; Russell, 1990) has suggested 
that children are able to identify emotions most accurately when presented with a 
combination of verbal labels and facial expressions rather than either alone, subjects 
of all ages were provided with a combination of schematic line drawings of emotional 
faces (shown in Figure 2) and the verbal labels of the emotion categories they were 
intended to represent. The six emotion labels used in the study were calm, happy, 
excited, scared, angry/cross and sad. These emotions were selected because they have· 
all been successfully used in at least one previous study with children and represent a 
broad spread on the dimensions of arousal and pleasure, incorporating three positive 
and three negative emotions at each of three levels of arousal or activation (low, 
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moderate, and high). In addition, Ridgeway, Waters and Kuczaj (1985), who collected 
normative data on (English-speaking) children's ability to understand emotion-
descriptive adjectives, found that the majority of 4-year-old children were reported 
by their parents to understand the above 6 terms: understanding ranged from 73.3% 
for 'calm' to 100% for 'happy', 'sad' and 'angry'. 
Figure 2: Schematic facial expressions used as response alternatives 
calm 
(©?\ 
~ ~ 0 
excited scared 
@© 
angry sad happy 
In order to validate that the line drawings did express the intended emotions and that 
subjects could discriminate between them, 38 pilot subjects (20 females, 18 males) 
between the ages of 5 and 52 (mean= 17 years, 10 months) made forced choice 
ratings of either which of the six emotions was best expressed by each face, or which 
of the six facial expressions best expressed each emotion. Interrater reliability 
(percentage agreement) for each face/emotion pair was as follows: calm: 92.1 %; 
happy: 89.5%; excited: 81.6%; scared: 94.7%; angry: 100%; sad: 100%. 
5.2.4. Procedure 
The general procedure used in the study involved asking the subjects to select the 
emotion word or facial expression that best matched the emotion expressed in each 
musical excerpt (or, for the control task, each verbal expression). In addition to 
completing the control task, each of the 120 subjects who participated in the study 
listened to the musical excerpts three times. On each of these three occasions of 
listening to the music, however, they were presented with different combinations of 
emotion categories from which to choose as response alternatives. On one occasion 
(labelled Task 1), they were asked to select one of three emotions expressing similar 
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degrees of pleasure but different degrees of activation. On another occ~sion (Task 2) 
they were asked to choose between two emotions expressing similar degrees of 
activation but different degrees of pleasure. Only on Task 3 were they presented with 
all six emotion terms simultaneously. Details of these tasks are provided below. 
CONTROL TASK 
Subjects' ability to understand the requirements of the tasks and to identify emotions 
expressed in speech was investigated by playing them the six verbal/vocal expressions 
of emotion which comprised the control tape, and asking them to select one of the six 
emotion word/face pairs described above tha~ best matched the way the woman on the 
tape was feeling in each extract. 
MUSIC TASKS: 
TASK 1: Activation Dimension Varied 
In order to determine whether children could use the dimension of level of arousal or 
activation to categorise musical stimuli, they were given three face-word pairs 
representing pleasant emotions varying in degree of arousal (that is, excited, happy 
and calm). They then listened to the 9 musical excerpts rated by the pilot subjects as 
expressing pleasant emotions, and were asked to select the facial expression or 
emotion that best matched the feeling in the music. This procedure was repeated for 
the nine musical excerpts previously rated as expressing negative emotions, with the 
subjects being asked to choose between scared, angry and sad expressions. Half the 
subjects began with the pleasant emotions,. and half began with the unpleasant 
emotions. 
TASK 2: Pleasure Dimension Varied 
In order to determine whether subjects could discriminate between musical excerpts 
expressing similar degrees of arousal or activation but different degrees of pleasure, 
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they were asked to match the 6 musical excerpts which fell into the high arousal 
category with either excited or scared facial expressions, to match the 6 excerpts 
which fell into the moderate arousal category with either happy or angry facial 
expressions, and to match the six excerpts which fell into the low arousal category 
with either calm or sad facial expressions. 
TASK 3: Both Dimensions Varied 
Subjects were presented with all six emotional expressions used in the study. After 
hearing each of the eighteen musical excerpts, they were asked to select the face-word 
pair which best matched the feeling in the music. 
The order in which the control task and the three music tasks were completed was 
randomised among subjects. 
The actual procedure followed in carrying out these tasks was slightly different for the 
five-year-olds and the older subjects. The five-year-olds were tested individually. At 
the beginning of each trial, the experimenter shuffled cards containing the emotional 
facial expressions and spread them out in a random array on the table in front of the 
child. Before playing the stimulus tape in the first session, the experimenter pointed 
to each of the cards and named the emotion depicted. At each of the subsequent 
sessions the experimenter made sure that the child could remember what emotion each 
face was intended to represent. Children were reminded of any emotion labels for the 
facial expressions that they had not recalled spontaneously. After hearing each 
excerpt on the tape, the child was asked to point to the face that best matched the 
feeling in the music and the experimenter recorded the child's picture choice. The 
stimulus tape was stopped if necessary between each excerpt to give the child time to 
respond. Response times varied from almost immediate (before the excerpt was 
completely finished) to several seconds after the music had ended. All responses were 
praised. 
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Older children and adults were tested in small groups of up to eight persons, and were 
instructed to circle their choices on an answer sheet which (depending on the task) 
consisted of 6, 9 or 18 boxes containing the names of either 2, 3 or 6 emotions as well 
as the line drawings of faces depicting each of the emotions .. In an effort to minimise 
the effect of response order on the results, the order of facial expressions was different 
in each box. The directions given to subjects were based on the model in Appendix 3, 
. with slight modifications according to the nature of the specific experimental task and . 
the age of the subjects. 
In order to guard against subject fatigue and maintain the children's interest, 
preschoolers were tested in three separate sessions on different days, each lasting 
approximately 20 minutes. The older children were tested on two different days in 
sessions lasting approximately half-an-hour. All of the children were tested in a quiet 
room at their schools. Adult subjects were tested in a single session lasting 
approximately one hour, either in a room in the Psychology Department or at the 
author's home. 
Additional measures 
Because IQ scores were only available for a minority of the subjects, teachers' ratings 
of children's reading and mathematics performance (A, B, C or D) were obtained 
from the 7- and 9-year-old children's end-of-year report cards (which were produced 
in the same week as the testing) as an indicator of their intellectual achievement. 
Adults were asked to indicate in writing the number of years formal musical training 
.(defined as lessons on an instrument, singing lessons and/or music theory lessons) that 
they had had, as well as describing their participation in musical activities such as 
singing in a choir or playing a musical instrument. Information on the children's 
musical training was provided by the primary school's.music teacher. 
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Qualitative Data 
Although time restrictions and the limitations of younger children's vocabulary made 
questioning each subject about the reasons for each of their judgments impractical, it 
was felt that individuals' subjective impressions and experiences of the tasks could 
provide an interesting complement to the quantitative data and perhaps give rise to 
hypotheses for future research. Consequently, each of the experimental sessions with 
the adult groups was followed by a short, semi-structured discussion session in which 
subjects were asked for their general impressions of, and comments on, the tasks, as 
well as being asked specific questions concerning the techniques they used to make 
their judgments, any particular difficulties they experienced, and familiarity of the 
musical excerpts. Answers were recorded by the author in writing. In addition, any 
spontaneous comments made by the children during the experimental sessions which 
related to the above issues were recorded by the experimenter. 
5.2.5. Scoring procedures 
Because the emotional character of musical excerpts can seldom if ever be determined 
a priori and objectively, there have been two main approaches to judging the 
'accuracy' with which subjects assign pieces of music to emotion categories. The first 
method is to select or specially compose musical excerpts which are subjectively 
judged by the experimenter or music experts to represent a particular emotion, 
sometimes also validating these judgments using forced-choice ratings by adults. The 
second approach is to avoid making prior judgments about the emotional meaning of 
musical excerpts in favour of seeking consensus among subjects, typically accepting 
the group modal choice as the 'correct' classification. Although both of these 
approaches have been useful, a consensus approach was adopted in this study for 
several reasons. One of these is that this research was concerned with how ordinary 
people interpret music's emotional character arid whether this interpretation is orderly 
or meaningful, and not with whether this interpretation is 'accurate' in terms of expert 
opinion. Moreover, a composer's intended emotional meaning can seldom be 
objectively determined, but rather only inferred, and even experts do not always agree 
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with each other about the emotional character of musical excerpts. It was also felt that 
taking a consensus approach to scoring the results would reduce the likelihood of the 
experimenter's own preconceived notions of the emotional character of each excerpt 
affecting subjects' responses through demand characteristics. 
Consensus can be measured in several different ways. As far as inter subject . 
consensus (group agreement) is concerned, we can examine the frequency with which 
children in each age group labelled each musical excerpt in accordance with the modal 
emotion choice of their own age group, of all the subjects collapsed across age, or of 
the adult group who - as a result of their more advanced cognitive abilities and wider 
experiences of music and emotion, and so on - are assumed to be a more 
knowledgeable or accurate comparison group whose responses can be used as a 
standard. In addition to these potential measures of intersubject consensus, however, 
Alexander & Enns (1988) point out that a measure of intrasubject consensus 
(individual consistency) across different categorisation tasks is also potentially 
important when studying fuzzy categories, as it can indicate whether a fuzzy category 
boundary identified in a group analysis reflects disagreement among subjects who are 
themselves consistent in different contexts, or whether each individual lacks clear 
boundaries for the concept or category. 
Consequently, it was decided to s.core each individual's responses in three different 
ways. In the first case, responses to the musical excerpts were scored as correct if 
they were in agreement with the adult modal choice for that excerpt. Because 
developmental trends and differences between the responses of adults and children of 
different ages were a particular focus of this study, this 'accuracy' score (Score A) 
was considered to be the variable of primary interest, and unless otherwise specified 
was used as the dependent variable in the statistical analyses described in the 
following chapter. However, two alternative scoring procedures were also used for 
comparison purposes. In one of these (Score B), children's responses were scored as 
correct if they were in agreement with the modal choice of their own age group rather 
than that of adults.. In the other , those subjects who completed all three tasks (N = 
112) were given an individual inconsistency score (Score C) representing the mean 
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number of emotional categories into which they placed each of the eighteen excerpts 
across the three tasks. Responses to the control task were scored as correct if they 
agreed with the emotion that each verbal segment was intended (by the author and the 
actress) to express. 
I 
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CHAPTER6: RESULTS 
6.1. Control task results 
Scores obtained on the control task suggested that even the youngest subjects 
understood the nature of the tasks and had the requisite skills for solving them. A 
one-way analysis of variance of control task scores by age group found that there was 
asignificantmaineffectofage(F(3, 116) 16.183, p<0.000). Post-hoc 
comparisons conducted using Tukey's Honest Significant Difference (HSD) test with 
alpha limited to 0.05 indicated that 5-year-olds were significantly less accurate than 
the 7- and 9-year-olds and adults (who did not differ among themselves). 
Nevertheless, when one-sample t-tests were used within age levels to compare mean 
correct responses on the control task, presented in Table III, with that which would be 
expected by chance (M = 1 ), the means were significantly better than would be 
expected by guessing or random responding for all age groups including the 
preschoolers (allps < 0.001). 
Table III. Mean correct interpretations of control stimuli as a function of subject age 
and stimulus emotion (n = 30 for each age group) 
Subject Stimulus Emotion 
Age 
'(years) Calm Happy Excited Scared Angry Sad Total (max. = 6) 
5 0.53 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.73 0.27 2.43 
7 0.50 0.60 0.77 0.37 0.93 0.83 3.67 
9 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.83 4.47 
Adult 0.77 0.47 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.83 4.03 
Combined 0.65 0.56 0.70 0.67 0.92 0.69 3.65 
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6.2. Intersubject consistency 
Traditionally, data on children's interpretation of emotion in music as well as in other 
contexts (for example, describing situations or labelling facial expressions) has been 
evaluated in terms of their agreement with an adult norm. It was therefore decided to 
begin with this approach and to investigate age differences in the number of subjects 
agreeing with the adult modal choice regarding the emotional categorisations of.the 
musical excerpts (Score A). 
6.2.1. Comparison with chance 
Research question 1 asked at what ,age subjects' identification of emotion in music 
would begin to exceed chance performance. Mean correct responses to the music 
excerpts (defined as agreement with the adult norm, or score A) for each task and each 
age group are presented in Table IV. As was done with the control task, these were 
analysed to investigate whether they differed from what would be expected by chance. 
Table IV. Mean correct interpretations of music stimuli for each task as a function of 
subject age 
Task Response Maximum Chance Subject Age (years) 
options possible 
5 7 9 Adult 
1 Calm, Happy, 9 3 4.30 5.77 7.30 7.90 
Excited 
Sad, Angry, 9 3 5.17 6.17 7.43 7.87 
Scared .i. 
Combined 18 6 9.47 11.93 14.73 15.76 
2 Calm, Sad 6 3 3.37 4.59 4.50 4.10 
Happy, Angry 6 3 4.13 4.62 5.10 5.57 
Excited, Scared 6 3 . 3.80 4.31 5.03 5.27 
Combined 18 9 11.30 13.51 14.63 15.40 
3 All 6 emotions 18 3 6.93 8.21 11.07 12.57 
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When subjects' mean 'accuracy' score on each of the three tasks was compared with a 
score that would be expected with random responding (33.3% for task 1, 50% for task 
2 and 16.67% for task 3), means of all age groups were found to be significantly 
greater than chance performance with alpha limited to 0.01. Division of tasks 1 and 2 
into their component sub-tasks, however, indicated a single exception to this finding: 
5-year-olds failed to perform at above-chance levels when asked to distinguish 
between sad and calm excerpts in task 2. 
6.2.2. Comparison with adult mode 
Research question two was concerned with age-related differences in agreement for 
the emotional categorisation of musical excerpts. Hypothesis 1 asserted that 
consistency among individuals in the emotion label chosen for the musical excerpts 
would increase with age. When consistency was defined as agreement with the adult 
norm (Score A), an initial inspection of the data suggested that this was in fact the 
case. Mean consensus among adults for the 18 excerpts averaged across the three 
tasks was 82%, and ranged from 43.3% to 100% for particular musical excerpts. The 
percentage of subjects agreeing with the adult modal choice was somewhat lower for 
children, ranging from 3.3% to 100% for nine-year-olds (M = 75%), from 6.9% to 
· 100% for seven-year-olds (M = 62%) and from 10% to 96.7% for five-year-olds (M 
51 %). The distribution of emotion choices for each extract, in each task, for each age 
group is presented in Appendix 4. 
ANOV A Results 
In order to investigate these effects in more detail, the accuracy scores obtained on the 
music tasks (Score A) were analysed using a 2-way analysis of variance for each task 
in which age. was a between-subjects factor and emotion was treated as a within-
subjects factor. In each of these three ANOV As, age consisted of four levels: 5-year-
olds, 7-year,..olds, 9-year-olds and adults. Emotion consisted of six levels: calm, 
happy, excited, scared, angry and sad. The dependent variable, or 'accuracy' score, 
was the mean proportion of responses in agreement with the modal emotion choice of 
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the adult group for each emotion category. 1 These accuracy scores are presented in 
Table V, and are displayed graphically in Figure 3. The 0.05 level of probability was 
used to evaluate the main and interaction effects for the ANOVA. Follow-up analytic 
comparisons of means were computed using Tukey's Honest Significant Difference 
(HSD) test, with a also set at 0.05. 
Table V. Mean correct interpretations of music stimuli (agreement with adult mode, 
expressed as percentages) as a function of subject age and stimulus emotion 
Task Subject No. of Stimulus emotion 
age subjects 
(years) Calm Happy Excited Scared Angry 
1 5 30 62 40 42 52 60 
7 30 89 49 57 60 46 
9 30 94 69 85 68 71 
Adult 30 98 81 87 83 78 
Combined 120 86 60 68 66 64 
2 5 30 54 65 60 70 67 
7 29 64 79 70 76 74 
9 30 70 76 82. 88 95 
Adult 30 77 88 86 92 97 
Combined 119 66 77 74 81 83 
3 5 30 38 32 25 63 38 
7 29 52 31 47 66 45 
9 30 66 57 48 93 51 
a 
Adult 30 68 69 63 93 63 
Combined 119 56 47 46 79 49 
1 Scores were expressed as proportions so that scores for different emotion categories would be 
comparable, as there were unequal numbers of musical excerpts in each emotion category according to 
the adult modal judgment. 
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The summary tables for the ANOVAs are provided in Appendix 5. For Task 1 
(Activation dimension varied) significant main effects of Age ( F (3, 116) = 36.429, p 
< 0.000) and Emotion ( F (5, 580) = 27.753, p < 0.000) were qualified by a 
significant two-way interaction between Age and Emotion ( F (15, 580) = 3.465, p < 
0.000). There were no significant interactions on Task 2 (Pleasure dimension varied) 
and Task 3 (Both dimensions varied). However, significant main effects were 
obtained for both Age (Task 2: F (3, 115) = 34.350, p < 0.000; Task 3: F (3, 115) = 
28.040,p < 0.000) and Emotion (Task 2: F(5, 575) = 18.386,p < 0.000; Task 3: F 
(5, 575) = 23.696,p < 0.000) on each of these tasks. 
Figure 3. Plot of mean correct interpretations of music stimuli (agreement with adult 
mode) as a function of subject age and stimulus emotion 
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Effects of Age 
The plots of means presented in Figure 3 suggest that there was a general trend 
(despite a few exceptions) for 'accuracy' - that is, agreement with the adult norm - to 
improve with age, since the means of the older groups are generally higher than those 
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of the younger groups. However, the ANOVA results indicated that the effects of age 
were slightly different for the different tasks. 
On task 1, analysis of simple main effects for age indicated that the effects of age 
were significant for all six emotion categories (all ps < 0.01). However, the effects of 
age on the number of subjects agreeing with the adult norm varied depending on the 
emotion being expressed. Post-hoc analytic comparisons of means (Tukey's HSD, a. 
= 0.05) indicated that for calm excerpts, 7-year-olds, 9-year-olds and adults were all 
significantly more accurate than 5-year-olds, but did not differ among themselves in 
their mean accuracy. Adults and 9-year-olds were significantly more accurate than 5-
year-olds in identifying happy excerpts, and the adults were also more accurate than 
the 7-year-olds. Excited excerpts were identified correctly significantly more often by 
the adults and 9-year-olds than the 5- and 7-year-olds. Adults (but not 9-year-olds) 
were also more accurate than the 5- and 7-year-olds at identifying scared excerpts. 
Angry excerpts were identified correctly significantly more often by the adults and 9-
year-olds than by the 7-year-olds, while adults, 9-year-olds and 7-year-olds were all 
significantly more accurate than the 5-year-olds in identifying sad excerpts. 
The main effect for age obtained on task 2 was explored using analytic comparisons 
of means (Tukey's HSD test) with alpha set at 0.05. The results of these comparisons 
indicated that there were no significant differences between the mean accuracy scores 
of adults and 9-year.:.olds. However, adults were significantly more accurate than the . 
7-year-olds, who in turn were significantly more accurate than the 5-year-olds. 
Post-hoc comparisons of means indicated that adults· also did not perform with 
significantly greater accuracy than the 9-year-olds on Task 3. Both adults and 9-year-
olds, however, were significantly more accurate than the 5- and 7-year-olds on this 
task (all ps < 0.05). 
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Effects of emotion 
Research question 3 was concerned with whether the accuracy of subjects would vary 
depending on the emotions expressed by the musical excerpts. The analysis of 
variance results suggested that this was in fact the case, although the effects of 
emotion appeared to vary according to the task. However, no support was obtained 
for hypothesis 2, which predicted that happy excerpts would be identified with greater 
consistency than excerpts expressing other emotions. 
On Task 1, the effects of emotion varied according to the age of the subjects. The 
performance of 5-year-olds and adults did not vary significantly for different 
emotions. 7-year-olds, however, were significantly more accurate at identifying calm 
and sad excerpts than any of the other four em?tion categories (all ps < 0.001), while 
9-year-olds identified the sad and calm excerpts correctly significantly more often 
than the happy, scared and angry excerpts (all ps < 0.05). 
On Task 2, post-hoc comparisons of means used to explore the main effect of emotion 
indicated that calm and sad excerpts were identified correctly significantly less often 
than excerpts expressing all four other emotions (all ps < 0.05). In addition, angry 
excerpts were identified correctly significantly more often than excited excerpts ( p < 
0.01). 
On Task 3, analytic comparisons of means indicated that the scared excerpt was 
identified correctly significantly more often than excerpts expressing all five other 
emotions, while the sad excerpts were also recognised correctly significantly more 
often than happy, excited and angry excerpts (all ps < 0.05). 
6.2.3. Comparison with age-group mode 
In order to investigate the effects of how consensus is defined on the results obtained, 
children's scores on all three tasks were recalculated as correct if they agreed with the 
modal choice of their age group as opposed to that of adults (Score 'B). Using this 
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scoring procedure, mean accuracy rose from 51.3% to 55.4% for 5-year-olds, from 
62.3% to 70.2% for 7-year-olds, and from 74.9% to 78.5% for 9-year-olds. When 
these results were submitted to a 4(age) x 2(score) analysis of variance, significant 
main effects of age ( F (3,115) = 61.96, p < 0.000) and type of score ( F (1, 115) = 
79.45, p < 0.000) were qualified by a significant Age x Score interaction ( F(3, 115) = 
13.42, p < 0.000). Analysis of simple main effects for type of score indicated that the 
accuracy scores of 5-, 7- and 9-year-olds were all significantly greater when the 
. children's responses were compared with their age-group mode as opposed to the 
adult mode (all ps < 0.01). Simple main effects for age were significant for both 
types of score. Follow-up analytic comparisons of means (Tukey's HSD test) with 
alpha set at 0.05 indicated that when responses were scored according to the adult 
mode (Score A), each age group was significantly more accurate than the age group 
directly below it (all ps < 0.01) When responses were scored according to the age 
group mode (Score B), the accuracy scores of 5- and 7-year-olds were still 
significantly lower than those of 9-year-olds and adults (all ps < 0.001 ). The revised 
accuracy scores of 9-year-olds, on the other hand, did not differ significantly from the 
accuracy scores of adults, suggesting that 9-year-olds were no less consistent than 
adults in their emotional categorisations of musical excerpts when their own age-
group modal choice, rather than the adult mode, was taken as the standard or 'correct' 
judgment. 
6.3. Base rates in the use of emotion labels 
Research question 4 concerned the role played by children's and adults' basic 
inclinations to use, or not to use, certain emotion labels in their apparent accuracy for 
recognising these emotions. As Felleman et al. (1983) have pointed out, levels of 
overall accuracy when subjects are asked to give emotion labels to stimuli can be 
influenced by any systematic differences in the frequency with which different age 
groups use the different emotion category labels. Consequently, base rates for label 
usage were calculated by computing the mean number of times subjects used each of 
the emotion labels in Task 3 (the only task in which they were presented with all six 
options simultaneously) independent of whether they were used correctly or not. 
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These data, which are displayed in Table VI, were then subjected to I-way ANOV As 
for each emotion, with age as a between-subjects factor. Significant differences in 
base rates were found for the labels happy ( F (3, 115) 8.919, p < 0.000), excited ( 
F(3, 115) = 6.712, p < 0.001) and scared ( F(3, 115) = 5.670, p < 0.01). Post-hoc 
planned comparisons ~LSD test) indicated that adults labelled excerpts as happy 
significantly more often than all three groups of children, while 9-year-olds had higher 
base rates for using the label 'happy' than the 7-year-olds (all ps < 0.01). In addition, 
children in all three age groups labelled excerpts as scared more often than did adults 
(all ps < 0.05), while 7-year-olds used the label 'excited' significantly more often 
. 
than all the other age groups (all ps < 0.05). 
Table VI. Mean base rates(%) for the use of emotion labels in task 3 as a function of 
subject age 
Subject Age Emotion label 
(years) Calm Happy Excited Scared Angry Sad 
5 19.1 15.5 14.l 19.4 14.1 17.8 
7 22.2 12.5 22.2 16.3 12.1 14.7 
9 21.9 17.7 17.5 16.5 10.2 16.2 
. Adult 21.3 21.7 17.6 11.8 12.6 15.0 
6.3.1. Differential Accuracy 
The above results indicating significant variation in the use of certain emotion labels 
· suggest that children's accuracy scores for task 3 may have been reduced or enhanced 
because they tended to use certain labels more or less often than they were used by 
adults. To investigate this possibility, a differential accuracy score was calculated for 
each subject that controlled for the influence of base rates by dividing the number of 
times a subject used an emotion label correctly (defined as agreement with the adult 
norm, or Score A) by the total number of times they used that label (correctly or 
incorrectly). This score can be thought of as a conditional probability: given that a 
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subjec~ usi;;d a particular label, what was the likelihood that the label was correct? 
Once computed, differential accuracy scores were compared to overall accuracy 
scores in a 4 (age) x 2 (type of score) ANOVA for each of the three emotion 
categories, with type of score treated as a within-subjects factor. If high base rates for 
using a particular label facilitated accurate recognition, overall accuracy should be 
significantly greater than differential accuracy, with the reverse being true if low base 
rates hindered recognition. Table VII presents a comparison of overall and 
differential accuracies (expressed as percentages) for the different age groups. 
Table VII. Differential versus overall accuracy (% correct) for the use of emotion 
labels on task 3 as a function of subject age 
Subject Emotion label 
Age 
(years) Happy Scared Excited 
Differential Overall Differential Overall Differential Overall 
accuracy accuracy accuracy accuracy accuracy accuracy 
5 56 32 18 63 19 25 
7 67 31 20 66 25 47 
9 92 57 35 93 28 48 
·Adult 89 69 52 93 43 63 
For happy excerpts, significant main effects of age (F (3, 115) 19.349, p < 0.000) 
and type of score ( F(l,115) = 144.235, p < 0.000) were qualified by a significant age 
x score interaction ( F(3, 115) 2.811, p < 0.05). Planned analytic comparisons (LSD 
test) indicated that differential accuracy scores were significantly higher than overall 
accuracy scores for all age groups (p < 0.000), suggesting that low base rates may 
have reduced subjects' accuracy for identifying happy excerpts. Post-hoc planned 
comparisons of the age-group means (LSD test) indicated that the overall accuracy 
scores of adults were significantly greater than those of 9-year-olds, who in tum 
performed with greater accuracy than the 5- and 7-year-olds (all ps < 0.05). The 
differential accuracy scores of the adults and 9-year-olds, however, did not differ 
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significantly from each other, although they were significantly higher than the 
differential accuracy scores of 7-year;.olds, which in turn were higher than the 
differential accuracy scores of the 5-year-olds (all ps < 0.05). Thus when the 
children's relatively low base rates for using the label 'happy' (compared with adults) 
were controlled for, 9-year-olds and adults performed with approximately equal 
accuracy. Furthermore, 7-year-olds were more accurate than 5-year-olds, a difference 
that was not apparent in the overall accuracy scores. 
Significant main effects of age ( F (3, 115) = 10.065, p < 0.000) and type of score ( F 
(1, 115) = 285.091, p < 0.000) were also found for the scared excerpt; there was no 
statistically significant interaction in this case. Overall accuracy scores were 
significantly higher than differential accuracy scores, suggesting that high base rates 
may have increased subjects' accuracy at identifying the scared excerpt Post-hoc 
planned comparisons of means (LSD test, a= 0.05) suggested that this was 
particularly the case for 9-year-olds: although their overall accuracy scores were 
equivalent to those of adults, their differential accuracy scores were significantly 
lower than those of adults (p < 0.01), indicating that 9-year-olds were less accurate 
than adults when their relatively high base rates for using the label 'scared' were 
controlled for. The high base rates of 5- and 7-year-olds, on the other hand, did not 
' . ' ' 
appear to affect their accuracy: the performance of these two age groups was · 
significantly poorer than that of 9-year-olds and adults for both overall and 
differential accuracy scores (all ps < 0.05). 
For excited excerpts, significant main effects of age ( F (3, 115) = 7.176, p < 0.000) 
and type of score ( F (1, 115) = 86.132, p < 0.000) were again qualified by a 
significant interaction between age and type of score ( F (3, 115) = 3.890, p < 0.05). 
Post-hoc planned comparisons of means (LSD test, a= 0.05) indicated that overall 
accuracy scores were significantly greater than differential accuracy scores for all age 
groups except the 5-year-olds, suggesting that high base rates for using the label 
'excited' may have enhanced the older subjects' 'accuracy' for identifying those 
excerpts. The overall accuracy scores of adults were greater than those of 9- and 7-
year-olds, who did not differ significantly from each other, but in turn were more 
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accurate than the 5-year-olds (all ps < 0.000). The differential accuracy scores of 
adults remained greater than those of all the other age groups, indicating that adults 
were still more accurate than the children for identifying excited excerpts when base 
rates were controlled for (all ps < 0.01). The only other finding that changed when 
differential accuracy scores were used is that there was no significant difference 
between the differential accuracy scores of 5- and 7-year-olds, suggesting that 7-year-
olds were no more accurate than 5-year-olds when their relatively high base rates for 
using the label 'excited' were controlled for. 
6.4. lntrasubject consistency 
Hypothesis 3 stated that intra-individual consistency should increase with age. 
Subjects' responses to the music tasks were analysed for individual consistency or 
stability by giving each subject who completed all three tasks (n = 112) an 
inconsistency score indicating the mean number of categories into which they placed 
the eighteen excerpts across the three tasks (Score C). A one-way analysis of variance 
on this measure revealed that within-subject agreement increased significantly with 
age: mean inconsistency was 2.194 for 5-year-olds, 1.969 for 7-year-olds, 1. 763 for 
9-year-olds and 1.680 for adults2 ( F (3, 109) = 43.613, p < 0.000). Post-hoc planned 
comparisons (LSD test) indicated that 5-year-olds were significantly more 
inconsistent than 7-year-olds, who were significantly more inconsistent than 9-year-
olds and adults (all ps < 0.0001). Inconsistency scores of9-year-olds and adults did 
not differ significantly. 
6.5. Systematic inaccuracies 
Analysing the data obtained in this study according to the traditional standard of 
agreement with the adult norm, it has been found that the inter- and intra-individual 
judgments of children (particularly those aged 7 or younger) regarding the emotional 
2 Inconsistency was not as great as these figures imply: these scores are inflated since the same 
emotion categories were not necessarily available to subjects on all three tasks. Nevertheless, even in 
cases where the same response options were available, even 9-year-olds and adults were not 
completely consistent in their judgments. 
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categorisation of musical excerpts are less consistent than those of adults. While 
many data analyses stop at this point, we also need to consider the possibility that 
children's (and adults') inaccurate judgments of the emotional character of the 
musical excerpts were not randomly distributed but rather represent systematic 
tendencies to 'confuse' one emotion category with another. 
Initial indications that children's responses might be more orderly than the accuracy 
. . 
data suggest were obtained from chi square values calculated to compare actual 
frequency with which emotion labels were associated with musical excerpts against a 
frequency to be expected with random responding ( 6 out of a possible 18 for Task 1, 
9 for Task 2, and 3 for Task 3). Overall, 216 goodness of fit chi square tests were 
carried out (18 musical excerpts, 4 age groups, 3 tasks) and 185 (86%) were 
significant with alpha set at 0.05. Adults' responses were different from a distribution 
expected by chance on 93% of the trials, 9- and 7-year olds' on 94% of the trials, and 
5-year-olds' on 61 % of the trials. Thus even where children did not agree with the 
adult standard (were 'inaccurate'), the majority of their responses were orderly. 
To examine what the subjects were doing that was orderly, the distribution of 
responses for each age group in Task 3 was calculated across excerpts that expressed 
the same emotion according to the adult standard. These responses are expressed as 
percentages in Table VIII. As predicted by hypothesis 4, category membership was 
found to be graded: there were better and poorer musical exemplars of each emotion 
category. For calm excerpts, percentage agreement across age groups ranged from 
37~9% (excerpt 12) to 67.2% (excerpt 6); for happy excerpts, from 38.6% (excerpt 2) 
to 56.2% (excerpt 5); for excited excerpts, from 26.7% (excerpt 17) to 64.9% (excerpt 
1); for angry excerpts, from 27.9% (excerpt 15) to 58.45% (excerpt 7); and for sad 
excerpts from 57.8% (excerpt 11) to 76.42% (excerpt 3). Only one excerpt was 
classified by the majority of adults as expressing fear: mean agreement on this 
classification across age groups was 79.7%. 
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Table VIII. Distribution ofresponses (task 3) by age and emotion 
Adult modal Subject Age Distribution of emotion judgments 
emotion (years) 
choice 
Calm Happy Excited Scared Angry Sad 
Calm 5 38 14 6 9 8 25 
7 54 7.3 4 5.3 0 29.3 
9 67 2 3 0 27 
Adult 68 9 . 1 0 21 
Combined 57 8 3 4.5 2 25.5 
Happy 5 12 32 27. 13 8 8 
7 8 33 48 4 6 
9 3 57 37 
Adult 0 67 31 0 2 0 
Combined 6 47 36 4.5 4 2.5 
Excited 5 12 10 25 30 15 8 
7 5 8 48 27 12 0 
9 3.3 3.3 48 33.3 12 0 
Adult 3.3 3.3 63 17 13.3 0 
Combined 6 6 46 27 13 2 
Scared. 5 3 3 7 63 17 7 
7 0 0 6.67 66.67 26.67 0 
9 0 0 0 97 3 0 
Adult 0 0 7 93 0 0 
Combined .75 .75 5 80 12 1.75 
Angry 5 11 6 8 33 38 4 
7 3 2 10 38 47 0 
9 0 9 38 52 0 
Adult 0 9 27 63 0 
Combined 3.5 2.5 9 34 50 1 
Sad 5 18.3 3.3 5 8 7 58.3 
7 37 3 0 3 0 57 
9 22 5 0 0 0 73 
Adult 18 0 0 0 0 82 
Combined 24 3 I 2.75 l.75 67.5 
Percentages in bold type refer to choices that correspond to the adult modal choice 
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In an attempt to answer research question 5 and examine whether there were 
systematic age-related changes in modal emotion choices, the children's data were 
reviewed for evidence of instances in which the percentage of subjects within an age 
level who agreed on an alternative interpretation exceeded the percentage who agreed 
with the adult interpretation. In Task 3, this was found to be the case for 6 (although 
not exactly the same six) out of the 18 excerpts for 5-year-olds and 7-year-olds, and 
. for 4 of the excerpts for 9-year-olds. 
In order to examine whether these ·shifts in modal choices were systematic, age-group 
modal choices were subsequently compared with the adult standard across emotion 
categories, revealing that for excerpts identified by the majority of adults as happy, 
48% of 7-year-olds' responses were excited interpretations, while only 33% were 
happy interpretations. For excerpts identified by the majority of adults as excited, 
30% of the 5-year-olds' responses were scared interpretations, while only 25% were 
excited interpretations. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the range of emotion categories selected would narrow 
with age. The data presented in Table VIII support this prediction. On average, 
adults' responses to the musical excerpts in Task 3 fell into 3 different categories 
(max.= 6). 9-yeai:-olds' responses fell into a mean of3.167 categories, 7-year-olds' 
into a mean of 4.11 categories, and 5-year-olds' into a mean of 5.56 categories. These 
values were found to differ significantly when examined by means of a one-way 
ANOVA ( F (3, 68) = 30.72, p < 0.000). Planned analytic comparisons (LSD test) 
indicated that 5-year-olds' responses fell into significantly more categories than 7-
year-olds', whose responses in turn fell into significantly more categories than those 
of 9-year-olds and adults (all ps < 0.01). There was no significant difference in the 
number of categories utilised by 9-year-olds and adults. 
Hypothesis 6 stated that for each musical .excerpt there would be a focal point, the 
emotion category most likely to be chosen, with the probability of a choice decreasing 
with the distance of the emotion from the focal point according to the structural 
model. As we can see from the raw data presented in Appendix 4, it appears that for 
120 
the majority of musical excerpts there was a clear modal choice, the emotion label 
most likely to be chosen, but that in some cases this shifted with age. Moreover, if we 
look at Table VIII we can see that subjects' choices on task 3 were clustered in a 
systematic fashion. The six emotion categories in this table have been arranged in the 
same order as they appear in Russell et al. 's (1980, 1983, 1986) circumplex model of 
emotions. Thus, provided the two end emotions (sad and calm) are thought of as 
adjacent, the distribution of subjects' choices can be considered in terms of what 
would be predicted by the structural model. According to this model, the majority of 
errors (defined here as choices other than the adult modal choice) should fall into the 
two emotion categories that are adjacent to the 'correct' choice. By chance, only 40% 
of these errors would be the two adjacent emotions. 
For the 5-year-olds, the mean percentage of errors across the 30 subjects that fell into 
adjacent categories was 60.5; the means for 7-year-olds, 9-year-olds and adults were 
80.15%, 84.23% and 85.1% respectively. These means were analysed with one 
sample t-tests and found to be highly significantly different from chance (p < 0.001) 
for each age group. 
Visual inspection of the data, however, suggested that this finding might in some 
cases simply reflect tendencies to confuse a. particular emotion with only one other. 
59.62% of errors on calm excerpts were sad interpretations, while only 18.46% were 
happy interpretations. 67.94% of errors on happy excerpts were excited 
interpretations, as opposed to only 10. 79% calm interpretations. On excited excerpts, 
49.61% of errors were scared interpretations, while only 11.63% were happy 
interpretations. On angry excerpts, 67. 78% of errors were scared interpretations, 
while only 2.22% were sad interpretations. For sad excerpts, 73.08% of errors were 
calm interpretations, as opposed to only 5.13% angry interpretations. The only 
emotion category for which errors were more-or-less evenly distributed between the 
adjacent emotion categories was scared: 25% of errors were excited interpretations, · 
and 20.83% were angry interpretations. 
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Furthermore, while the general pattern did show a modal response with declining 
probability of response to either side, there were a few minor exceptions to this 
pattern. 5- and 7-year-olds' 'misidentifications' of sad and calm excerpts were more 
likely to be scared judgments than the structural model would predict, while angry 
excerpts were more often misidentified by these two younger groups as calm than the 
model would predict. 
6.6. Correlations with Hedonic Tone and Arousal ratings . 
Hypothesis 7 was largely supported by the finding already presented that with the 
exception of 5-year-olds' distinction of sad and calm excerpts, subjects of all ages 
were able to make reliable distinctions between musical excerpts varying on only one 
dimension, with the other underlying dimension held more-or-less constant. 
Hypothesis 8 proposed that there would be a relationship between independent 
pleasure and arousal ratings of the music and the categories into which subjects placed 
them. In order to examine this relationship, mean pleasure ratings of the pilot subjects 
on Mehrabian and Russell's (1974) scales were correlated with the number of subjects 
in each age group who rated each excerpt as calm, happy or excited on task 3 (as· 
opposed tO sad, angry or scared), and mean arousal ratings were correlated with the 
number of subjects in each age group who labelled each excerpt as happy, excited, 
scared or angry (as opposed to calm or sad). 
For pleasure ratings, correlations with the number of subjects classifying each excerpt 
as expressing positive emotions ranged from 0.69 for the 5-year-olds to 0.81 for the 9-
year-olds; the correlation coefficient across all the age groups combined was 0.78. 
These were all significantly above chance levels (all ps < 0.01). r-sq ranged from 
0.473 for the 5-year-olds to 0.663 for the 9-year-olds; taken across age groups, 
pleastire ratings accounted for 61.4 7% of the variance in the number of subjects 
associating the excerpts with positively valenced emotions on task 3. 
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Correlations between arousal ratings and the number of subjects categorising each 
excerpt as expressing active emotions ranged from 0.89 for the 5-year-olds to 0.94 for 
the adults and 9-year-olds, and all were highly significant (all ps < 0.000). r-sq 
values ranged from 0.80 for the 5-year-olds to 0.885 for the adults; combined across 
age groups, arousal ratings accounted for 88.4% of the variance in the number of 
subjects associating each excerpt with active as opposed to passive emotions on task 
3. 
6.7. Basis for emotion judgments of musical excerpts 
Research question 6 was concerned with the basis for subjects' emotional 
categorisations of the musical excerpts. Subjects' spontaneous comments and answers 
to direct questions suggested that listeners of all ages used two main 'techniques' for 
assigning musical excerpts to emotion categories. 
The most common technique across age groups was a form of 'visualisation' -
forming 'mental pictures' of movie or stage scenes ("like a pirate movie" [5-yr-old]; 
"kissing movie music" [7-year-old]; "where the dinosaurs die" [7-year-old]) or of 
cartoons, dance motions, or other institutionalised occasions or settings such as 
circuses and formal or religious ceremonies ("Academy Award music;, [Adult]; 
"sounds royal...they might be getting married" [5-yr-old]; "sounds like Christmas" [5-
year-old]). Some listeners also pictured more personal or idiosyncratic scenes (e.g. 
"like a big m9nster stepping" [5-year-old]; "a herd of cheetahs and lions" [5-year-
old]). 
All age groups also used the formal musical elements of the excerpts as a basis for 
their judgments, although the adults tended to describe these in more technical terms. 
Even the 5-year-olds made reference to tempo: for example," 'cause it's going fast"; 
and "very quick" were justifications given for describing excerpt 1 as excited. 
Subjects of all ages also made reference to the rhythm of the musical excerpts. The 
latter appeared to be particularly important for excerpts judged as angry: while adults 
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referred to "deep drum sounds", 5-year-olds couched their responses in terms such as 
"boom boom" (excerpt 14). Adults also made reference to other musical elements 
such as articulation (staccato versus legato), melodiousness, pitch level, 
instrumentation and modality, the last 3 of which were claimed to be useful for 
making distinctions between excerpts similar in activity level. In addition, both adults 
and children made more general and ambiguous comments about features of the music 
such as "Sad music has a 'crying' sound" (adult) and "If it goes woo, woo, woo, then I · 
know it's sad" (5-year-old). A few adults commented that formal musical elements 
were particularly useful for making subtle distinctions between closely related 
emotions such as happiness and excitement or fear and anger. An analysis of the 
quantitative data obtained was subsequently used to examine the effects of these 
musical elements in more depth. 
The quantitative part of the statistical analysis examined the relationship between 
subjects' responses on task 3 and the formal musical characteristics of the excerpts on 
the stimulus tape. The means of the judges' ratings for tempo, rhythm (firm vs. 
flowing), rhythmic activity, articulation, pitch range and harmony as well as the 
codings for modality were initially correlated with the number of subjects in each age 
group (as well as with the mean across age groups) who placed each musical excerpt 
in each of the six emotion categories .. That is, the mean ratings of the musical 
elements were correlated with the number of calm judgments, the number of happy 
judgments, the number of sad judgments, and so on. They were then correlated with 
the number of subjects in each age group, and with the mean across age groups, who 
responded to each excerpt with calm, happy or excited judgments (pleasant emotions) 
as opposed to the unpleasant emotions of sadness, fear and anger, as well as with the 
number who responded with 'active' emotion labels (happy, excited, scared or angry) 
as opposed to the passive emotions of sadness and calmness. The results of these 
correlation matrices for the mean number of subjects across age groups are presented 
in Table IX; full results for each age group separately are displayed in Appendix 6. 
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Table IX. Correlations between musical elements and emotional categorisations of mean 
number of subjects across age groups combined (task 3) 
Musical Emotion 
elements 
CALM HAPPY EXCITED SCARED ANGRY SAD PLEASANT 
TEMPO 
-0.70* 0.41 0.83* 0.35 0.12 -0.75* 0.23 
RHYTHM 
-0.82* 0.34 0.65* 0.37 0.54* -0.78* -0.01 
RHYTHMIC 
-0.61 * 0.30 0.74* 0.40 ·0.20 -0.79* 0.18 
ACTIVITY 
AR TI CU-
-0.56* 0.38 0.53* 0.43 0.31 -0.84* 0.13 
LATION 
HARMONY 
-0.38 -0.62* -0.24 0.79* 0.59* -0.07 . -0.82* 
MODALITY 0.03 0.57* 0.52 -0.41 -0.30 -0.70* 0.92* 
* Indicates significant at a = 0.05 
As can be seen from the data presented in Appendix 6, the patterns of correlations 
were very similar across age groups. Consequently, stepwise multiple regression 
analyses conducted to explore these relationships in more detail were calculated using 
the mean number of judgments across age groups for each emotion category as the 
. criterion variable, and the judges' ratings of the six musical elements as predictor 
variables. 
Table X. Intercorrelations of musical elements 
ACTIVE 
0.85* 
0.94* 
0.82* 
0.82* 
0.27 
0.41 
TEMPO RHYTHM RHYTHMIC ARTICULATION HARMONY 
ACTIVITY 
TEMPO 
RHYTHM 0.81* 
RHYTHMIC 0.95* 0.81 * 
ACTIVITY 
ARTICULATION 0.77* 0.75* 0.82* 
HARMONY 0.12 0.21 0.15 0.17 
MODALITY 0.53 0.27 0.56* 0.60* -0.67* 
* Indicates significant at a 0.05 
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The number of subjects describing excerpts as calm was highly correlated with 
rhythm for all age groups (all rs:::;; -0.75), and was also moderately and significantly ( 
p < 0.05) correfated with tempo, rhythmic activity and articulation: correlation 
coefficients for these elements ranged from -0.49 to -0.76. As can be seen in Table X, 
these variables were also highly correlated with each other. 
A stepwise multiple regression analysis was subsequently performed with the mean 
number of calm judgments across age groups as the criterion variable and the six 
musical elements as the predictor variables. The results of the regression model 
obtained indicated that the predictor variables of rhythm, harmony, rhythmic activity 
and tempo, when taken together, accounted for 76% of the variance in the number of 
subjects describing the music as calm ( F (4, 13) = 14.478, p < 0.00). Rhythm was 
the single best predictor, accounting for approximately 67% of the variance in 
subjects' responses ( t (13) = -3.57, p < 0.01, 13 -0.75.) These results suggested that 
excerpts with flowing rhythms, consonant harmonies, little rhythmic activity and slow 
tempos tended to be judged as calm. The absence of articulation from this regression 
model is notable, considering its high simple correlation with the criterion variable. 
However, articulation was quite highly correlated with rhythmic activity, rhythm and 
tempo, and the relationship between calm judgments and legato articulation apparent 
· . from the simple correlations was masked in the regression analysis because these 
elements were more strongly related to the criterion variable. 
The second correlation matrix showed that the number of subjects in each age group 
describing excerpts as happy was significantly correlated with harmony (-0.63:::;; all rs 
:::;; -0.57), and also showed a moderate correlation with modality (0.47:::;; all rs:::;; 0.65), 
although this relationship only reached statistical significance (p < 0.05) for the 7-
year-olds and adults. Harmony and modality were also significantly correlated with 
each other (r = -0.67). 
A stepwise regression analysis indicated that 68% of the variance in the mean.number 
of subjects across age groups responding with happy judgments could be predicted 
from a combination of harmony, articulation, tempo and rhythmic activity ( F (4, 13) 
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= 10.17, p < 0.00). Excerpts tended to be judged as happy if they were characterised 
by consonant harmonies, staccato articulation, fast tempos and much rhythmic 
activity. The absence of modality from the regression equation despite its high simple 
correlation with the number of happy judgments can be attributed to its high 
correlation with harmony: when harmony was omitted as a predictor variable, 
modality entered the regression model at the first step and accounted for 
approximately 26% of the variance in the number of happy responses. This suggests 
that excerpts rated as happy also tended to be in the major mode. 
The number of subjects identifying excerpts as excited showed a significant 
correlation with tempo, rhythmic activity and rhythm for all age groups (0.56 ::;; all rs 
::;; 0.85), as well as a moderate correlation with articulation (0.45 ::;; all rs ::;; 0.55) which 
reached statistical significance (a.= 0.05) for the 5-year-olds and adults. Multiple 
regression results indicated that tempo alone accounted for nearly 58% of the variance 
in the number of subjects responding with the label 'excited'; harmony was the only 
other predictor variable which contributed significantly towards R-sq, adding another 
0.10 to its value ( F (2, 15) = 18.86, p < 0.00). Thus, fast excerpts with consonant 
harmonies tended to be judged as excited. The relationship between excited 
judgments and large amounts of rhythmic activity and staccato articulation which are 
apparent in the simple correlations did not appear in the regression analysis as they 
were masked by these variables' high correlations with tempo. 
The only musical element with which the number of scared judgments was 
significantly correlated was harmony, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.68 
to 0.85 for the different age groups. A stepwise regression analysis indicated that this 
was indeed the most significant predictor of the number of scared judgments ( t (15) 
= 5.40, p < 0.00, f) = 0.74); however, articulation also contributed significantly 
towards R-sq ( t (15) = 2.25, p < 0.05, f) = 0.31 ). These two elements combined 
accounted for 69% of the variance in the numbers of scared judgments ( F (2, 15) = 
19.7, p < 0.00), suggesting that a label of 'scared' tended to be applied to dissonant 
and staccato music. 
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Harmony was also significantly correlated with angry judgments for all age groups 
(0.51 ~all rs ~ 0.69), while moderate correlations between the number of angry 
responses and rhythm were significant for all ages with the exception of the 9-year-
olds (0.43 ~all rs~ 0.59). These two variables entered the stepwise regression 
analysis first, together accounting for approximately 72% of the variance in the 
number of angry responses. Inclusion of tempo and modality into the equation 
increased R-sq significantly, with all four variables together accounting for 78% of the 
variance ( F(4, 13) 15.85,p < 0.00). These results suggest that subjects tended to 
describe excerpts with dissonant harmonies, firm rhythms, fast tempos and in the 
minor mode as sounding angry. 
The number of sad categorisations in each age group was significantly correlated with 
all of the musical elements other than harmony, with correlation coefficients ranging 
between 0.59 and 0.87. Results of a stepwise multiple regression analysis indicated 
that articulation, modality and rhythm together accounted for 83% of the variance in 
the number of sad judgments ( F (3, 14) = 28.67, p < 0.00): in other words, legato 
excerpts with a flowing rhythm and in the minor mode tended to be described as sad. 
The association between sad judgments and slow tempos as well as little rhythmic 
activity suggested by the simple correlations was not apparent in the regression model 
as these elements were highly correlated with rhythm and articulation, which were 
more strongly related to the number of sad judgments. · 
The number of subjects describing the excerpts as expressing pleasant emotions was 
found to be highly and significantly correlated with harmony and modality for all age 
groups, with correlation coefficients ranging between ± 0.72 and± 0.95. Results of a 
stepwise multiple regression analysis indicated that harmony was the single most 
significant predictor ( t (13) = -5.79, p < 0.000, ~ = -6.95), accounting for 
approximately 68% of the variance on its own. Together with modality, tempo and 
rhythm it accounted for approximately 90% of the variance in responses ( F ( 4, 13) 
17.45, p < 0.00), suggesting that subjects tended to associate excerpts with pleasant 
emotions particularly if they had consonant harmonies and were in the major mode, 
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while faster tempos and flowing rhythms were also associated with more pleasant 
emotion states. 
The number of subjects categorising excerpts as expressing active emotions was 
significantly correlated with rhythm, tempo, rhythmic activity and articulation (0.74::; 
all rs ::; 0.94), and again this pattern ofrelationships was apparent for all age groups. 
A stepwise multiple regression analysis indicated that rhythm was the most important 
single predictor variable ( t (12) = 5.45, p < 0.00, P = 0.64). Together with 
articulation, tempo, rhythmic activity and harmony it accounted for approximately 
93% of the variance in subjects' responses (F (5, 12) = 46.927,p < 0.000). A firm (as 
opposed to flowing) rhythm therefore appeared to be the most important musical 
element for predicting the number of subjects associating the excerpts with active 
emotions; however, active judgments were also related to staccato articulation, fast 
tempos, much rhythmic activity and dissonant harmonies. 
6.8. Effects of personal characteristics 
Although there was a general tendency for consistency of emotional judgments to 
increase with age, there were marked individual differences in accuracy (for our 
purposes, agreement with the adult mode, or Score A). The highest scoring 5-year-
old, for instance, was substantially more accurate than the lowest scoring adult (70% 
versus 57% correct). 
As an initial step in investigating what variables might be related to individual 
differences within age groups and attempting to answer research question 7, t-tests 
were used to investigate whether there were differences in the mean accuracy across 
the three music tasks of males and females within each age group. Accuracy was 
defined as the number of responses that agreed with the adult modal choice out of a 
total of 54 (18 musical excerpts each judged 3 times). Only one significant difference 
was found: 9-year-old females (M = 42.33) were significantly more accurate ( t (27) = 
-2.075,p < 0.05) than 9-year-old males (M .= 38.765). 
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In order to check these results, subject sex was included in correlation matrices for 
each age group along with the following independent variables: control task score (all 
age groups), reading and maths scores (7- and 9-year-olds only) and number of years 
formal musical training (adults only). Once again, the dependent variable was the 
accuracy score (compared with the adult standard) across all three music tasks 
combined. 
As far as sex is concerned, the correlation matrices tended to confirm the results of the 
t-tests. For 5-year-olds, there was a fairly low and nonsignificant (a= 0.05) 
correlation (r = -0.33) between sex and accuracy on the music tasks in favour of boys, 
which accounted for 11.06% of the variance in subjects' performance. There was also 
a slight tendency for boys to perform better than girls on the control task, although 
here the relationship was somewhat smaller (r = -0.23, r-sq = 0.053). For 7-year-olds, 
there was a very small and nonsignificant correlation between sex and accuracy on the 
music tasks, again in favour of boys (r = -0.1, r-sq = 0.011), and a slightly higher but 
still nonsignificant correlation between sex and the control task score in favour of girls 
(r 0.33, r-sq = 0.11 ). The accuracy of adults on the music tasks showed only a very 
slight and nonsignificant correlation with sex in favour of females (r = 0.12, r-sq = 
0.015), and there was virtually no relationship between sex and the control task score 
. (r = 0.07). As expected from the t-test results, a stronger, although still fairly small 
and statistically nonsignificant relationship between sex and accuracy on the music 
tasks in favour of girls was found for 9-year-olds (r = 0.33, r-sq 0.11 ). When sex 
was correlated with accuracy scores for each emotion separately, however, it was 
found that the 9-year-old females' advantage was limited to the identification of 
happy excerpts (r = 0.58, r-sq = 0.34, p < 0.05). Sex showed only very low and 
nonsignificant correlations with accuracy for the other emotion categories. Control 
task scores also showed a weak and nonsignificant correlation with sex in favour of 
girls (r = 0.19, r-sq = 0.036). 
A closer look at the results indicated that for 9-year-olds (but not 7-year-olds) sex was 
also moderately, and significantly, correlated with reading and maths scores (reading: 
r = 0.42, r-sq = 0.18, p < 0.05; maths: r = 0.48, r-sq 0.23, p < 0.01), which were 
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themselves moderately intercorrelated (r = 0.45, r-sq = 0.20, p < 0.05) and in tum 
showed a positive, albeit rather low and nonsignificant correlation with accuracy on 
the music tasks (reading: r = 0.25, r-sq = 0.062; maths: r = 0.11, r-sq = 0.01). The 7-
year-olds' reading and maths scores were highly intercorrelated (r = 0.82, r-sq = 0.68, 
p < 0.001); however, only maths scores showed a (nonsignificant) correlation with sex 
in favour of girls (r = 0.33, r-sq = 0.11 ). Reading scores, but not maths scores, were 
slightly positively correlated with accuracy on the music tasks (r = 0.20, r-sq = 0.04), 
although again these correlations did not reach statistical significance. 
Subjects' scores on the control task showed only low and nonsignificant (p > 0.05) 
correlations with accuracy on the music tasks for all age groups. The highest 
correlation coefficient, r = 0.26, was found for the preschoolers; for older children and 
adults the correlations ranged from 0.14 to 0.16. Thus, subjects' accuracy on the 
control task accounted for only between 2 and 7% of the variance in their accuracy on 
the music tasks. 
As only 5 of the 90 children were known to have had any formal musical training, 
correlations between the amount of musical training and accuracy on the music tasks 
were only computed for adults. The number of years of musical training, which was 
unrelated to sex, showed only a low' and nonsignificant positive correlation with 
accuracy on the music tasks (r = 0.19, r-sq = 0.04) and, curiously, a slightly higher, 
but still nonsignificant, correlation with performance on the control task (r = 0.25, r-
sq = 0.06). 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
This study has identified several broad trends in the development of children's 
interpretation of emotion in music which are consistent with the findings of previous 
' . . . . 
research. The ability to identify emotions in music was found to emerge in the 
preschool years and to improve with age. In addition, the consistency of subjects' 
judgments was found to vary according to the particular emotion being expressed, and 
subjects' 'misjudgments' (that is, their selection of emotion labels other than the adult 
modal choice) were found to be systematic. However, the results also provided some 
contributions that are unique, and others that conflict with the existing literature. 
Furthermore, even though the majority of the findings are in accordance with those of 
previous work, the interpretations provided for these findings will differ somewhat 
from the interpretations that have been provided in the past. 
7.1. Effects of age 
. The finding that even preschool children generally show beyond-chance agreement 
with each other and with adults in judging the emotional character of short, 
decontextualised musical excerpts supports the conclusions of previous studies which 
indicate that children's sensitivity to emotional expression in an abstract stimulus like 
music follows closely in time on their ability to identify more conventional, everyday 
expressions of emotion found in the human face and voice (Cunningham & Sterling, 
1988; Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Meerum Terwogt& van Grinsven, 1988, 1991; 
Trehub et al., 1987 in Trehub, 1993). Despite the fact that the ability to identify 
emotions in music does not have the same ecological advantages or social 
consequences as the ability to identify emotions expressed by one's fellow humans, 
the general finding of these studies is that the ability to apply emotion terms to music 
in a reliable manner is well established by 6 or 7 years of age. This conclusion was 
supported by the findings of this study, even though the range of possible emotion 
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choices was increased from the 2 - 4 used in previous studies to 6, and despite the fact 
that the musical excerpts were not preselected as prototypical examples of particular 
emotion categories. This suggests that (as other recent research on children's 
understanding of emotion has indicated) young children have a more advanced 
understanding of emotional expression than they have traditionally been credited with. 
Furthermore, the ability to identify emotion in music appears to be little influenced by 
a person's gender or intellectual skills - a conclusion that has also been reached by 
several other researchers (Behrens & Green, 1993; Campbell, 1942; Hevner, 1935; 
Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1991), although Beldoch (1964) did find that 
college students' verbal (both not mathematical) aptitude was related to their ability to 
interpret emotions in music. 
This study is also consistent with the previous literature on children's interpretation of 
emotion in music - as well as in more naturalistic stimuli such as facial expressions -
in finding that children's agreement with the modal emotion choice of adults tends to 
increase with age, particularly up to the age of nine or thereabouts (Cunningham & 
Sterling, 1988; Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1988, 
1991; Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977). What these studies typically fail to do, however, is 
to provide any systematic explanation of how and why these age-related changes 
occur. 
One possibility is that children simply make more errors than adults do due to lack of 
concentration, confusion, a shorter attention span, a tendency to be distracted, and so 
on. Such an explanation cannot be completely dismissed: on the whole the adult 
sample in this study did appear to concentrate more closely on the tasks, to listen more 
carefully to the excerpts and to put a large amount of thought into their judgments, 
whereas children were more likely to respond instantaneously. Nevertheless, the 
results of this investigation suggest that such an explanation is far from sufficient to 
account for the greater agreement with the adult standard in the emotion judgments 
made by older subjects. 
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7.2. Effects of musical elements 
Another possible explanation that has been raised for these findings is that age-related 
increases in consistency may be related to an improved ability to perceive or 
differentiate the relevant acoustic emotion cues. The results of this study do not, 
however, support this explanation. Firstly, although the influence of tempo, rhythm 
and articulation on emotion judgments were similar to the role these elements have 
been found to play in expressing emotion in speech (Scherer, 1986; Sundberg, 1982), 
accuracy on the control task showed little relationship to accuracy on the music tasks. 
Although the control task was only a brief measure whose validity for measuring 
subjects' ability to identify emotions expressed in speech has not been established, 
these results do suggest that sensitivity to emotion in music does not depend solely, or 
even largely, on the ability to perceive auditory 'emotion detectors' common to both 
speech and music. Rather, it appears to require an awareness of features that are in the 
music itself, and not simply or exclusively extra-musical features of the voice. 
Secondly, the patterns of correlations between musical elements and emotional 
. categorisations found in this study were remarkably similar for all age groups, which 
is inconsistent with Sloboda's (1985) hypothesis that while all subjects should be able 
to make broad emotional distinctions between musical selections based on global, 
iconic characteristics like tempo and rhythm, only those who possess a fair amount of 
musical sophistication will be able to perceive and make discriminations based on 
more subtle (symbolic) aspects of the music such as tonal relations. Although the 
multiple regression results need to be interpreted with caution due to the high 
intercorrelations among musical elements, when viewed in conjunction with the 
simple correlations they contradict traditional beliefs that children cannot perceive the 
difference between consonant and dissonant harmonies until they are around 8-10 
years old (Moog, l 976a in Kastner & Crowder, 1990). They are also inconsistent 
with Trehub et al.'s (1987) finding (cited in Trehub, 1993) that only musically trained 
adults made the conventional emotional associations to short melodic sequences in the 
major and minor modes. Rather, they support the findings of Crowder (1995; Kastner 
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& Crowder, 1994) and Kratus (1993) in suggesting (although not proving) that - at 
least in the context of other musical elements - even young children are able to 
perceive quite subtle aspects ofinusic such as harmony and modality, and that they 
associate these and other musical elements with emotions in the same way that adults 
do. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that subjects' judgments were 
influenced by musical elements that were not investigated in this study, there was no 
evidence that children were focusing on different or fewer elements than those used 
by adults, nor that they were giving different weightings to the same features. 
In fact, although adults were able to describe the musical elements in more technical 
terms than children, subjects of all ages appeared to make use of a fairly standard set 
of musical features which they interpreted in a way that was largely consistent with 
the findings of previous research (Crowder, 1985, 1994; Hevner, 1935, 1936, 1937; 
Kratus, 1993; Nielzen & Cesarec, 1982; Rigg, 1940; Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977; 
Wedin, 1972). The only finding that was not in accordance with the results of 
previous research was the slight tendency for children (but not adults) to rate excerpts 
with consonant harmonies as excited. This finding may reflect the relatively 
ambiguous position of excitement on the dimension ofhedonic tone for adults: 
perhaps dissonant harmonies are associated with a more unpleasant, tense sort of 
excitement and consonant harmonies (which were correlated with judgments of 
pleasant emotions by all age groups) with a more positive, joyful form of excitement. 
The quantitative results of this study also provide some support for the hypothesis put 
forward by Frances and Bruchon-Schweitzer (1983) that musical variables related to 
activation are iconic (i.e. similar to those that reflect activation in the voice and in 
body movement), while evaluative distinctions rely more on conventional, 
intrinsically 'musical' features like harmony and tonality. Reasons given by the 
subjects for their judgments generally support this conclusion, but suggest that it is 
not a hard-and-fast rule: some music was judged angry because the rhythm resembled. 
a person stamping; some was judged sad because it" sounded like a person crying. The 
distinction between iconic and more conventional features of music is not, however, 
always clear-cut, and at times the two are difficult to separate. In addition, it needs to 
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be remembered that other potentially important musical elements such as volume, 
timbre and various melodic characteristics were not investigated in this study; nor 
were the interaction effects of musical elements. These remain a potential topic for 
future research . 
. Regardless of whether musical elements connote emotion iconically or in a more . 
. conventional, symbolic fashion, however, the results of this study suggest that ail 
advanced or sophisticated knowledge of music is not necessary for one to be able to 
interpret it in emotional terms. Additional support for this conclusion is provided by 
the finding that formal musical training was unrelated to adults' 'accuracy' at 
identifying the emotions expressed in music. 
This does not, of course, discount the possibility that adults may be more consistent in 
their emotional interpretations than children because they have more experience with 
musical conventions or 'metaphors' - in other words, with the indexical associations 
of music. Sloboda (1985) refers to this as musical acculturation (or enculturation): 
knowledge about music which is acquired spontaneously, without the self-conscious, 
directed efforts to improve musical skills that constitute musical training. Although 
Meerum Terwogt and van Grinsven (1988) found that experience with music - both 
active (performance) and passive (the importance one attaches to music and the 
frequency with which one listens to it) had no significant effect on their subjects' 
ability to identify the emotions expressed in music, they point out that a small sample 
size and limited within-group differences in experience might have obscured any 
effects of the latter. Indeed, reasons given by the subjects in this study for their 
answers do suggest that the ability to interpret emotions in music is influenced by a 
knowledge of the types of music that typically accompany particular kinds of scenes 
or emotional episodes in movies, ballets, cartoons and the like, as well as of the types 
of music that are regularly associated with particular occasions, settings, or 
ceremonies. Some adults even spoke about a "film sense" and a "conditioned 
response to movie music". To what extent this knowledge depends on age, however, 
is a matter for conjecture: even the youngest subjects in this study seemed to have a 
good idea about what kinds of music tend to accompany love scenes, death scenes, 
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chases and so on in the media. Some of the 5-year-olds made specific references to 
movies from which they believed the excerpts came, and although these were 
inaccurate except for Pinocchio, some of their responses were remarkably perceptive. 
Examples are the 5-year-olds who described excerpt 5 ('Hero's Wedding') as 
sounding "royal...they might be getting married", and excerpt 14 ('The Fall of 
Saigon') as depicting "mad soldiers - cross soldiers". 
7 .3. Effects of emotion 
The results of this study therefore suggest that increasing knowledge of musical 
conventions does not go a very long way towards explaining age-related differences in 
the consistency with which individuals interpret emotion in music. Rather, they raise 
the possibility that an improved ability to understand emotional expression in music 
may reflect not so much an increase in musical sophistication as an increase in 
knowledge about and understanding of emotion. As Barwell (1986) has stated, in 
order to understand what it means to call music sad or to be able to recognise the 
sadness in the music, one first has to know what it means to say that a person is sad, 
and to be able to recognise his or her sadness. 
That this is in fact the case is suggest.ed by previous studies which indicate that 
children find some emotions easier to identify in music than others (Cunningham & 
Sterling, 1988; Dolgin & Adelson, 1990; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1991). 
More specifically, children apparently learn to identify happy music, facial 
expressions and situations first, with knowledge of more complex or unfamiliar 
emotions gradually being acquired later. 
Viewed from this perspective, the results of the present study are puzzling. In 
contradiction to previous research, given a choice of all six emotion categories (task 
3), children - like adults - identified the scared excerpt 'correctly' most often, 
followed by the sad excerpts. Performance on happy excerpts was relatively poor in 
comparison .. On Task 1 (Activation dimension varied) sad and calm excerpts were 
identified correctly most often, while on Task 2 (Pleasure Dimension varied) these 
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two emotion categories were identified correctly least often. How do we explain 
these discrepancies? 
I 
7.3.1. Musical stimuli 
One possibility is that the results obtained for Task 3 reflect the particular musical 
excerpts used: perhaps the scared and sad excerpts were particularly good examples 
of music expressing fear and sadness, while the happy excerpts were only mediocre 
examples of this emotion category. This might have been the case particularly as 
(unlike in most previous research with the exception of Kratus, 1993) - the scoring 
procedures used in this study meant that the excerpts were not equally divided among 
emotion categories. In fact, only one excerpt was labelled as scared by the majority 
of adults and two as sad, whereas five were classified as happy. 
This unequal distribution of musical excerpts among emotion categories does mean 
that the findings regarding the effects of the emotion being expressed on subjects' 
'accuracy' need to be interpreted with caution. It is certainly true that excerpt number 
10 ('Whale Chase') may have been a particularly good example of fear in music: 
four out of the five pilot subjects included synonyms of 'afraid' in their open-ended 
emotional descriptions of the music, whereas in previous studies (Cunningham & 
Sterling, 1988; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1991) the percentage of pilot 
subjects agreeing on the emotional categorisation of scared excerpts was somewhat 
lower than the percentage agreeing on the emotional character of the other excerpts. 
On the other hand, the pilot subjects' descriptions do not suggest that the 'sad' 
excerpts used in this study were particularly good examples of this category, nor that 
the 'happy' excerpts failed to express this emotion clearly. Furthermore, ifthe 
consistency of subjects' responses was determined by how clearly particular emotions 
were expressed in the musical excerpts, we would expect that particular emotion 
categories would be identified correctly more often on all three tasks, which was not 
the case. Therefore while the particular selection of musical excerpts may have 
contributed to the results of this study, this is not a sufficient explanation for the 
present findings. 
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7.3.2. Base rates 
Another possibility that was examined in this study is that agreement" among subjects 
with the adult modal choice may be influenced by factors unrelated to their ability to 
interpret emotional expressions in music, and hence be inadvertent. The effects of 
base rates for using certain emotion labels on accuracy was felt to be a particularly 
important consideration in this study because (as discussed above) the musical 
excerpts were not evenly divided among the six emotion categories. The present 
results help to account for the contrasting findings of this study and previous research 
regarding the effects of emotion by suggesting that 'accuracy' for the identification of· 
scared and excited excerpts in task 3 may have been enhanced by subjects' relatively 
high base rates for using those labels, while accuracy for the identification of happy 
excerpts may have been reduced by relatively low base rates for using the happy label. 
The results of this study also indicate that in a few instances, 'accuracy' and 
'inaccuracy' in identifying the emotional character of musical excerpts in Task 3 was 
in fact significantly influenced by adults' and children's varying preferences for the 
use of particular emotion terms. Happy excerpts, in particular, were not as difficult 
for the 7- and 9-year-old children in this study to interpret as their low overall 
accuracy rates, compared to those of adults and 5-year-olds respectively, might 
suggest: 9-year-olds performed equivalently to adults, and 7-year-olds performed 
with greater accuracy than 5-year-olds, when their low base rates for using the label 
'happy' (compared with adults) were controlled for. The low base rates of 7-year-olds 
in relation to 9-year-olds did not, however, appear to affect the relative accuracy of 
these two groups: 9-year-olds were more accurate at identifying happy excerpts than 
7-year-olds even when their differential base rates were controlled for. In addition, 
fear in music was not as easy for the 9-year-old children to recognise as their overall 
accuracy rates for Task 3 appear to indicate: when the children's relatively high base 
rates for using the 'scared' label were controlled for, 9-year-olds' accuracy fell 
significantly below that of adults. Similarly, the 7-year-old~ high base rates for using 
the 'excited' label apparently increased their accuracy at recognising that state 
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relative to the 5-year-olds: when base rates were controlled for, they did not perform 
significantly better than the preschoolers. 
Only one previous study (Cunningham & Sterling, 1988) has taken children's base 
rates for using certain emotion labels into account. Although these authors also found 
that their youngest subjects (4-year-olds) had high base rates for scared responses, this 
did not appear to influence their accuracy. Nevertheless, the results of the present 
investigation support the point made by Felleman et al. (1983) that research on 
children's understanding of emotional expressions must recognise that 'accuracy' or 
'inaccuracy' in identifying expressions may be influenced by more than the mere 
ability to interpret expressive cues 'correctly'. 
Why children and adults use different emotion labels with different frequencies is a 
question that still needs to be investigated. Is fear simply more common in children 
than in adults? Possibly, but it seems doubtful that happiness is less common. 
Perhaps, however, these findings partly reflect the subjects' ways ofresponding to the 
task. It was observed during the experimental trials that when unsure of how to 
respond, the children who participated in this study tended to look for patterns in their 
answers (such as choosing the first emotion in block 1, the second in block 2, the third 
in block 3, and so on), or to choose an emotion that they felt had been too long . 
neglected. Adults, on the other hand, tended to be less concerned about the 
frequencies with which they used the different emotion labels, and simply to select the 
term which they felt was most appropriate to descfibe a particular musical excerpt. 
While the particular selection of musical excerpts and subjects' base rates for 
choosing particular labels go some way towards explaining why some emotions were 
identified more consistently than others, the evidence obtained in this study also 
suggests an alternative interpretation. It appears that (a) the varying effects of 
emotion for the different tasks, as well as (b) the discrepancies between this study and 
previous findings concerning the differential accuracy for different emotion categories 
and systematic 'confusion' of particular emotions and (c) the broad age-related trends 
observed, can all be accounted for if we shift our focus away from simply examining 
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children's accuracy in comparison to the adult standard (assuming that this represents 
the 'correct' way to describe each excerpt), and instead focus on the meaning and 
nature of emotion concepts at different ages from the perspective of prototype theory. 
7 .4. Prototype analysis 
The findings of this study are consistent with the idea that emotion concepts - as used 
in everyday life - are prototypically organised and have fuzzy boundaries. For all age 
groups, some musical excerpts belonged quite clearly in a particular emotion category. 
Others, however, were more ambiguous and difficult to categorise, and were 
inconsistently described as expressing two or more different emotions: no sharp 
boundary separated excited musical excerpts,.for example, from scared excerpts. 
Thus for each emotion category, some excerpts were good exemplars, others were 
poorer, and one excerpt could be a clear member of one category (e.g. happy) and a 
peripheral member of another (e.g. excited). These findings support the data obtained 
by Bullock and Russell (1984, 1986; Russell & Bullock, 1985, 1986) on children's 
and adults' categorisation of emotional facial expressions. 
The present results also indicate that although category membership was graded and 
category boundaries fuzzy for all age groups, children's categories tend to become 
less fuzzy as they grow older. This was shown in three different ways. 
Firstly, consensus among subjects about the emotion expressed in each excerpt tended 
to increase with age (at least up to the age of nine) regardless of whether consensus 
was defined as agreement with the adult or the age-group modal emotion choice. This 
finding supports Nelson and Nelson's (1978) hypothesis (cited in Alexander & Enns, 
1988) that decisions about category membership become more conventional (that is, 
increase in social consensus) as people grow older. 
Secondly, there was an age-related increase in the stability of category boundaries 
within individuals, again at least up until the age of 9. Because children were tested 
on two or three different days and adults at a single sitting, it might be argued that this 
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finding merely reflects procedural differences: children may simply have had more 
difficulty than adults in remembering the excerpts and their previous responses to 
them because of the greater time span separating tasks and their more limited memory 
capacity. However, the fact that the 9-year-olds were more consistent than the 7-year-
olds despite the same procedure being followed for the two groups, and that 9-year-
olds were no less consistent than adults despite experiencing a greater delay between 
tasks, tends to argue against this explanation. 
Therefore while a degree of caution is advisable in interpreting these findings, they 
do suggest that for 5- and 7-year-olds the fuzzy category boundaries seen in the group 
data were a result of their individual consistency across tasks as well as their lack of 
agreement with one another within a task, whereas the fuzzy category boundaries seen 
in the 9-year-old and adult group data were primarily the result of disagreement 
among individuals (although some intra-individual inconsistency remained). A 
similar age-related trend was found in Alexander and Enns' (1988) study of children's 
categorisation of a set oftoy animals whose group membership was ambiguous, 
although in their study individuals achieved intra-individual consistency at an earlier 
age. 
This question of intra-individual consistency is one which has not previously been 
investigated with regard to children's interpretation of emotion in music, despite the 
possibility of doing so: in the studies by Cunningham and Sterling (1988) and Kratus 
(1993) subjects responded to the same excerpts twice. The findings of this 
investigation suggest that these researchers' failure to examine the consistency of 
individual children's judgments is an important oversight, as examining the stability 
of individual judgments gives us information about changes in children's emotion 
concepts which is not obtained by simply comparing their responses with those of 
other individuals. 
A third converging source of evidence for decreasing fuzziness of category boundaries 
can be seen in the trend for children's categories to become narrower or more 
exclusive with age, in the sense that the number of emotion categories into which each 
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excerpt was placed decreased with age. Again, this finding is consistent with Bullock 
and Russell's ( 1986) research on the categorisation of emotional facial expressions. 
As Alexander and Enns (1988) point out, the notion of age-related changes in the 
fuzziness of children's category boundaries makes sense of the apparently paradoxical 
literature on children's lexical generalisation, some of which argues that children 
· typically overextend words, and some that they err by underextending words. A child 
with a fuzzy concept will both over- and under-extend that concept in comparison to 
individuals with a more clearly defined concept: on the one hand, they will 
overextend the concept to dissimilar exemplars; on the other, they will simultaneously 
be underextending the concept to similar exemplars. So, for instance, this study found 
a substantial proportion of 5-year-olds using 'sad' as a descriptor for excerpts 
classified by adults as expressing dissimilar emotions like happiness and excitement 
(overextension), and a correspondingly low proportion (compared with adults) using 
the term 'correctly'. Both of these tendencies decreased with age. 
As Alexander and Enns (1988) comment, what this·analysis suggests is that the 
concepts of younger children will share some features or properties with the concepts 
of older children and adults (accounting for the largely above-chance agreement with 
their categorisations), but that they will also contain some unique properties 
(accounting for overextension) and be missing some properties (accounting for 
underextension). Another way of looking at this is to consider a preschooler's 
prototype for a 'scared' piece of music, for instance, to share some features of the 
adult prototype, but also to exclude some features of the adult prototype and to 
include some features which are not part of the adult prototype. 
7.4.1. Systematic inaccuracies 
The idea that children's emotion concepts change slightly with age is consistent with 
the finding of this study thatthe majority of 5- and 7-year-olds chose an alternative 
emotional categorisation to that of adults for as many as a third of the excerpts 
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listened to, whereas 9-year-olds agreed with the adult emotion choice for 78% of the 
excerpts. 
In addition, the argument that children's concepts for some emotions are similar, but 
not equivalent to, those of adults can help to explain why excerpts identified by adults 
as happy tended to be interpreted by alarge proportion of children as excited, but not 
vice versa: when children disagreed with the adult categorisation of excited excerpts, 
their response was most likely to be scared. Viewed from the perspective of prototype 
theory, children tend to overextend the concept of excitement to include happy 
excerpts and to underextend it to excited excerpts, tending rather to label these as 
scared. This suggests that younger children's concept of excitement is something 
closer to happy than the adult meaning of the word. This interpretation is supported 
by the finding that for children (but not for adults) excited judgments were linked to 
consonant harmonies, which subjects of all ages associated with the expression of 
pleasant emotions. This interpretation is also consistent with previous research 
(Bullock & Russell, 1984, 1986; Manstead, 1993; Russell, 1990; Russell & 
Ridgeway, 1983; Trabasso, Stein & Johnson, 1981 in Stein & Jewett, 1984) 
suggesting that children tend to use the words 'excited' and 'surprised' to refer to 
positive events and facial expressions, whereas adults use them to refer to high arousal 
states which may be either positive or negative. 1 
Age-related changes in emotion concepts help to explain why the majority of 7-year-
olds interpreted the happy excerpts as excited, while the majority of 5-year-olds 
interpreted the excited excerpts as scared. What they do not explain, however, is why 
systematic tendencies to confuse particular emotions - sadness and calmness, 
happiness and excitement, fear and anger as well as fear and excitement - were found 
for all age groups. 
1 It is also possible that this tendency may have been encouraged by the smiling 'excited' facial 
expression - it is conceivable that children may have placed more weight on the pictures than the 
adults, who might have concentrated more on the meaning of the emotion words. 
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One of these systematic 'errors' - the confusion of fear and anger - has also been 
found in previous studies (Cunningham & Sterling, 1988; Meerum Terwogt & van 
Grinsven, 1988, 1991). Meerum Terwogt and van Grinsven (1991) have attempted to 
explain this finding in terms of limitations in children's perspective-taking ability: 
children, it is argued, have difficulty differentiating the emotion evoked in themselves 
by an angry piece of music (fear) from the emotion expressed in the music. 
Comments made by some of the 5-year-olds about excerpts which they classified as 
scared do lend some support to this hypothesis: " .. .like it's going to cut off your 
head" (excerpt 14); "sounds like a herd of elephants" (excerpt 2); "like a big monster 
stepping" (excerpt 10); here the judgment of fear presumably reflects the children's 
own response (the music is scary) rather than the emotion attributed to the monster, 
elephants, or aggressor. However, the finding that adults apparently often made the 
same 'mistake' suggests that it cannot be entirely attributed to children's cognitive 
egocentricity - particularly as recent research (Wellman et al., 1995) has suggested 
that even children as young as 2 can clearly distinguish between their own emotions 
and those of others, and accept that they can differ. Perhaps, then, it is more closely 
related to the music itself. In fact, several adults accounted for their difficulty in 
making the anger/fear distinction by explaining that some excerpts brought to mind a 
scene involving both an aggressor and a victim, a pursuer and a pursued. Their choice 
of emotion category therefore depended on which side they identified with - perhaps 
as a result of their personality or current mood. Support for this idea can be found in 
the open-ended emotional descriptions of the excerpts given by the pilot subjects: 
excerpt 14 ('The Fall of Saigon'), for example, evoked responses which included 
'dread' as well as 'strength' and 'assertiveness'. One could hypothesise that because 
of children's relative vulnerability and powerlessness compared to adults, given such 
a scenario they would be more likely to identify with the weaker or 'scared' party, 
perhaps explaining their higher base rates for using the label 'scared'. From this 
perspective, anger and fear categorisations represent alternative ways of interpreting a 
musical excerpt, rather than a correct response and an error. Unlike Meerum Terwogt 
and van Grinsven's hypothesis, this account is able to explain why scared excerpts are 
sometimes interpreted as angry, and not only vice versa: musical expressions of fear 
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and anger are not polar opposites, as Dolgin and Adelson (1990) suggest, but rather 
contain a number of features in common, and overlap to a substantial degree. 
The results of this investigation suggest that the same can be said of other pairs of 
emotions such as calmness and sadness, happiness and excitement, and fear and 
excitement. In particular, they provide support for the idea that emotion concepts are 
interrelated in a systematic fashion, with the degree of overlap between different 
emotions being explicable according to an underlying structure based on the 
dimensions of degree of pleasure and degree of activation (Russell, 1978, 1980, 1983, 
1991b; Russell & Bullock, 1985, 1986; Russell & Ridgeway, 1983). 
7.5. Dimensions 
The results of this study provide three converging sources of evidence for the 
contention that the dimensions of pleasure and activation are a fundamental aspect of 
the interpretation of emotions in music for both adults and children - a suggestion that 
has been supported by several previous studies (Asada & Ohgushi, 1991; Meerum 
Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1991; Wedin, 1972). 
Firstly, results on Task 1 showed that all three groups were able to distinguish 
between musical excerpts expressing similar degrees of pleasure while varying on the 
underlying dimension of degree of activation, and that they were most accurate at 
distinguishing the excerpts expressing sadness or calmness (low activation emotions, 
according to the structural model) from those expressing the other four emotions, 
which all fall into the high activation quadrants of the model. In addition, Task 2 
showed that (with the exception of 5-year-olds' distinction between calm and sad 
excerpts) subjects of all ages were able to distinguish between excerpts expressing 
similar degrees of activation on the basis of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the 
expressed emotions. This is consistent with Kratus's (1993) finding that 6- and 12-
year-old children could distinguish between happy and. sad music as well as between 
excited and calm music at well above chance levels. 
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A second source of evidence in favour of the dimensional approach to emotion 
concepts comes from the high correlations between the pilot subjects' pleasure and 
activation ratings of the musical excerpts on Mehrabian and Russell's (1974) semantic 
differential scales, and the emotion categories into which the excerpts were 
subsequently placed. Although this finding is perhaps not particularly surprising 
given that the semantic differential scales included distinctions such as happy-sad and 
excited-calm which were also used in the main study, they do support the idea that 
children and adults perceive emotions in music as varying in similarity in a systematic 
and quantitative way. 
Additional support for an analysis of emotion concepts in terms of underlying 
dimensions comes from an examination of the 'errors' made by subjects: those 
choices that did not conform to the adult standard tended to fall into the pattern that 
would be predicted on the basis of the circumplex model. In other words, they were 
more likely to be selections of emotions expressing similar degrees of pleasure and 
activation than any other choice. 
In fact, understanding subjects' emotion choices in terms of underlying dimensions 
can help to shed some light on the apparent discrepancies between this study and 
previous research (as well as between some of the previous studies themselves, and 
between the different tasks in this study) regarding the varying abilities of children to 
interpret particular emotions 'accurately'. From a dimensional perspective, children's 
performance on emotion detection tasks will vary according to the particular set of 
emotion labels with which they are provided as response alternatives: the closer these 
emotions fall to each other according to the structural model, the more difficult they 
will be to distinguish. The finding in this study that the relative consistency (that is, 
agreement with the adult modal choice) with which different emotions were identified 
in music varied from task to task is quite consistent with this idea: the 'accuracy' with 
which subjects identified musical expressions of particular emotions varied depending 
on the specific set of emotion categories with which they were provided as response 
alternatives. For example, calm and sad excerpts tended to be accurately identified 
more often than other excerpts on task 1, in which they had to be distinguished from 
147 
happy and excited, and angry and scared, excerpts respectively. However, they were 
identified correctly less often than all the other excerpts on task 2, which required 
subjects to differentiate calm and sad excerpts from each other. Similarly, angry and 
happy excerpts tended to be identified relatively well (compared to excerpts 
expressing other emotions) on task 2, which required that they be distinguished from 
each other. However, subjects were relatively poor at identifying excerpts expressing 
these states on tasks 1 and 3, where the response alternatives included emotions such 
as excitement and fear which fall much closer to happiness and anger respectively on 
the structural model. This finding supports Russell and Bullock's (1986) contention 
that children's superior performance for 'happy' stimuli in previous research might 
simply reflect the fact that in the majority of studies it is the only positive emotion 
included, and hence is maximally distinct from the other emotion categories provided 
(typically the three negative emotions of sadness, anger and fear). This might also 
help to explain why Kratus's (1993) 6-year-old subjects were no less consistent in 
their emotional categorisations of music than 12-year-olds: his subjects had only to 
choose between two emotions representing opposite poles of the pleasure and arousal 
dimensions, and may therefore have had an easier task than subjects who are 
presented with more closely overlapping emotions like anger and fear. 
The finding of this study that 'errors' were most often characterised by similarity 
along the dimension of activity (for example, the confusion of calm and sad excerpts 
with each other, rather than with happy and angry excerpts respectively) and that 
subjects' emotion judgments were more highly correlated with arousal than pleasure 
ratings on Mehrabian and Russell's (1974) scales is also consistent with previous 
research suggesting that the activity dimension is more salient than the pleasure 
dimension in distinguishing auditory expressions of emotion2 (Campbell, 1942; 
Dimitrovsky, 1964; Meerum Terwogt & van Grinsven, 1991; Scherer & Oshinsky, 
1977), and with theoretical arguments such as those ofHanslick (1891/1986) and 
Langer ( 1942) which contend that it is the motion or dynamic aspects of emotion that 
2 A similar tendency can be observed in the responses of the pilot subjects, who tended to agree on 
whether excerpts expressed low or high activation emotions, but sometimes disagreed about whether 
high-arousal excerpts were excited (positive) or agitated (negative), or whether low-arousal excerpts 
were peaceful or sad. 
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are best expressed in music. This salience of the activation dimension in interpreting 
musical expressions of emotion appears to contrast with the interpretation of facial 
expressions, where the pleasure-displeasure dimension may be more important 
(Felleman et al., 1983), and confusion of emotions expressing similar degrees of 
pleasure but different degrees of activation (for instance anger and sadness) is more 
common. / 
Despite the overall support for the dimensional approach to emotion concepts, 
however, this study also revealed two minor trends in the pattern of responses which 
were not consistent with what the structural model would predict. The tendency of 
younger children to interpret sad and calm excerpts as scared more often than the 
model would lead us to expect is in accordance with Bullock and Russell's 
unexpected finding in their 1984 study that subjects tended to apply a label of 'afraid' 
to the sad facial expression more often than.to the adjacent angry and disgusted facial 
expressions, as well as with Dolgin and Adelson' s (1990) finding that children tended 
to confuse frightened- and sad-sounding musical excerpts. A possible explanation for 
this finding has been provided by Meerum T erwogt and van Grinsven ( 1991 ), who 
point out that while there are prototypical types of fear which involve high arousal and 
motivate a person to act (to escape from the threatening situation), there are also 
others which blockevery activity and are immobilising (being "petrified" or 
"paralysed with fear"). These two different types of fear could fit in at two different 
places in the structural model, and the latter type may have more in common with the 
low activation emotions of sadness and calmness than with the high activation 
emotions of anger and excitement, particularly as fear and sadness also share the 
common feature of being low in potency or dominance (in other words, the subject is · 
in a weak position). 
The tendency of younger children to interpret angry excerpts as calm more frequently 
than would be expected is more difficult to explain. As is the case with fear, it might 
be that there are different prototypical types of anger. One adult subject in this study 
pointed out that anger can refer both to "fury" and to "anger kept inside". Scherer and 
Oshinsky (1977) have made asimilar distinction between "hot" and "cold" anger, and 
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argue that the two might be expressed by different combinations of acoustic cues. 
While it is possible, therefore, that 'cold' anger may be confused with low arousal 
emotions, it is not clear why 'calm' is chosen more often than 'sad', which has a 
closer resemblance to anger in terms ofhedonic tone. Perhaps it is simply the case 
that some younger children are unsure about the meaning of the term 'calm', and 
might have heard it used by a parent or teacher in the context of anger ("Calm 
down!"). Alternatively, because the calm facial expression was the most neutral in 
terms of the degree of pleasure expressed, perhaps younger children tended to select 
this expression for excerpts whose hedonic tone was neither clearly positive nor 
negative. 
These exceptions are relatively minor, and by no means invalidate the structural 
' 
model. Nevertheless, they do suggest that emotion categories may be interrelated in a 
way slightly more complicated than that captured by Bullock and Russell's (1984, 
1986) 2-dimensional model (perhaps incorporating other dimensions such as potency) 
and that a single emotion category might have different prototypical forms which take 
on slightly different positions in 2-dimensional space. A similar argument in favour 
of the idea that many emotions have several prototypes has been provided by 
Kovecses (1995). 
7.6. Directions for future research 
An important question which merits closer examination in future research concerns 
whether children are able to discriminate emotions in terms of broad dimensions 
before they are able to sort them into specific categories, or whether knowledge of 
categories and dimensions develops simultaneously, with children perhaps acquiring 
ideas about the degree of activation and pleasure implied by certain emotion concepts 
along with other features of the emotion script. Russell and Bullock's (1985, 1986; 
Russell, 1989) studies of children's interpretation of facial expressions have presented 
evidence that children as young as two or three can use dimensions to understand 
emotional expressions before they can categorise these expressions accurately. Since 
even the youngest subjects in this study were able to make quite reliable distinctions 
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between different emotion categories, we would have to study still younger children to 
determine whether their knowledge of emotion categories is preceded by knowledge 
of dimensions. 
In addition, there are numerous other factors that might contribute to the emotional 
connotations of music and which must still be systematically examined if we are to 
) 
refine our understanding of music's expression of emotion. These include the 
relationship between judgment and felt emotion: is it possible, for example, for adults 
and children to interpret a piece of music to represent extreme grief and yet be totally 
unmoved by it? If so, how? Other issues which require further study include the 
extent to which excerpts reflect more than one emotion, the effects of a person's 
current mood and of the order in which excerpts are heard, as well as of the social 
context of listening. In addition, although we have made some progress in this regard, 
a clear and full specification of the prototypical musical features associated with each 
emotion category still needs to be achieved - assuming that this daunting task is 
possible. Future research might also benefit from the inclusion of a structured set of 
probe questions designed to determine - in a more systematic way than was possible 
in this study - the basis of subjects' responses, although problems of children's limited 
vocabulary would need to be kept in mind. In addition, a wider variety of musical 
styles could be incorporated. Although the present study used more contemporary, 
popular and 'mundane' music than most previous investigations which have tended to 
concentrate on classical art music, numerous other musical styles including 
folk/ethnic music, rhythm and blues, heavy metal and so on deserve more specific 
focus in continuing investigations. In particular, it should be pointed out that although 
an effort was made in this study to select music that would be reasonably accessible to 
children, the excerpts still tended to be fairly complex and 'adult-centred' (Chris 
Wildman, personal communication, 12 December 1995). In other words, this study 
was investigating children's knowledge of the adult world and its music, rather than 
their interpretations of music specifically aimed at, or even created by, children. It is 
possible that the present results might had been different if simple traditional folk 
melodies or other, more 'child-centred' forms of music had been used. Finally, the 
question of what personal characteristics and experiences contribute to the ability to 
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interpret emotion in music also remains open, and future research might also attempt 
to address this issue. 
In fact, the range of influences which might potentially contribute to the meaning of 
music for listeners of different ages is almost infinite, and much remains to be learned. 
Significant progress is, however, being made, and this study represents one more 
contribution towards understanding how it is that musiC is able to convey emotions in 
ways that can be recognised by listeners, and how the ability to interpret emotions in 
music develops with increasing age. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In attempting to further our knowledge of how children's interpretation of emotion in 
music develops, this dissertation has presented theoretical arguments and 
experimental evidence which suggest that the conceptual network used by humans to 
understand emotion concepts involves fuzzy, prototypically organised categories 
related according to underlying dimensions of degree of pleasure and degree of 
activation or arousal. The application of this approach to the investigation of 
children's interpretation of emotion in music has provided some significant and 
meaningful findings that are not evident in results obtained in previous studies which 
have taken a more traditional approach to this issue, and simply evaluated children's 
responses as accurate or inaccurate against an adult standard. 
The evidence presented here suggests that this traditional approach is inadequate for 
two main reasons. Firstly, the assumption that a particular emotional categorisation of 
a musical excerpt - whether it is the judgment of a musical expert, or of the majority 
of adults - is objectively correct, and that emotional development involves a 
straightforward registering of this universal truth, has been shown to be problematic. 
Rather, the notion of fuzzy categories implies that the emotional 'meaning' of musical 
excerpts is always more-or-less ambiguous for ordinary listeners, and that more than 
one emotion label may be justifiably applied to a single excerpt. 
Secondly, it appears that simply evaluating children's performance as accurate or 
inaccurate against an adult norm may underestimate their ability to interpret emotional 
expressions in music: the evidence gathered here suggests that children's 
interpretation of emotion in music is quite systematic and meaningful, even though it 
is not exactly the same as that of adults. Children's so-called 'errors' are in fact not 
mistakes as such, but rather manifestations of their conceptual system. The major 
developmental change seen in this conceptual system is that as children grow older, so 
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their emotion categories become less fuzzy: that is, their emotion concepts become 
narrower, more specific and more exclusive, and the boundaries between different 
emotion concepts more stable. 
Even preschool children, however, are clearly aware of at least some of the 
conventional emotional meanings expressed through music. To what extent these 
associations between music and emotion are culture-bound is uncertain: although 
there may well be a universal, biological basis for some emotional connotations in 
sounds, it is also clear that the average 5-year-old today has already learnt much about 
the emotional connotations of music from its dramatic use in films and television and 
its association with particular kinds of situations. 
As Kratus (1993) points out; one implication of this finding for music teachers is that 
there is little need for them to teach primary school students to associate emotions 
with music, because they can already do this. On the other hand, descriptions like 
'happy music' and 'sad music' could be used effectively as starting points in teaching 
children about musical elements, because unlike technical labels such as pitch or 
major and minor, these are labels that children readily understand. 
The findings of this research also support the common-sense assumptions underlying 
the use of music to enhance (or occasionally reduce or ironically counter) the 
emotional qualities of words, actions or images in film and television dramas and 
commercials (Bruner, 1990; Radocy & Boyle, 1979), as well as to work diagnostically 
and therapeutically with people and their emotional problems (Behrens & Green, 
1993). Although music therapists who work with children should be aware that the 
emotional connotations of music tend to be more ambiguous for children than for 
adults, and hence avoid making assumptions about how a particular selection will be 
interpreted, music might be a particularly useful tool for helping young children who 
find it difficult to talk about their emotions to explore and express them nonverbally. 
What this dissertation does not intend to suggest, however, is that summing up or 
classifying musical excerpts with neat labels li~e happy, sad, or angry does justice 
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either to music as a means of emotional expression, or to those who appreciate it. The 
emotions conveyed by 'expressive' music are frequently complex, subtle, 
multifaceted and shifting; often they have a peculiar quality of their own which is only 
revealed by attending to the music itself, and which resists description in any words at 
all (Barwell, 1986). The fact that verbal labels are only a coarse approximation of 
what we perceive in music is a perennial problem when talking about it and the other 
arts, albeit one which might have to be accepted if we are to study the arts empirically. 
. . . 
Nevertheless, we should continue to seek other, nonverbal methods which can be used 
as alternatives or supplements. 
We also need to be careful of falling into the trap of believing that something is only 
fully understood when it can be expressed verbally: it may well be that music 
conveys the ambiguous, overlapping, fluid and dynamic nature of emotions better 
than words (Appleton, 1993; Langer, 1942; Mendelssohn, 1842 in Cooke, 1959; 
Osborne, 1982; Radocy & Boyle, 1979). After all, words, as we have seen, are merely 
labels for fuzzy categories: markers which help to make sense of, and allow us to 
communicate economically about, an almost infinite number of possible combinations 
of subjective feelings, cognitive appraisals, experiences, expressions, and so on, by 
focusing on their common features and indicating their most general character. And if 
·music can express the nature of emotions better than words, this raises the question of· 
whether it - and the other arts - might be able to stimulate children's perceptive, 
emotional and cognitive development by widening their understanding of the 
possibilities of human affect, and by helping them to make finer discriminations 
among their own feelings and those of others (Clynes, 1986; Gardner, 1983; Parsons, 
1982; Reimer, 1989). Parsons (1982), for example, has put forward the idea that an 
individual's ability to empathise with others might be more finely guided and 
stimulated by a good artist than by the less carefully structured interactions of social 
life. And the musicologist John Blacking (1987, p.118) has argued that 
The development of the senses and the education of the emotions through the 
arts are not merely desirable options. They are essential both for balanced 
action and the effective use of the intellect. 
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Such questions about the significance and pedagogical uses of music go far beyond 
the issues with which this dissertation has been concerned, and it did not even attempt 
to answer them. Indeed, after centuries of debate about music's continuing 
importance in human experience, it is quite possible that a simple and universally 
acceptable explanation of music's connection with emotion will never be found. 
Nevertheless, through. a combination of philosophical argument and empirical 
investigations that cut across the fields of psychology, linguistics, aesthetics, 
education, anthropology and of course also music itself, our knowledge of how we 
perceive and are affected by music gradually does seem to be expanding. This thesis 
represents one more step in that direction, carrying us a little further towards the goal 
of coming to a clear and complete understanding of how, during the course of 
development, we acquire knowledge about emotions, about music, and about the 
complex and fascinating relationship between the two. And in so doing, perhaps it 
will help to resolve a little of the confusion and controversy surrounding the scientific 
study of two of the most important, fundamental, and yet in many ways least 
understood aspects of what it means to be human. 
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Appendix 1: Semantic differential scales for hedonic 
tone and arousal (from Mehrabian & Russell, 1974) 
Instructions 
This study is concerned with how people perceive emotions expressed in music. You 
are going to hear 16 short musical excerpts. I would lik~ you to listen to each excerpt 
carefully, and then to rate it on the set of scales which you will find overleaf. In other 
words, you will rate the first musical excerpt on all the scales in set 1, the second 
musical excerpt on all the scales in set 2, and so on. 
Each of the scales contains a pair of adjectives separated by seven spaces. Some of 
the pairs might seem unusual or irrelevant to the music, but you will probably feel that 
one adjective describes the music better than the other. So, for each pair, you should 
put a cross close to the adjective which you feel describes the music better. The more 
appropriate the adjective seems, the closer you put your cross to it. You should place 
your cross in the middle space only if you consider the music to be neutral on that 
scale, or if the scale is completely irrelevant. 
~: 
1. Place your crosses in the middle of spaces, not on the boundaries. 
2. Please mark the scales in the order they appear. 
3. Be sure you mark every scale for every piece of music - do not leave any out. 
4. Do not put more than one cross on a single scale. 
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Please make each item a separate and independent judgment. Do not look back and 
forth through the items. You should work at fairly high speed, because it is your first 
impressions I want. On the other hand, please do not be careless, because I want your 
true impressions . 
. Scales utilised 
Hedonic tone 
contented ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 .•. 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... melancholic 
relaxed ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ..• 1 ... bored 
satisfied ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... unsatisfied 
pleased ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... annoyed 
happy ... 1 .. :1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... unhappy 
hopeful ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... despairing 
Arousal 
jittery ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... dull 
wide awake ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... sleepy 
frenzied ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... sluggish 
aroused ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... unaroused 
excited ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... calm 
stimulated ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... relaxed 
Following Mehrabian & Russell (1974), these 12 scales were combined and presented 
to subjects in random order, with half the scales reversed. 
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CALM: 
HAPPY: 
Appendix 2: Verbal expressions of emotion 
"It will be so peaceful. We shall listen to the birds and have a goat, 
and grow the best vegetables in Trentino." 
Adapted from Ibbotson, E. (1985). A Company of Swans (p. 56). 
New York: Avon Books. 
"Oh Danny. Didn't we have a glorious time! We did it, Danny. We 
pulled it off. That was the greatest time I've ever had in my whole 
life." 
Adapted from Dahl, R. (1975). Danny The Champion of the World 
pp. 141, 145). Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
EXCITED: "I wish tomorrow would come quickly. Suppose there is something 
really thrilling in that ruined building after all! Now I shan't be able to 
go to sleep tonight - I shall keep on and on thinking about tomorrow!" 
Adapted from Blyton, E. (1976). The Treasure Hunters (p. 131 ). 
London: William Collins Sons & Co. 
SCARED: "That man over there .... Don't let him see me! Oh, can't we tum back, 
please ... please .... He's come to take me back!" 
ANGRY: 
Adapted from Ibbotson, E. (1985). A Company' of Swans (p. 171). 
"How dare you, Harriet? How dare you argue with me! You will 
leave the table immediately and go to your room!" 
Adapted from Ibbotson, E. (1985). A Company of Swans (pp. 23-24). 
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SAD: "What I can't figure out is why the good things always end. I don't 
want to go. I don't want this to be over. I want to stay, Torey." 
Adapted from Hayden, T. L. (1980). One Child (p. 206). New York: 
Avon Books. 
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Appendix 3: Instructions to subjects (Task 1) 
Hello, my name is Lauren and I'm here today because I want to find out what children 
know about feelings. I'd like you to help me do this by playing some special games 
that I've brought with me. In the first game, we're going to listen to some music that 
has a feeling. Sometimes when we listen to music, music sounds happy, and 
sometimes it sounds calm or excited. Today I'm going to play you a tape of some 
music, and when you listen your job will be to decide whether the music sounds 
happy or calm or excited. Look at your answer sheet There are nine boxes. In each 
box there is a happy face, a calm face, and an excited face (show example). Can you 
point to the happy face in box 1? Can you point to the calm face in box 9? Can you 
point to the excited face in box 4? (Make sure that all the children are able to identify 
the faces in the proper boxes). I'm going to play you nine short pieces of music on 
the tape recorder. After you listen to each one, I want you to draw a circle round the 
face that you think best matches the feeling in the music. So if you think the first 
piece of music sounds happy, circle the happy face in box 1. If you think the music 
sounds calm, circle the calm face. If you think the music sounds excited, circle the 
excited face. Don't circle more than one face in the same box, and don't leave any 
boxes blank. If you change your mind about an answer, just cross out your old 
answer. This game has no right or wrong answers. I just want to know what ea.ch one 
of you thinks, so please don't look at anybody else's answers. Are there any 
questions? 
... This is the first piece of music. Listen to it carefully .... Now draw a circle around 
the face in box 1 that you think best matches the feeling in the music .... 
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Appendix 4: distribution of emotion choices by age and task (n = 30) 
0 6 24 24 5 1 . 2 25 1 0 0 
0 1 29 19 11 1 1 22 6 0 0 
0 1 29 .18 12 2 0 22 2 4 0 
10 10 10 17 13 5 3 6 10 3 3 
12 8 10 22 7 4 10 8 3 4 0 
7 1 22 26 4 1 14 13 1 1 0 
2 5 23 29 1 0 19 ·10 0 1 0 
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1 2 27 5 24 7 1 0 o· 0 .21 
0 0 30 7 23 3 1 0 0 0 26 
1 0 29 5 25 5 0 0 0 0 25 
17 7 6 13 17 15 1 2 1 1 10 
27 3 0 8 21 11 6 ·2 2· 0 8 
28 2 o· 10 20 25 0 0 1 0 4· 
29 1 0 14 16 24 6 
5 16 9 27 3 4 10 6 6 .3 1 
5 15 10 ,,. 29 0 3 13 O· 13 0 0 
9 21 0 30 0 . 0 21 7 0 0 2 
4 23 3 29 1 0 23 6 0 1 0 
17 7 6 19 11 12 . 6 ·2 1 5 4 
26 4 0 26 3 21 3 2 0 0 3 
27 3 0 29 1 26 2 0 0 0 1 
29 1 0 29 1 20 7 0 .0 0. ·3 
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21 6 2 6 23 1 0 2 13 13 0 
10 20 0 2 28 0 0 3 6 20 0 
11 19 0 0 30 0 0 1 8 21 .0 
15 .6 9 17 13 11 5 1 4 3 6 
2 1 27 28 1 16 1 1 1 0 10 
I 0 29 25 5 20 1 1 1 0 . 7. 
1 0 29 25 5 26 1 0 1 0-. 2 
5 6 . 19 23 7 2 13 7 2 3 3 
0 10 20 27 2 0 8 20 0 1 0 
0 22 8 30 0 0 14 16 0 0 ·0 
0 20 10 29 1 0 19 10 0 1 0 
14 12 4 6 ·24 1 1 2· 19 s· 2 
15 12 2 4 25 0 0 2 19 8 o. 
23 7 0 0 30 0 0 0 29 1 0 
28 1 1 1 29 .. 0. 0 2 28 0 0 
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2 0 28 20 8 15 1 o. 2 0 11 
0 0 30 13 17 10 2 0 0 0 18 
0 0 30 3 27 6 0 0 0 0 24 
6 5 19 5 25 8 4 4 5 3 6 
3 1 26 6 23. 13 0 1 4 0 11 
1 0 29 6 24 11 0 0 3 0 16 
1 1 28 21 9 13 4 1 1 0 11 
7 14 9 29 1 2 16 10 0 1 . 1 
3 7 19 29 0 0 7 21 l 0 0 
0 13 ·17 30 0 0 20 10 . 0 0 0 
0 25 5 30 0 0 20 10 0 0 0 
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11 18 1 19 10 0 1 1 14 13 0 
13 17 0 7 23 0 0 0 5 25 0 
4 25 1 4 26 0 0 1 6 23 0 
6 18 6 16 14 7 4 0 11 6 2 
12 17 1 9 20 2 1 6 7 13 ·O 
3 27 0 1 29 0 1 5 23 1 0 
3 26 0 2 28 0 1 6" 10 13 0 
5 12 13 21 9 5 6 11 2 2 4 
1 27 2 25 4 5 7 10 2 4· 1 
1 27 2 30 0 3 17 10 0 0 0 
0 29 1 30 0 0 20 10 0 0 0 
17 7 6 18 12 4 2 7 9 5 3 
21 7 2 10 19 2 3 2 15 7 0 
18 11 1 23 7 1 1 7· 14 7 0 
22 8 0 . 26 4 0 2 16 8 4 0 
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Appendix 5: Summaries of ANOV As for accuracy 
scores (comparison with adult mode) on the three 
music tasks 
Taskl 
Source of variation SS 
Between-subjects 
Age (A) 13.444 
Error-between 14.270 
Within-subjects 
Emotion (E) 7.899 
AxE 2.959 
Error-within 33.016 
* Indicates significant at a= 0.05 
Task2 
Source of variation 
Between-subjects 
Age(A) 
Error-between 
Within-subjects 
Emotion (E) 
AxE 
Error-within 
SS 
5.378 
6.002 
3.451 
0.842 
21.588 
* Indicates significant at a = 0.05 
df 
3 
116 
5 
15 
580 
df 
3 
115 
5 
15 
575 
MS 
4.481 
0.123 
1.580 
0.197 
0.057 
MS 
1.793 
0.052 
0.690 
0.056 
0.038 
F 
36.429 
27.753 
3.465 
F 
34.350 
18.386 
1.494 
p 
<0.000* 
< 0.000* 
< 0.000* 
p 
< 0.000* 
<0.000* 
0.102 
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Task3 
Source of variation 
Between-subjects 
Age (A) 
Error-between 
Within-subjects 
Emotion (E) 
AxE 
Error-within 
SS 
10.627 
14.528 
10.246 
1.446 
49.723 
*Indicates significant at a= 0.05 
df 
3 
115 
5 
15 
575 
MS 
3.542 
0.126 
2.049 
0.096 
0.086 
F 
28.040 
23.696 
1.114 
p 
< 0.000* 
< 0.000* 
0.339 
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Appendix 6: Correlations between musical 
elements and emotional categorisations for each age 
group separately (task 3) 
AGE 
EMOTION MUSICAL 5yrs 7yrs 9yrs 
ELEMENTS 
CALM Tempo -0.59* -0.76* -0.65* 
Rhythm -0.75* -0.79* -0.78* 
Rhythmic -0.53* -0.66* -0.54* 
activity 
Articulation -0.53* -0.66* -0.50* 
Harmony -0.38 -0.39 -0.36 
Modality 0.01 -0.17 0.12 
HAPPY Tempo 0.27 0.38 0.43 
Rhythm 0.25 0.25 0.37 
Rhythmic 0.22 0.28 0.31 
activity 
Articulation 0.39 0.27 0.38 
Harmony -0.59* -0.63* -0.57* 
Modality 0.47 0.65* 0.51 
EXCITED Tempo 0.71 * 0.69* 0.81 * 
Rhythm 0.59* 0.56* 0.63* 
Rhythmic 0,61 * 0.61 * 0.73* 
activity 
Articulation 0.55* 0.46 0.45 
Harmony -0.19 -0.36 -0.27 
Modality 0.55 0.52 0.49 
Adult 
-0.68* 
-0.82* 
-0.60* 
-0.49* 
-0.34 
0.10 
0.41 
0.36 
0.30 
037 
-0.59* 
0.54* 
0.85* 
0.64* 
0.80* 
0.54* 
-0.00 
0.42 
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AGE 
EMOTION MUSICAL 5yrs 7yrs 9yrs Adult 
ELEMENTS 
SCARED Tempo 0.40 0.27 0.36 0.30 
Rhythm 0.44 0.40 0.32 0.27 
Rhythmic 0.43 0.32 0.41 0.33 
activity 
Articulation 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.39 
Harmony 0.68* 0.85* 0.71* 0.74* 
Modality -0.18 -0.51 -0.42 -0.42 
ANGRY Tempo 0.12 0.29 0.02 0.09 
Rhythm 0.53* 0.59* 0.43 0.53* 
Rhythmic 0.21 0.35 0.09 0.16 
activity 
Articulation 0.28 0.43 0.24 0.25 
Harmony 0.51 * 0.69* 0.53* 0.51 * 
Modality -0.16 -0.29 -0.18 -0.33 
SAD Tempo -0.67* -0.80* -0.75* -0.69* 
Rhythm -0.79* -0.87* -0.73* -0.67* 
Rhythmic -0.71 * -0.83* -0.80* -0.72* 
activity 
Articulation -0.83* -0.81 *. -0.82* -0.82* 
Harmony -0.11 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 
Modality -0.59* -0.60* -0.74* -0.73* 
·PLEASANT Tempo 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.25 
Rhythm -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
Rhythmic 0.12 0.16 0.20' 0.20 
activity 
Articulation 0.21 0.02 0.12 0.19 
Harmony -0.72* -0.85* -0.84* -0.76* 
Modality 0.72* 0.84* 0.95* 0.93* 
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AGE 
EMOTION MUSICAL 5yrs 7yrs 9yrs Adult 
ELEMENTS 
ACTIVE Tempo 0.74* 0.86* 0.87* 0.86* 
Rhythm 0.91 * 0.92* 0.94* 0.94* 
Rhythmic 0.74* 0.82* 0.83* 0.82* 
activity 
Articulation 0.82* 0.81 * 0.81 * 0.81* 
Harmony 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.26 
Modality 0.43 0.44 0.37 0.40 
* Indicates significant at a = 0.05 
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Appendix 7: Glossary of musical terms 
CONSONANCE: An accord of sounds agreeable and satisfying to the ear 
DISSONANCE: The sounding together of notes which produce a discord or disturb 
the ear· 
HARMONICS: The secondary sounds resonating (often barely audibly) at fixed 
intervals above the fundamental or principle tone 
HARMONY: A combination of notes sounded simultaneously to produce a chord 
LARGO: Slow 
LEGATO: Notes are connected in a close, smooth, graceful manner 
MAJOR SCALE/MODE: An eight-note scale consisting of a succession of whole-
tone gaps except for a semitone between the third and fourth degrees and 
between the seventh and eighth degrees; that mode or scale in which the interval 
between the first and third notes comprises two whole tones or steps 
(See also mode, scale, semitone, tone) 
MELODY: A succession of notes of varying pitch and rhythm which carry the 'tune' 
or dominant theme 
MINOR SCALE/MODE:. As the major scale, but with a semitone introduced between 
the second and third degrees and between the sixth and seventh degrees, with 
slight variations in certain formations; that scale or mode in which the interval 
between the first and third notes consists of one-and-a-half tones 
(See also mode, scale, semitone, tone) 
METER: The pattern of successive rhythmic pulses produced by notes of similar or 
varying length within a bar 
MODE: The arrangement of notes in a scale; the scale used to develop harmony, e.g. 
major, minor, doric, plagal (See also scale, harmony) 
OVERTONES: See HARMONICS 
PITCH: The height or depth of a sound, determined by the frequency or rate of 
vibration of the voice or instrument 
PRESTO: Fast 
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RHYTHM: The systematic grouping of musical notes within a pattern which 
establishes their relationships with one another in time 
SCALE: A ladder of ascending or descending successive notes 
SEMITONE: A half-sized step between two notes, as between C and C sharp 
STACCATO: Notes are detached, distinct, separated from each other 
TEMPO: The pace or speed at which a piece of music is played; the rapidity at which 
the natural rhythmic accents follow each other 
TIMBRE: Tone colour; the quality of the sound produced by different voices or 
instruments 
TONE: An interval of a major second; the whole step between two notes, as between 
CandD 
[Information drawn from Burke's (1988) and Elson's (1905) music dictionaries and 
definitions provided by Peters (1990)]. 
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